



JEODS4

SMARTBOOK

Fourth Edition

**Joint Doctrine
Fundamentals**

**Joint
Operations**

**Joint Operation
Planning**

**Joint
Logistics**

**Joint Task Forces
(JTFs)**

**Information
Operations**

**Multinational
Operations**

**Interorganizational
Coordination**



joint forces

OPERATIONS&DOCTRINE

Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

The Lightning Press
Norman M Wade



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Lakeland, FL 33813

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Fourth Edition

(JFODS4) The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook

Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

This is the fourth revised edition of The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, designed for use by ALL SERVICES and JOINT FORCES across the tactical, operational and strategic levels of war. In addition to the current editions of JP 3-0 Joint Operations (Aug '11) and JP 5-0 Joint Operation Planning (Aug '11), JFODS4 incorporates the full scope of new material from JP 1 Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States (Mar '13), JP 3-08 Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations (Jun '11), JP 3-13 Information Operations (Nov '14), JP 3-16 Multinational Operations (Jul '13), JP 3-33 Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jun '12), JP 3-60 Joint Targeting (Jan '13), and JP 4-0 Joint Logistics (Oct '13).

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ISBN: 978-1-935886-65-5

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
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Printed and bound in the United States of America.



(JFODS4) Notes to Reader

Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interorganizational Operations

The nature of the challenges to the United States and its interests demand that the Armed Forces operate as a fully integrated joint team across the range of military operations. The synergy that results from the integration and synchronization of Service components' capabilities under a single joint force commander maximizes the effectiveness and efficiency of the force.

Military operations vary in scope, purpose, and conflict intensity across a range that extends from military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities to crisis response and limited contingency operations and, if necessary, to major operations and campaigns.

Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders and their subordinate joint force commanders in response to contingencies and crises.

Achieving national strategic objectives requires effective unified action resulting in unity of effort -- to include interagency, intergovernmental, nongovernmental and multinational partners. This is accomplished by collaboration, synchronization, and coordination in the use of the diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power.


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
Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 1*	Mar 2013	Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0	Aug 2011	Joint Operations
JP 3-08*	Jun 2011	Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations
JP 3-13*	Nov 2014	Information Operations (with Change 1)
JP 3-16*	Jul 2013	Multinational Operations
JP 3-33*	Jul 2012	Joint Task Force Headquarters
JP 3-60*	Jan 2013	Joint Targeting
JP 4-0*	Oct 2013	Joint Logistics
JP 5-0	Aug 2011	Joint Operation Planning

Other Publications and Manuals

CJCSM 3122.05*	Dec 11	Operating Procedures for Joint Operation Planning and Execution System (JOPES) (Current as of 18 Nov 2014)
CJCSM 3130.01A*	Nov 14	Campaign Planning Procedures & Responsibilities
CJCSM 3500.03E*	Apr 15	Joint Training Manual for the Armed Forces of the United States
ADP 3-0	Oct 11	Unified Land Operations (Army)
AFDD1	Oct 11	Air Force Basic Doctrine

* New/updated references in this edition.



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Chap 1

I. Joint Doctrine Theory & Foundations

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), chap. I.

Joint Publication 1 provides overarching guidance and fundamental principles for the employment of the Armed Forces of the United States. It is the capstone publication of the US joint doctrine hierarchy and it provides an overview for the development of other joint service doctrine publications. It is a bridge between policy and doctrine and describes authorized command relationships and authority that military commanders use and other operational matters derived from Title 10, United States Code (USC).

I. Fundamentals

The purpose of joint doctrine is to enhance the operational effectiveness of joint forces by providing fundamental principles that guide the employment of US military forces toward a common objective. With the exception of Joint Publication (JP) 1, joint doctrine will not establish policy. However, the use of joint doctrine standardizes terminology, training, relationships, responsibilities, and processes among all US forces to free joint force commanders (JFCs) and their staffs to focus their efforts on solving strategic, operational, and tactical problems. Using historical analysis of the employment of the military instrument of national power in operations and contemporary lessons, these fundamental principles represent what is taught, believed, and advocated as what works best to achieve national objectives.

Jointness and the Joint Force

The Armed Forces of the United States conduct military operations as a joint force. "Joint" connotes activities in which elements of two or more Military Departments participate. Joint matters relate to the integrated employment of US military forces in joint operations, including matters relating to:

- National military strategy (NMS)
- Deliberate and crisis action planning
- Command and control (C2) of joint operations
- Unified action with Department of Defense and interagency partners

The capacity of the Armed Forces of the United States to operate as a cohesive joint team is a key advantage in any operational environment. Unity of effort facilitates decisive unified action focused on national objectives and leads to common solutions to national security challenges.

The Armed Forces of the United States have embraced "jointness" as their fundamental organizing construct at all echelons. Jointness implies cross-Service combination wherein the capability of the joint force is understood to be synergistic, with the sum greater than its parts (the capability of individual components). Some shared military activities are less joint than are "common;" in this usage "common" simply means mutual, shared, or overlapping capabilities or activities between two or more Services.

II. War

War can result from failure of states to resolve their disputes by diplomatic means. Some philosophers see it as an extension of human nature. Thomas Hobbes stated that man's nature leads him to fight for personal gain, safety, or reputation. Thucydides said nearly the same thing in a different order, citing fear, honor, and interest as the common causes for interstate conflict.

Individuals, groups, organizations, cultures, and nations all have interests. Inevitably, some of those interests conflict with the interests of other individuals, groups, organizations, cultures, and nations. Nearly all international and interpersonal relationships are based on power and self-interests manifested through politics. Nations exercise their power through diplomatic, informational, military, and economic means. All forms of statecraft are important, but as the conflicts approach the requirement for the use of force to achieve that nation's interests, military means become predominant and war can result. The emergence of non-state actors has not changed this concept. Non-state actors may not use statecraft as established; however, they do coerce and threaten the diplomatic power of other nations and have used force, terrorism, or support to insurgency to compel a government to act or refrain from acting in a particular situation or manner or to change the government's policies or organization.

See facing page for discussion of forms of warfare.

The Principles of War

War is socially sanctioned violence to achieve a political purpose. War historically involves nine principles -- objective, offensive, mass, economy of force, maneuver, unity of command, security, surprise, and simplicity -- collectively and classically known as the principles of war. The basic nature of war is immutable, although warfare evolves constantly.

The application of these classic "Principles of War" in the conduct of joint operations is amplified and expanded in JP 3-0, Joint Operations. See p. 2-2.

Strategy in War

The two fundamental strategies in the use of military force are strategy of annihilation and strategy of erosion. The first is to make the enemy helpless to resist us, by physically destroying his military capabilities. This has historically been characterized as annihilation or attrition. It requires the enemy's incapacitation as a viable military force. The second approach is to convince the enemy that accepting our terms will be less painful than continuing to aggress or resist. This can be characterized as erosion, using military force to erode the enemy leadership's or the enemy society's political will. In such an approach, we use military force to raise the costs of resistance higher than the enemy is willing to pay. We use force in this manner in pursuit of limited political goals that we believe the enemy leadership will ultimately be willing to accept.

Particularly at the higher levels, waging war should involve the use of all instruments of national power that one group can bring to bear against another (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). While the military focuses on the use of military force, we must not consider it in isolation from the other instruments of national power.

III. Strategic Security Environment and National Security Challenges

The strategic security environment is characterized by uncertainty, complexity, rapid change, and persistent conflict. This environment is fluid, with continually changing alliances, partnerships, and new national and transnational threats constantly appearing and disappearing. While it is impossible to predict precisely how challenges will emerge and what form they might take, we can expect that uncertainty, ambiguity, and surprise will dominate the course of regional and global events. In addition to traditional conflicts to include emerging peer competitors, significant and emerging challenges continue to include irregular threats, adversary propaganda, and other information activities directly targeting our civilian leadership and population, catastrophic terrorism employing weapons of mass destruction (WMD), and other threats to disrupt our ability to project power and maintain its qualitative edge.

The strategic security environment presents broad national security challenges likely to require the employment of joint forces in the future. They are the natural products of the enduring human condition, but they will exhibit new features in the future. All

IV. Instruments of National Power (DIME)

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), pp. I-11 to I-14.

The ability of the United States to achieve its national strategic objectives is dependent on the effectiveness of the US Government (USG) in employing the instruments of national power. The appropriate governmental officials, often with National Security Council (NSC) direction, normally coordinate these instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic). They are the tools the United States uses to apply its sources of power, including its culture, human potential, industry, science and technology, academic institutions, geography, and national will.

At the President's direction through the interagency process, military power is integrated with the other instruments of national power to advance and defend US values, interests, and objectives. To accomplish this integration, the armed forces interact with the other responsible agencies to ensure mutual understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military and civilian actions. They also identify the ways in which military and nonmilitary capabilities best complement each other. The NSC plays key roles in the integration of all instruments of national power facilitating mutual understanding, cooperation, and integration of effort. This process of different USG agencies and organizations coordinating and working together is called "interagency coordination." The use of the military to conduct combat operations should be a last resort when the other instruments of national power have failed to achieve our nation's objectives.

Instruments of National Power

D Diplomatic	I Informational	M Military	E Economic
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Embassies/ Ambassadors Recognition Negotiations Treaties Policies International forums 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military information Public diplomacy Public affairs Communications resources International forums Spokespersons, timing, media and venues for announcements 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Military operations Engagement, Security Coop, Deterrence Show of force Military technology Size, composition of force 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> Trade policies Fiscal and monetary policies Embargoes Tariffs Assistance

D - Diplomacy

Diplomacy is the principal instrument for engaging with other states and foreign groups to advance US values, interests, and objectives. The Department of State (DOS) is the lead agency for the USG for foreign affairs. The credible threat of force reinforces, and in some cases, enables the diplomatic process. Leaders of the Armed Forces of the United States have a responsibility to understand US foreign policy and to assure that those responsible for US diplomacy have a clear understanding of the capabilities, limitations, and consequences of military action. Geographic combatant commanders (GCCs) are responsible for integrating military activities with diplomatic activities in their areas of responsibility (AORs). The US ambassador and the corresponding country team are normally in charge of diplomatic-military activities in countries abroad. When directed by the President or Secretary of Defense (SecDef), the GCC employs military forces in concert

with the other instruments of national power. In these circumstances, the US ambassador and the country team or another diplomatic mission team may have complementary activities (employing the diplomatic instrument) that do not entail control of military forces, which remain under command authority of the GCC. Since diplomatic efforts are often complementary with military objectives, planning should be complementary and coincidental.

I - Information

In a broad sense, the informational instrument of national power has a diffuse and complex set of components with no single center of control. The United States believes in the free market place of ideas. Therefore, information is freely exchanged with minimal government controls. Constraints on public access to USG information normally may be imposed only for national security and individual privacy reasons. Information readily available from multiple sources influences domestic and foreign audiences including citizens, adversaries, and governments. It is important for the official agencies of government, including the armed forces, to recognize the fundamental role of the media as a conduit of information.

The USG uses strategic communication (SC) to provide top-down guidance relative to using the informational instrument of national power in specific situations. SC is focused USG processes and efforts to understand and engage key audiences to create, strengthen, or preserve conditions favorable to advancing national interests and objectives through the use of coordinated information, themes, messages, and products synchronized with the actions of all instruments of national power. SC's primary communication capabilities are coupled with defense support to public diplomacy (DSPD) and military diplomacy activities to implement a holistic SC effort.

The predominant military activities that support SC themes and messages are information operations (IO), public affairs (PA), and DSPD. IO are those military actions to attack an adversary's information and related systems while defending our own. PA are those public information, command information, and community relations activities directed toward both the external and internal publics with interest in the Department of Defense. DSPD comprises those activities and measures taken by DOD components to support and facilitate USG public diplomacy efforts.

M - Military

The purpose of the Armed Forces is to fight and win the Nation's wars. As the military instrument of national power, the Armed Forces must ensure their adherence to US values, constitutional principles, and standards for the profession of arms. The United States wields the military instrument of national power at home and abroad in support of its national security goals in a variety of military operations.

E - Economy


The United States free market economy is only partially controlled by governmental agencies. In keeping with US values and constitutional imperatives, individuals and entities have broad freedom of action worldwide. The responsibility of the USG lies with facilitating the production, distribution, and consumption of goods and services worldwide. A strong US economy with free access to global markets and resources is a fundamental engine of the general welfare, the enabler of a strong national defense, and an influence for economic expansion by US trade partners worldwide.

The USG's financial management ways and means support the economic instrument of national power. The Department of the Treasury, as the steward of US economic and financial systems, is an influential participant in the international economy. In the international arena, the Department of the Treasury works with other federal agencies, the governments of other nations, and the international financial institutions to encourage economic growth, raise standards of living, and predict and prevent, to the extent possible, economic and financial crises.

III. Strategy, Planning, and Resourcing

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), p. II-3 to II-6.

Military planning consists of joint strategic planning with its three subsets: security cooperation planning, force planning, and joint operation planning. Regarding force planning for the future, DOD conducts capabilities-based planning (CBP). The essence of CBP is to identify capabilities that adversaries could employ against the US or a multinational opponent and to defend themselves; identify capabilities, US and multinational, that could be available to the joint or combined force to counter/defeat the adversary; and then identify and evaluate possible outcomes (voids or opportunities), rather than forecasting (allocating) forces against specific threat scenarios. Integral to a capabilities-based approach are joint capability areas (JCAs), DOD's capability management language and framework. (National planning documents, fig. II-1, below.)



See pp. 3-3 to 3-18 for further discussion of "strategic direction."

Combatant Commands (CCMDs)

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), pp. I-10, I-14, and III-12 to III-15. *Unified Command Plan 2011, Change 1* (dated Sept '11).

In accordance with the UCP, combatant commands are established by the President, through the SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified commands may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by the SecDef through the CJCS. JTFs can be established by the SecDef, a CCDR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

Geographic Combatant Commanders are assigned a geographic AOR by the President with the advice of the SecDef as specified in the UCP. Functional CCDRs support GCCs, conduct operations in direct support of the President or the SecDef normally in coordination with the GCC in whose AOR the operation will be conducted, and may be designated by the SecDef as the supported CCDR for an operation.

See pp. 1-35 to 1-42 for further discussion of joint forces organization, roles and responsibilities, to include unified commands.

Geographic Combatant Commanders (GCCs)

GCCs are the vital link between those who determine national security policy and strategy and the military forces or subordinate JFCs that conduct military operations within their geographical AORs. GCCs are responsible for a large geographical area requiring single responsibility for effective coordination of the operations within that area. Directives flow from the President and SecDef through CJCS to the GCCs, who plan and conduct the operations that achieve national, alliance, or coalition strategic objectives. GCCs provide guidance and direction through strategic estimates, command strategies, and plans and orders for the employment of military force. As military force may not achieve national objectives, it must be coordinated, synchronized, and if appropriate, integrated with OGAs, IGOs, NGOs, MNFs, and elements of the private sector.

Six combatant commanders have geographic area responsibilities. These combatant commanders are each assigned an area of responsibility (AOR) by the Unified Command Plan (UCP) and are responsible for all operations within their designated areas: U.S. Northern Command, U.S. Central Command, U.S. European Command, U.S. Pacific Command, U.S. Southern Command and U.S. Africa Command.



U.S. Northern Command
www.northcom.mil

USNORTHCOM was established Oct. 1, 2002 to provide command and control of Department of Defense (DoD) homeland defense efforts and to coordinate defense support of civil authorities. USNORTHCOM defends America's homeland — protecting our people, national power, and freedom of action.

USNORTHCOM plans, organizes and executes homeland defense and civil support missions, but has few permanently assigned forces. The command is assigned forces whenever necessary to execute missions, as ordered by the president and secretary of defense.



U.S. Pacific Command
www.pacom.mil

USPACOM encompasses about half the earth's surface, stretching from the west coast of the U.S. to the western border of India, and from Antarctica to the North Pole. The 36 nations that comprise the Asia-Pacific region are home to more than fifty percent of the world's population, three thousand different languages, several of the world's largest militaries, and five nations allied with the U.S. through mutual defense treaties.

USPACOM protects and defends, in concert with other U.S. Government agencies, the territory of the United States, its people, and its interests. With allies and partners, USPACOM is committed to enhancing stability in

IV. Joint Command Organizations

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), chap. IV.

Joint forces are established at three levels: unified commands, subordinate unified commands, and JTFs. In accordance with the National Security Act of 1947 and Title 10, USC, and as described in the UCP, CCMDs are established by the President, through SecDef, with the advice and assistance of the CJCS. Commanders of unified CCMDs may establish subordinate unified commands when so authorized by SecDef through the CJCS. JTFs can be established by SecDef, a CCDR, subordinate unified commander, or an existing JTF commander.

See pp. 1-29 to 1-34 for discussion of the UCP, the six geographic combatant commands, and the three functional combatant commands.

Joint Commands



Unified Combatant Command



Specified Combatant Command

(There are currently no specified CCMDs designated.)



Subordinate Unified Command



Joint Task Force (JTF)

Basis for Establishing Joint Forces

Joint forces can be established on either a geographic area or functional basis:

Geographic Area

Establishing a joint force on a geographic area basis is the most common method to assign responsibility for continuing operations. The title of the areas and their delineation are prescribed in the establishing directive. Note: Only GCCs are assigned AORs. GCCs normally assign subordinate commanders an operational area from within their assigned AOR.

- The UCP contains descriptions of the geographic boundaries assigned to GCCs. These geographic AORs do not restrict accomplishment of assigned missions; CCDRs may operate forces wherever required to accomplish their missions. The UCP provides that, unless otherwise directed by SecDef, when significant operations overlap the boundaries of two GCCs' AORs, a JTF will be formed. Command of this JTF will be determined by SecDef and forces transferred to the JTF commander through a CCDR, including delegation of appropriate command authority over those forces.
- Each GCC and subordinate JFC will be kept apprised of the presence, mission, movement, and duration of stay of transient forces within the operational area.

B. Operational Control (OPCON)

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), pp. V-6 to V-7.

OPCON is the command authority that may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCMD and may be delegated within the command.

Basic Authority

OPCON is able to be delegated from a lesser authority than COCOM. It is the authority to perform those functions of command over subordinate forces involving organizing and employing commands and forces, assigning tasks, designating objectives, and giving authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training necessary to accomplish the mission. It should be delegated to and exercised by the commanders of subordinate organizations; normally, this authority is exercised through subordinate JFCs, Service, and/or functional component commanders. OPCON provides authority to organize and employ commands and forces as the commander considers necessary to accomplish assigned missions. It does not include authoritative direction for logistics or matters of administration, discipline, internal organization, or unit training. These elements of COCOM must be specifically delegated by the CCCR. OPCON does include the authority to delineate functional responsibilities and operational areas of subordinate JFCs. Commanders of subordinate commands, including JTFs, will be given OPCON of assigned forces and OPCON or TACON of attached forces by the superior commander. OPCON includes the authority for the following:

- Exercise or delegate OPCON and TACON or other specific elements of authority and establish support relationships among subordinates, and designate coordinating authorities.
- Give direction to subordinate commands and forces necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command, including authoritative direction over all aspects of military operations and joint training.
- Prescribe the chain of command to the commands and forces within the command.
- With due consideration for unique Service organizational structures and their specific support requirements, organize subordinate commands and forces within the command as necessary to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Employ forces within the command, as necessary, to carry out missions assigned to the command.
- Assign command functions to subordinate commanders.
- Plan for, deploy, direct, control, and coordinate the actions of subordinate forces.
- Establish plans, policies, priorities, and overall requirements for the ISR activities of the command.
- Conduct joint training exercises required to achieve effective employment of the forces of the command, in accordance with joint doctrine established by the CJCS, and establish training policies for joint operations required to accomplish the mission. This authority also applies to forces attached for purposes of joint exercises and training.
- Suspend from duty and recommend reassignment of any officer assigned to the command.
- Assign responsibilities to subordinate commanders for certain routine operational matters that require coordination of effort of two or more commanders.
- Establish an adequate system of control for local defense and delineate such operational areas for subordinate commanders as deemed desirable.
- Delineate functional responsibilities and geographic operational areas of subordinate commanders.

SecDef may specify adjustments to accommodate authorities beyond OPCON in an establishing directive when forces are transferred between CCRDs or when members and/or organizations are transferred from the Military Departments to a CCMD.

C. Tactical Control (TACON)

TACON is an authority over assigned or attached forces or commands, or military capability or forces made available for tasking, that is limited to the detailed direction and control of movements and maneuvers within the operational area necessary to accomplish assigned missions or tasks assigned by the commander exercising OPCON or TACON of the attached force.

Basic Authority

TACON is able to be delegated from a lesser authority than OPCON and may be delegated to and exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the level of CCMd.

TACON provides the authority to:

- Give direction for military operations; and
- Control designated forces (e.g., ground forces, aircraft sorties, or missile launches).

TACON does not provide the authority to give or change the function of the subordinate commander. TACON provides sufficient authority for controlling and directing the application of force or tactical use of combat support assets within the assigned mission or task. TACON does not provide organizational authority or authoritative direction for administrative and logistic support. Functional component commanders typically exercise TACON over military capability or forces made available for tasking.

II. Support

Support is a command authority. A support relationship is established by a common superior commander between subordinate commanders when one organization should aid, protect, complement, or sustain another force. The support command relationship is used by SecDef to establish and prioritize support between and among CCMds, and it is used by JFCs to establish support relationships between and among subordinate commanders.

Basic Authority

Support may be exercised by commanders at any echelon at or below the CCMd level. The designation of supporting relationships is important as it conveys priorities to commanders and staffs that are planning or executing joint operations. The support command relationship is, by design, a somewhat vague but very flexible arrangement. The establishing authority (the common JFC) is responsible for ensuring that both the supported commander and supporting commanders understand the degree of authority that the supported commander is granted.

The supported commander should ensure that the supporting commanders understand the assistance required. The supporting commanders will then provide the assistance needed, subject to a supporting commander's existing capabilities and other assigned tasks. When a supporting commander cannot fulfill the needs of the supported commander, the establishing authority will be notified by either the supported commander or a supporting commander. The establishing authority is responsible for determining a solution.

An establishing directive normally is issued to specify the purpose of the support relationship, the effect desired, and the scope of the action to be taken.

- The forces and resources allocated to the supporting effort;
- The time, place, level, and duration of the supporting effort;
- The relative priority of the supporting effort;
- The authority, if any, of the supporting commander to modify the supporting effort in the event of exceptional opportunity or an emergency; and
- The degree of authority granted to the supported commander over the supporting effort.

III. Joint Functions

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Aug '11), chap. III.

Joint functions are related capabilities and activities grouped together to help JFCs integrate, synchronize, and direct joint operations. Functions that are common to joint operations at all levels of war fall into six basic groups—C2, intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment. Some functions, such as C2 and intelligence, apply to all operations. Others, such as fires, apply as the JFC's mission requires. A number of subordinate tasks, missions, and related capabilities help define each function, and some could apply to more than one joint function.

Joint Functions



Command and Control



Intelligence



Fires



Movement and Maneuver



Protection



Sustainment

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, chap. III.

The joint functions reinforce and complement one another, and integration across the functions is essential to mission accomplishment. The OPLAN or OPORD describes how the JFC uses military capabilities (i.e., organizations, people, and systems) to perform tasks associated with each joint function. However, forces and other assets are not characterized by the functions for which the JFC is employing them. Individual Service capabilities often can support multiple functions simultaneously or sequentially while the joint force is executing a single task. Just as component commanders integrate activities across functions to accomplish tasks and missions, the JFC and staff do likewise for the joint force. The synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of military operations with the activities of inter-organizational partners to achieve unity of effort are key to success, and military forces need to work competently in this environment while properly supporting the lead agency, department, or organization. While information operations (IO) is not a separate function, the JFC and staff apply the IO core, supporting, and related capabilities across the joint functions and independently in some cases.

I. Command and Control (C2)

C2 encompasses the exercise of authority and direction by a commander over assigned and attached forces to accomplish the mission. The JFC provides operational vision, guidance, and direction to the joint force. The C2 function encompasses a number of tasks, including the following:

- Establish, organize, and operate a joint force HQ
- Command subordinate forces
- Prepare and, when required, modify plans, orders, and guidance
- Establish appropriate command authorities among subordinate commanders
- Assign tasks and operational areas as needed
- Prioritize and allocate resources
- Manage risk
- Communicate and maintain the status of information
- Assess progress toward accomplishing tasks, creating conditions, and achieving objectives
- Coordinate and control the employment of joint lethal and non-lethal capabilities
- Coordinate, synchronize, and when appropriate, integrate joint operations with the operations and activities of inter-organizational partners
- Conduct PA from the operational area

Command

Command includes both the authority and responsibility to effectively use available resources to accomplish assigned missions. Command at all levels is the art of motivating and directing people and organizations into action to accomplish missions. The C2 function supports an efficient decision-making process. Enabled by timely intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (ISR), the goal is to provide the ability to make decisions and execute those decisions more rapidly and effectively than the adversary. This decreases risk and allows the commander more control over the timing and tempo of operations.

Control is Inherent in Command

To control is to manage and direct forces and functions consistent with a commander's command authority. Control of forces and functions helps commanders and staffs compute requirements, allocate means, and integrate efforts. Control is necessary to determine the status of organizational effectiveness, identify variance from set standards, and correct deviations from these standards. Control permits commanders to acquire and apply means to support the mission and develop specific instructions from general guidance. Control provides the means for commanders to maintain freedom of action, delegate authority, direct operations from any location, and integrate and synchronize actions throughout the operational area. Ultimately, it provides commanders a means to measure, report, and correct performance.

B. Command Authorities (and Support Relationships)

JFCs exercise command authorities (i.e., combatant command [command authority] {COCOM}, OPCON, tactical control [TACON], and support) delegated to them by law or senior leaders and commanders over assigned and attached forces. Command relationships is another term for these authorities.

See pp. 1-43 to 1-52 for a listing and discussion of command and support relationships.

III. Homeland Defense and Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Aug '11), pp. V-28 to V-29.

Security and defense of the US homeland is the USG's top responsibility and is conducted as a continuous cooperative effort among all federal agencies as well as state, tribal, and local government. Military operations inside the United States and its territories, though limited in many respects, are conducted to accomplish two missions—HD and DSCA. HD is the protection of US sovereignty, territory, domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure against external threats and aggression or other threats as directed by the President. DSCA consists of DOD support to US civil authorities for domestic emergencies and for designated law enforcement and other activities. Requests for federal assistance of this nature must be submitted to the DOD Executive Secretary.

Commander, US Northern Command, and Commander, US Pacific Command, have specific responsibilities for HD and DSCA. These responsibilities include conducting operations to deter, prevent, and defeat threats and aggression aimed at the United States, its territories, and interests within their assigned AORs, as directed by the President or SecDef. However, DOD support to HD is global in nature and is often conducted by all CCDRs beginning at the source of the threat. In the forward regions outside US territories, the objective is to detect and deter threats to the homeland before they arise and to defeat these threats as early as possible when so directed.

See related discussion on pp. 8-3 and 8-10.


1. Homeland Defense (HD)

The purpose of HD is to protect against and mitigate the impact of incursions or attacks on sovereign territory, the domestic population, and critical defense infrastructure. DOD is the federal agency with lead responsibility, supported by other agencies, in defending against external threats/aggression. However, against internal threats DOD may be in support of an OGA. When ordered to conduct HD operations within US territory, DOD will coordinate closely with OGAs. Consistent with laws and policy, the Services will provide capabilities to support CCDR requirements against a variety of threats to national security.

2. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (DSCA)

Support provided by US federal military forces, DOD civilians, contract personnel, component assets, and National Guard forces (when SecDef, in coordination with the Governors of the affected states, elects and requests to use those forces in Title 32, USC status) in response to requests for assistance from civil authorities for domestic emergencies, law enforcement support, and other domestic activities, or from qualifying entities for special events. For DSCA operations, DOD supports and does not supplant civil authorities. Within a state, that state's governor is the key decision maker.

The majority of DSCA operations are conducted in accordance with the NRF. The NRF establishes a comprehensive, national, all-hazards approach to domestic incident response. The NRF identifies the key response principles, as well as the roles and structures that organize national response. It describes how communities, states, the USG and private-sector and nongovernmental partners apply these principles for a coordinated, effective national response.



Refer to *The Homeland Defense & DSCA SMARTbook (Protecting the Homeland / Defense Support to Civil Authority)* for complete discussion. Topics and references include homeland defense (JP 3-28), defense support of civil authorities (JP 3-28), Army support of civil authorities (ADRP 3-28), multi-service DSCA TTPs (ATP 3-28.1/MCWP 3-36.2), DSCA liaison officer toolkit (GTA 90-01-020), key legal and policy documents, and specific hazard and planning guidance.

V(c). Major Operations and Campaigns

Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations* (Aug '11), chap. V, section E (pp. V-31 to V-65).

When required to achieve national strategic objectives or protect national interests, the US national leadership may decide to conduct a major operation or campaign involving large-scale combat, placing the United States in a wartime state. In such cases, the general goal is to prevail against the enemy as quickly as possible, conclude hostilities, and establish conditions favorable to the HN, the United States, and its multinational partners. Establishing these conditions often requires joint forces to conduct stability operations to restore security, provide essential services and humanitarian relief, and conduct emergency reconstruction.

Major Operation

A major operation is a series of tactical actions, such as battles, engagements, and strikes, and is the primary building block of a campaign. Within a campaign, combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, conduct major operations to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area.

Major operations and campaigns typically include multiple phases (such as the 1990-1991 Operations DESERT SHIELD and DESERT STORM and 2003 OIF). Some specific crisis-response or limited contingency operations may not involve large-scale combat, but could be considered major operations or campaigns depending on their scale and duration (such as Tsunami relief efforts in Indonesia or Hurricane Katrina relief efforts in the US, both in 2005).

Campaign


A campaign is a series of related military operations aimed at accomplishing a military strategic or operational objective within a given time and space. Planning for a campaign is appropriate when the contemplated military operations exceed the scope of a single major operation. Thus, campaigns are often the most extensive joint operations in terms of time and other resources. Campaign planning has its greatest application in the conduct of large-scale combat operations, but can be used across the range of military operations. While intended primarily to guide the use of military power, campaign plans consider all instruments of national power and how their integrated efforts work to attain national strategic objectives.

Campaigns are joint in nature—functional and Service components conduct supporting operations, not independent campaigns. A campaign plan is not a unique type of joint OPLAN. JFCs normally prepare a campaign plan in OPLAN format in accordance with the Joint Operation Planning and Execution System under APEX. However, the size, complexity, and anticipated duration of operations typically magnify the planning challenges. There are three categories of campaigns, which differ generally in scope.

See pp. 3-20 to 3-25 for further discussion from JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*.

- **Global Campaign.** A global campaign is one that requires the accomplishment of military strategic objectives within multiple theaters that extend beyond the AOR of a single GCC.
- **Theater Campaign.** A theater campaign encompasses the activities of a supported GCC, and accomplishes military strategic or operational objectives within a theater of war or theater of operations that is primarily within the supported commander's AOR. OIF has shown that adjacent GCCs can, at the direction of SecDef, conduct supporting operations within the AOR of the supported commander, or within their own AORs, under the overall direction of the supported GCC.

- **Subordinate Campaign.** A subordinate JFC may conduct a subordinate campaign to accomplish (or contribute to) military strategic or operational objectives in support of a global or theater campaign. Subordinate JFCs develop subordinate campaign plans if their assigned missions require military operations of substantial size, complexity, and duration and cannot be accomplished within the framework of a single major joint operation. Subordinate campaign plans must be consistent with the strategic and operational guidance and direction provided in the supported JFC's campaign plan.



Ref: JP 3-0, *Joint Operations*, fig. V-3, p V-6. *See pp.. 3-50 to 3-52 for discussion of the phasing model.

I. Considerations for Shaping

JFCs are able to assist in determining the shape and character of potential future operations before committing forces. In many cases, these actions enhance bonds between potential multinational partners, increase understanding of the region, help ensure access when required, strengthen future multinational operations, and prevent crises from developing.

Organizing and Training Forces

Organizing and, where possible, training forces to conduct operations throughout the operational area can be a deterrent. JTFs and components that are likely to be employed in theater operations should be exercised regularly during peacetime. Staffs should be identified and trained for planning and controlling joint and multinational operations. The composition of joint force staffs should reflect the composition of the joint force to ensure that those responsible for employing joint forces have thorough knowledge of their capabilities and limitations. When possible, JFCs and their staffs should invite non-DOD agencies to participate in training to facilitate a common understanding and to build a working relationship prior to actual execution. When it is not possible to train forces in the theater of employment, as with US-based forces

Chap 3

I. Role of Joint Operation Planning

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Aug '11), chap. I.

Joint operation planning consists of planning activities associated with joint military operations by combatant commanders (CCDRs) and their subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) in response to contingencies and crises. It **transforms national strategic objectives into activities** by development of operational products that include planning for the mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization of joint forces. It ties the **military instrument of national power** to the achievement of **national security goals and objectives** and is essential to securing strategic end states across the range of military operations. Planning begins with the end state in mind, providing a unifying purpose around which actions and resources are focused.

Joint operation planning provides a common basis for discussion, understanding, and change for the joint force, its subordinate and higher headquarters, the joint planning and execution community (JPEC), and the national leadership. The **Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)** system facilitates iterative dialogue and collaborative planning between the multiple echelons of command to ensure that the military instrument of national power is employed in accordance with national priorities, and that the plan is continuously reviewed and updated as required and adapted according to changes in strategic guidance, resources, or the operational environment. **Joint operation planning** also identifies capabilities outside Department of Defense (DOD) required for achieving the strategic objectives to reach the end state by providing a forum that facilitates the inter-organizational coordination that enables **unified action**.

The pursuit and attainment of the US national strategic objectives in today's environment requires **critical and creative thinking** about the challenges facing the joint force. Joint operation planning fosters understanding, allowing commanders and their staffs to provide adequate order to ill-defined problems, reduce uncertainty, and enable further detailed planning. The planning process, both iterative and collaborative, enables understanding and facilitates the development of options to effectively meet the complex challenges facing joint forces throughout the world.

The body of knowledge and understanding created during planning allows JFCs and their staffs to **monitor, assess, and adapt to uncertain and changing environments** and to anticipate and proactively act in crisis situations. Joint operation planning produces multiple options to employ the US military and to integrate US military actions with other instruments of US national power in time, space, and purpose to achieve national strategic end states. Achieving operational military victory may be only a step toward achieving the overall national strategic goals and objectives, as demonstrated by events in Operations IRAQI FREEDOM and ENDURING FREEDOM. Additionally, planning identifies and aligns resources with military actions, providing a framework to identify and mitigate risk.



Refer to "Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 1: Joint Strategic and Operational Planning (Planning for Planners)" for 400 pages of detailed discussion of joint strategic and operational planning. This new revision of *Planning for Planners* incorporates the latest thinking on Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), Global Force Management (GFM), Campaign Planning and Assessment Fundamentals. *Planning for Planners* has been utilized since 2007 as a step-by-step guide to understanding the complex world of global planning and force management.

Role of Joint Operation Planning

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Aug '11), pp. I-2 to I-7.

Strategic Direction

Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the planning activities and operations of the Joint Staff (JS), combatant commands (CCMDs), Services, JFCs, combat support agencies (CSAs), and other DOD agencies. It provides purpose and focus to the planning for employment of military force. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and manner by which the President and the Secretary of Defense (SecDef) provide strategic guidance to the joint force.

See pp. 3-3 to 3-18 for further discussion of strategic direction.

Providing Common Basis for Understanding and Adaptation

Joint operation planning occurs within Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX), which is the department-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. APEX is supported by communications and information technology that is used by the joint planning and execution community (JPEC) to monitor, plan, and execute mobilization, deployment, employment, sustainment, redeployment, and demobilization activities associated with joint operations. APEX formally integrates the planning activities of the JPEC and facilitates the JFC's seamless transition from planning to execution during times of crisis. APEX activities span many organizational levels, but the focus is on the interaction between SecDef and CCDRs, which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military forces.

Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction among senior leaders, combatant commanders (CCDRs), and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs) promotes early understanding of, and agreement on, strategic and military end states, objectives, planning assumptions, risks, and other key factors.

See pp. 3-12 to 3-13 for further discussion of adaptive planning and execution (APEX).

Creating Understanding and Reducing Uncertainty

In conducting joint operation planning, commanders and staff apply operational art to operational design using the joint operation planning process (JOPP). Planners apply operational design to provide the conceptual framework that will underpin joint operation or campaign plans and their subsequent execution. The application of operational art and operational design further reduces uncertainty and adequately orders complex problems to allow for more detailed planning.

See pp. 3-31 to 3-52 for further discussion of operational art and design.

Providing Options, Aligning Resources, and Mitigating Risks

The planning staff uses JOPP to conduct detailed planning to fully develop options, identify resources, and identify and mitigate risk. Planners develop the concept of operations (CONOPS), force plans, deployment plans, and supporting plans that contain multiple options in order to provide the flexibility to adapt to changing conditions and remain consistent with the JFC's intent.

See pp. 3-53 to 3-104 for further discussion of the joint operations planning process (JOPP).

Constant Change, Learning, and Adaptation

Joint operation planning plays a fundamental role in securing the Nation's interests in a continuously changing operational environment. Through structured review, assessment, and modification, plans are constantly assessed and updated by the JFC and reviewed by the broader JPEC and senior DOD leadership.


See pp. 3-105 to 3-108 for further discussion of the assessment process.

VI. Adaptive Planning and Execution (APEX)

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Aug '11), pp. I-3 to I-5 and II-13 to II-14.

Joint operation planning occurs within APEX, which is the department-level system of joint policies, processes, procedures, and reporting structures. APEX formally integrates the planning activities of the JPEC and facilitates the JFC's seamless transition from planning to execution during times of crisis. The integration of joint operation planning with inter-agency and multinational partners begins with national strategic direction. APEX activities span many organizational levels, but the focus is on the interaction between SecDef and CCDRs, which ultimately helps the President and SecDef decide when, where, and how to commit US military forces. The interactive and collaborative process at the national level guides the way in which planning and execution occurs throughout the Armed Forces.

Adaptive Planning Review & Approval



*Approving official is typically the Secretary of Defense or designated representative


Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, fig. I-1, p I-4.

Clear strategic guidance and frequent interaction among senior leaders, CCDRs, and subordinate JFCs promotes early understanding of, and agreement on, strategic and military end states, objectives, planning assumptions, risks, and other key factors. Based on guidance from this iterative dialogue, planners develop multiple viable options to achieve end states while providing commanders and national leaders flexibility in how they shape the situation and respond to contingencies. Collaborative and iterative assessment and recurring dialogue between commanders and senior national leadership facilitates responsive plan development and modification, resulting in plans that are continually updated. APEX also promotes early, robust, and frequent discourse between DOD planners and their interagency and multinational counterparts throughout the planning process.

Joint Operation Planning

Joint operation planning provides a common intellectual framework for the joint force, its subordinate and higher headquarters, the JPEC, and DOD leadership from which to adapt to the dynamic operational environment. APEX incorporates planning detail, frequent IPRs, continuous assessment, and collaborative technology, which provide increased opportunities for consultation and guidance during the planning process.

Joint Operation Planning Activities




Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, fig. II-5, p II-14.

IPRs constitute a disciplined dialogue between commanders and their higher headquarters and are a part of the formal adaptive planning review and approval process for campaign and contingency plans. Plan development will include as many IPRs as necessary. Topics for discussion may include clarification of the problem, strategic and military end states, military objectives, confirmation of intelligence and the operational environment, mission, facts and assumptions, courses of action (COAs), capabilities and force requirements, areas of risk, identification and removal of planning obstacles, required supporting and supported activities, guidance on coordination with the interagency and multinational communities, and the resolution of planning conflicts. Further, IPRs generate valuable feedback for planning staffs and provide a common vision between national and military leadership.

Analysis of Friendly and Adversary COGs

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug '11), pp. III-23 to III-25.

Analysis of friendly and adversary COGs is a key step in operational design. Joint force intelligence analysts identify adversary COGs, determining from which elements the adversary derives freedom of action, physical strength (means), and the will to fight. The J-2, in conjunction with other operational planners, then attempts to determine if the tentative or candidate COGs truly are critical to the adversary's strategy. This analysis is a linchpin in the planning effort. Others on the joint force staff conduct similar analysis to identify friendly COGs. Once COGs have been identified, JFCs and their staffs determine how to attack enemy COGs while protecting friendly COGs. The protection of friendly strategic COGs such as public opinion and US national capabilities typically requires efforts and capabilities beyond those of just the supported CCDR. An analysis of the identified COGs in terms of critical capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities is vital to this process.



Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning, fig. III-11, p III-23.

Understanding the relationship among COGs not only permits but also compels greater precision in thought and expression in operational design. Planners should analyze COGs within a framework of **three critical factors—capabilities, requirements, and vulnerabilities**—to aid in this understanding. Critical capabilities are those that are considered crucial enablers for a COG to function as such, and are essential to the accomplishment of the adversary's assumed objective(s). **Critical requirements** are the conditions, resources, and means that enable a critical capability to become fully operational. **Critical vulnerabilities** are those aspects or components of critical requirements that are deficient or vulnerable to direct or indirect attack in a manner achieving decisive or significant results. In general, a JFC must possess sufficient operational reach and combat power or other relevant capabilities to take advantage of an adversary's critical vulnerabilities while protecting friendly critical capabilities within the operational reach of an adversary.

When identifying **friendly and adversary critical vulnerabilities**, the JFC and staff will understandably want to focus their efforts against the critical vulnerabilities that will do the most decisive damage to an adversary's COG. However, in selecting those critical vulnerabilities, planners must also compare their criticality with their accessibility, vulnerability, redundancy, ability to recuperate, and impact on the civilian populace, and then balance

A. Analyze Higher Headquarters' Planning Directives and Strategic Guidance

1. Strategic Guidance

Strategic guidance is essential to joint operation planning and operational design. The President, SecDef, CJCS, and CCDRs promulgate strategic guidance that covers a broad range of situations. Documents such as the NDS, NMS, and the CCDR's theater strategy provide long-term as well as intermediate or ancillary objectives.

2. Planning Directives

For a specific crisis, a planning directive such as a CJCS PLANORD, ALERTORD, or WARNORD provides specific guidance, typically including a description of the situation, purpose of military operations, objectives, anticipated mission or tasks, pertinent constraints, and forces available to the commander for planning and strategic lift allocations. The apportionment tables provide a quantity of forces that the planner can reasonably expect to be available, but not necessarily allocated when a plan transitions to execution. The CJCS orders may amplify the guidance from the apportionment tables for the specific crisis. This guidance can confirm or modify the guidance in an existing contingency plan. This might simplify the analysis step, since consensus should already exist between the supported command and higher authority on the nature of the operational environment in the potential joint operations area (JOA)—such as the political, economic, social, and military circumstances—and potential US or multinational responses to various situations described in the existing plan. But even with a preexisting contingency plan, planners should not assume that the current operational environment is as the plan and higher headquarters describe. The specific nature of the emerging crisis can change many key aspects of the environment compared with earlier estimates. These changes can greatly affect the plan's original operational approach upon which the commander and staff based decisions about COA alternatives and tasks to potential subordinate and supporting commands. In particular, planners must reconfirm strategic and operational objectives and the criteria that comprise the military end state. Differences between the commander's perspective and that of higher headquarters must be resolved at the earliest opportunity.

3. Headquarters Assessment

In time-compressed, crisis situations with no preexisting plan, planners may be inclined to trust the higher headquarters' assessment of the operational environment and objectives associated with a desired end state. However, this circumstance is one that can benefit the most from the commander's and staff's independent assessment of circumstances to ensure they agree with higher headquarters on the operational environment, the description of strategic objectives, and the tasks or mission assigned to achieve these objectives.


4. Multinational Strategic Guidance

In multinational settings, military committee directives provide the strategic guidance and direction for joint operation planning. The JFC and staff, as well as component and supporting commanders and their staffs, must clearly understand the strategic and military end states, objectives, and conditions that the national or multinational political leadership want the multinational military force to attain in terms of the internal and external balance of power, regional security, and geopolitics. When multinational strategic objectives are unclear, the senior US military commander must seek clarification and convey the positive or negative impact of continued ambiguity to the President and SecDef.

Mission Analysis (Overview)

Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning* (Aug '11), pp. IV-5 to IV-6.

The **primary inputs** to mission analysis are the higher headquarters' planning directive, other strategic guidance, and the commander's initial planning guidance, which may include a description of the operational environment, a definition of the problem, the operational approach, initial intent, and the JIPOE. The **primary products** of mission analysis are staff estimates, the mission statement, a refined operational approach, the commander's intent statement, updated planning guidance, and commander's critical information requirements (CCIRs).



Ref: JP 5-0, *Joint Operation Planning*, fig. IV-3, p. IV-5.

Mission Analysis Activities *(not necessarily sequential)*

- Analyze higher headquarters planning activities and strategic guidance
- Review commander's initial planning guidance, including his initial understanding of the operational environment, of the problem, and description of the operational approach
- Determine known facts and develop planning assumptions
- Determine and analyze operational limitations
- Determine specified, implied, and essential tasks
- Develop mission statement
- Conduct initial force allocation review
- Develop risk assessment
- Develop mission success criteria
- Develop commander's critical information requirements
- Prepare staff estimates
- Prepare and deliver mission analysis brief
- Publish commander's updated planning guidance, intent statement, and refined operational approach

B. Review Commander's Initial Planning Guidance

Staffs should analyze the operational approach to gain an appreciation for the commander's understanding and visualization. This provides a basis for continued detailed analysis of the operational environment and of the tasks that may describe the mission and its parameters. The staff should not take the commander's perspective as the final answer, but should analyze his understanding and visualization, so that the intent and planning guidance provided during the latter stages of mission analysis provide a strong basis for development of appropriate COAs.

Staff members and representatives from supporting organizations should maintain an open dialogue with the commander to better develop an appropriate solution to the problem, and be able to adapt solutions to match the evolving operational environment and any potentially changing problems.

C. Determine Known Facts and Develop Planning Assumptions

The staff assembles both facts and assumptions to support the planning process and planning guidance.

Fact

A fact is a statement of information known to be true (such as verified locations of friendly and adversary force dispositions)

Assumption

An assumption provides a supposition about the current situation or future course of events, assumed to be true in the absence of facts. Assumptions that address gaps in knowledge are critical for the planning process to continue. For planning purposes, subordinate commanders can treat assumptions made by higher headquarters as true in the absence of proof to the contrary. However, they should challenge those assumptions if they appear unrealistic. Assumptions must be continually reviewed to ensure validity. A valid assumption has three characteristics: logical, realistic, and essential for the planning to continue. Assumptions are made for both friendly and adversary situations.

Commanders and staffs should anticipate changes to the plan that may become necessary should an assumption prove to be incorrect. Because of assumptions' influence on planning, planners must either validate the assumptions (turn them into facts) or invalidate the assumptions (alter the plan accordingly) as quickly as possible. Commanders and staffs should never assume away adversary capabilities or assume that unrealistic friendly capabilities would be available.

Plans developed during deliberate planning may contain assumptions that cannot be resolved until a potential crisis develops. In CAP, however, assumptions should be replaced with facts as soon as possible. The staff accomplishes this by identifying the information needed to convert assumptions to facts and submitting an information request to an appropriate agency as an information requirement. If the commander needs the information to make a key decision, the information requirement can be designated a CCIR. Although there may be exceptions, the staff should strive to resolve all assumptions before issuing the OPORD.

D. Determine and Analyze Operational Limitations

Operational limitations are actions required or prohibited by higher authority and other restrictions that limit the commander's freedom of action, such as diplomatic agreements, political and economic conditions in affected countries, and host-nation issues. A constraint is a requirement placed on the command by a higher command that dictates an action, thus restricting freedom of action. For example, General Eisenhower was required to liberate Paris instead of bypassing it during the 1944

B. Sample Wargaming Steps

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug '11), fig. IV-12, p. IV-33.

There are two key decisions to make before COA analysis begins.

- The first decision is to decide what type of war game will be used. This decision should be based on commander's guidance, time and resources available, staff expertise, and availability of simulation models. At this point in the planning process, there may be no phases developed for the COA; pre-hostilities, hostilities, and post-hostilities may be the only considerations at this point. Phasing comes later when the planner begins to flesh out the selected COA into a strategic concept.
- The second decision is to prioritize the enemy COAs the war game is to be analyzed against. In time-constrained situations, it may not be possible to wargame against all COAs.

The primary steps are prepare for the war game, conduct the war game and assess the results, and prepare products.

1. Prepare for the War Game

- Gather tools
- List and review opposing forces and capabilities
- List known critical events
- Determine participants
- Determine opposing course of action (COA) to war game
- Select wargaming method (manual or computer-assisted)
- Select a method to record and display wargaming results
 - narrative
 - sketch and note
 - war game worksheets
 - synchronization matrix

2. Conduct War Game and Assess Results

- Purpose of war game (identify gaps, visualization, etc.)
- Basic methodology (e.g., action, reaction, counteraction)
- Record results

3. Prepare Products

- Results of the war game brief
 - potential decision points
 - evaluation criteria
 - potential branches and sequels
- Revised staff estimates
- Refined COAs
- Time-phased force and deployment data refinement and transportation feasibility
- Feedback through the COA decision brief

During the war game, the staff takes a COA statement and begins to add more detail to the concept, while determining the strengths or weaknesses of each COA. Wargaming tests a COA and can provide insights that can be used to improve upon a developed COA. The commander and staff (and subordinate commanders and staffs if the war game is conducted corroboratively) may change an existing COA or develop a new COA after identifying unforeseen critical events, tasks, requirements, or problems.

IV(b). Joint Operation Plan (OPLAN) Format

Ref: JP 5-0, Joint Operation Planning (Aug '11), app. A.

Below is a sample format that a joint force staff can use as a guide when developing a joint OPLAN. The exact format and level of detail may vary somewhat among joint commands, based on theater-specific requirements and other factors. However, joint OPLANs/CONPLANs will always contain the basic five paragraphs (such as paragraph 3, "Execution") and their primary subparagraphs (such as paragraph 3a, "Concept of Operations"). The JPEC typically refers to a joint contingency plan that encompasses more than one major operation as a campaign plan, but JFCs prepare a plan for a campaign in joint contingency plan format.

The CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes describe joint operation planning interaction between the President, SecDef, CJCS, the supported joint commander, and other JPEC members, and provides models of planning messages and estimates. The CJCSM 3122.01 series volumes provide the formats for joint OPLANs/CONPLANs when commanders must submit contingency plans in accordance with APEX policy requirements.

Notional Operation Plan Format

- a. Copy No. _____
- b. Issuing Headquarters
- c. Place of Issue
- d. Effective Date/Time Group
- e. OPERATION PLAN: (Number or Code Name)
- f. USXXXXCOM OPERATIONS TO . . .
- g. References: (List any maps, charts, and other relevant documents deemed essential to comprehension of the plan.)

1. Situation

(This section briefly describes the composite conditions, circumstances, and influences of the theater strategic situation that the plan addresses [see national intelligence estimate, any multinational sources, and strategic and commanders' estimates].)

a. General. (This section describes the general politico-military environment that would establish the probable preconditions for execution of the OPLAN. It should summarize the competing political goals that could lead to conflict. Identify primary antagonists. State US policy goals and the estimated goals of other parties. Outline political decisions needed from other countries to achieve US policy goals and conduct effective US military operations to attain US military objectives. Specific items can be listed separately for clarity as depicted below.)

(1) Environment of Conflict. (Provide a summary of the national and/or multinational strategic context [JSCP, UCP].)

Continued on next page

V. Joint Force Targeting Cycle

Ref: JP 3-60, Joint Targeting (Apr '07), chap. 2.

Joint targeting is integral to the joint operation planning process (JOPP) and begins with the planning initiation and mission analysis steps of JOPP. Detailed country assessments and target systems analysis, performed by combatant commanders within their regional responsibilities, set the stage for detailed targeting within the joint targeting cycle.

The joint targeting cycle is an iterative process that is not time-constrained, and steps may occur concurrently, but it provides a helpful framework to describe the steps that must be satisfied to successfully conduct joint targeting. The deliberate and dynamic nature of the joint targeting cycle supports all of the planning horizons of the JOPP ensuring that the targeting process adaptively supports achievement of the commander's objectives as opportunities arise and plans change.

Phases 1 through 4 of the joint targeting cycle collectively produce the commander's guidance for all targeting, whether deliberate or dynamic.

- **Phase 1 – End state and commander's objectives**
- **Phase 2 – Target development and prioritization**
- **Phase 3 – Capabilities analysis**
- **Phase 4 – Commander's decision and force assignment**
- **Phase 5 – Mission planning and force execution**

Lessons learned from recent operations have demonstrated the need for a distinct focus on dynamic targeting during phase 5, which consists of five steps:

- **Find.** During this step, possible targets are detected and classified for further prosecution.
 - **Fix.** The fix step of dynamic targeting includes actions to determine the location (fix) of the potential target.
 - **Track.** During this step, the target is observed and its activity and movement are monitored.
 - **Target.** During this step the decision is made to engage the target in some manner to create desired effects and the means to do so are selected and coordinated.
 - **Engage.** In this step, action is taken against the target.
- **Phase 6 - Assessment.** The assessment phase is common to both deliberate and dynamic targeting of the joint targeting cycle and examines the results.

The joint targeting process does not end when hostilities cease. During the transition phase of post conflict operations there is normally a critical need to collect all available information that feeds all forms of assessment.

The joint targeting cycle supports both contingency planning and crisis-action planning. Planning continues during execution, with an initial emphasis on refining an existing plan or order and producing the operation order (OPORD). As the operation progresses, joint operation planning generally occurs in three distinct but overlapping time frames: future plans, future operations, and current operations.

Deliberate targeting typically supports the joint force's future plans effort, while the nature and time frame associated with current operations planning (usually the current 24-hour period) typically requires the immediate responsiveness of dynamic targeting. The time frame for future operations planning can vary from a day to several days. The time frame involved is the primary factor that determines whether deliberate or dynamic targeting will support the JFC's future operations targeting requirements.

Chap 4

I. Joint Logistics Overview

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), chap. I.

Sustainment

Sustainment is one of the six joint functions (command and control [C2], intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Sustainment provides the joint force commanders (JFCs) freedom of action, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commander (CCDR) and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies (CSAs), and supporting commands. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint logistics supports sustained readiness for joint forces.

Logistics

Logistics concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to support the JFC's concept of operations (CONOPS). The relative combat power that military forces can generate against an adversary is constrained by a nation's capability to plan for, gain access to, and deliver forces and materiel to required points of application.

I. Joint Logistics

Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments' logistics resources to support the joint force. The joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) projects and sustains a logistically ready joint force by leveraging Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, nongovernmental agencies, multinational, and industrial resources. The identification of established coordination frameworks, agreements, and other connections creates an efficient and effective logistic network to support the mission.

A. Joint Logistics Enterprise (JLEnt)

The JLEnt is a multi-tiered matrix of key global logistics providers cooperatively structured to achieve a common purpose. It may be bound by an assortment of collaborative agreements, contracts, policy, legislation, or treaties designed to make it function in the best interest of the JFC or other supported organization. The JLEnt includes organizations and partnerships from the Services, combatant commands (CCMDs), joint task forces (JTFs), CSAs, other US Government departments and



Refer to *The Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistics SMARTbook (Warfighter's Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support)* -- updated with the latest doctrinal references (ADRP 4-0 Sustainment, ATP 4-93 Sustainment Brigade, JP 4-0 Joint Logistics, FM 3-35 Deployment & Redeployment, and more than 20 other joint and service publications) -- for complete discussion of strategic, operational, and tactical logistics.

agencies, and NGOs. Commercial partners also play a vital role in virtually all aspects of the JLEnt and function on a global scale providing comprehensive, end-to-end capabilities. The JLEnt may also include multinational partners. Participants operate across the strategic, operational, and tactical levels—many are affiliated with either supported or supporting commands and operate under a variety of command relationships. Knowing the roles, responsibilities, and authorities of JLEnt partners is essential to planning, executing, controlling, and assessing logistic operations. JLEnt partners must collaborate to ensure the coordinated employment and sharing of capabilities and resources.

B. Building Partnership Capacity (BPC)

Complicated supply lines, finite resources, the challenges of providing robust logistics in austere environments, and shared lines of communications (LOCs) require the ability to establish and foster nontraditional partnerships. BPC is important for sharing the costs and responsibilities, improving information flow, and establishing PN agreements. BPC includes coordination of resources with multinational partners, IGOs, and NGOs. BPC improves unity of effort within the entire JLEnt. BPC is an essential component of joint operations because the Services seldom have sufficient capability to support a joint force independently. BPC is an ongoing, long-term relationship development process that may not yield immediate results. The earlier the BPC efforts begin the better the chance of success for securing partner logistics support when needed. By combining capabilities, commanders can provide maximum effectiveness and flexibility to the joint force focused on common outcomes, that deliver sustained logistics support.

C. Personnel

Joint logisticians are military personnel, civilians, and contractors who specialize in providing joint logistics support extending from the national industrial base to the end user. Joint logisticians plan, supervise, execute, synchronize, and coordinate core joint logistic functions. They understand tactical, operational, and strategic operations and synchronize efforts to effectively meet joint force requirements. Joint logisticians reach a level of proficiency through a combination of training, education, and operational experience created by Service, joint, and multinational duty assignments. Joint logisticians are exposed to logistic operations in a complex, diverse, and globally dispersed environment.

II. Joint Logistics Environment (JLE)

Military leaders conduct operations in a complicated, interconnected, and global environment. Operations are distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operations areas (JOAs), within a single theater, or across boundaries of more than one geographic combatant commander (GCC). These operations can involve a variety of military forces, other governmental organizations, and multinational forces. The joint logistics environment is the sum of conditions and circumstances that affect logistics. The joint logistics environment exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (see Figure I-1, facing page). Globalization, technology advancements, anti-access/area-denial, and flexible adversaries create a complex, ever-changing operational environment. Understanding this environment is essential to planning, executing, synchronizing, and coordinating logistic operations. Joint logistics takes place throughout the operational environment. Service components and CSAs provide the expertise while the JFC's staff focuses on integrating the capabilities with operations. Access to secure networks is necessary to sustain joint force readiness and is achieved through Internet-based applications. Effective networks: find and access relevant information; facilitate collaboration; distribute data to forward deployed areas; increase performance and reliability; utilize the enterprise infrastructure for evolving DOD systems are resilient; and leverage PN's capabilities.


See facing page for further discussion of the JLE operating framework.

Joint Logistics Environment (JLE) Operating Framework

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), fig. I-1, p. I-5.

Military leaders conduct operations in a complicated, interconnected, and global environment. Operations are distributed and conducted rapidly and simultaneously across multiple joint operations areas (JOAs), within a single theater, or across boundaries of more than one geographic combatant commander (GCC). These operations can involve a variety of military forces, other governmental organizations, and multinational forces. The joint logistics environment is the sum of conditions and circumstances that affect logistics. The joint logistics environment exists at the strategic, operational, and tactical levels (see Figure I-1, below).

<u>Strategic Level</u>	<u>Operational Level</u>	<u>Tactical Level</u>
Campaign Quality	Coordinate, Integrate, and Synchronize	Effectiveness
<ul style="list-style-type: none">Industrial base capacity enables sustained operationsEnd-to-end processes drive efficiencies across Services, agencies, and industryEffectiveness dependent upon optimizing processes against required outcomes	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Combatant commander integrates joint requirements with national systemsMust optimize component, agency, and other partner nation capabilities to meet requirementsMost significant impact for joint logistics and the joint force	<ul style="list-style-type: none">Outcome is measuredOperational readiness enables "freedom of action"Desired outcomes should drive optimization—from strategic to tactical




Joint Logistics Planning Considerations

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), pp. IV-3 to IV-6.

Figures IV-3 and IV-4 reflect the joint logistics planning process combined with elements of the joint operation planning activities, functions, and products. A means of anticipating future requirements is through the theater logistics analysis (TLA) process supporting TLO development and codification, logistics estimate, and logistics planning process.

Steps I - III (Joint Logistics Planning)

Strategic Guidance/Concept Development/Plan Development




Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), fig. IV-3, p. IV-5.

I. Joint Task Forces (JTF) Overview

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jul '12), chap. I.

A joint task force (JTF) is established when the scope, complexity, or other factors of the contingency or crisis require capabilities of Services from at least two Military Departments operating under a single JFC. The JTF establishing authority designates the CJTF, assigns the mission, designates forces, delegates command authorities and relationships, and provides other command and control (C2) guidance necessary for the CJTF to form the joint force and begin operations. The appropriate authority may establish a JTF on a geographic or functional basis or a combination of the two. In either case, the establishing authority typically assigns a joint operations area (JOA) to the JTF. There may also be situations in which a CJTF has a logistics-focused mission. See pp. 1-35 to 1-42 for discussion of considerations for establishing joint forces.



Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters, fig. I-2, p. I-3.


JTFs can be organized, staffed, and equipped for operations across the full range of military operations. The size, composition, capabilities, and other attributes will vary significantly among JTFs based on the mission and various factors of the operational environment, such as the adversary, the geography of the JOA, the nature of the crisis (e.g., flood, earthquake), and the time available to accomplish the mission. CJTFs typically function at the operational level and employ their capabilities in all physical dimensions of their JOA and in the information environment.

The CJTF and staff have a fundamental role in unified action—the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort. The JTF may often operate in conjunction with multinational military forces. Even as a US unilateral force a JTF usually will operate with a variety of nonmilitary interorganizational partners.

Joint Planning Group (JPG) Composition

Ref: JP 3-33, Joint Task Force Headquarters (Jul '12), fig. IX-5, p. IX-11.

The JPG is a planning group charged with writing deliberate plans and orders for the JTF as well as for the execution of CAP and writing and developing future plans. To execute either mission, the JPG follows JOPP.



Legend

AFFOR	Air Force forces	JPG	joint planning group
ARFOR	Army forces	JSOTF	joint special operations task force
COA	course of action	JTCB	joint targeting coordination board
IO	information operations	JTF	joint task force
J-1	manpower and personnel directorate of a joint staff	LNO	liaison officer
J-2	intelligence directorate of a joint staff	MARFOR	Marine Corps forces
J-3	operations directorate of a joint staff	NAVFOR	Navy forces
J-4	logistics directorate of a joint staff	NG	National Guard
J-5	plans directorate of a joint staff	OPORD	operation order
J-6	communications system directorate of a joint staff	PAO	public affairs officer
JCMOTF	joint civil-military operations task force	POLAD	political advisor
JFACC	joint force air component commander	RFI	request for information
JFLCC	joint force land component commander	SJA	staff judge advocate
JFMCC	joint force maritime component commander	TPFDD	time-phased force and deployment data
JMISTF	joint military information support task force	USSTRATCOM	United States Strategic Command
JOC	joint operations center	USTRANSCOM	United States Transportation Command
JOPES	Joint Operation Planning and Execution System	WARNORD	warning order

The primary purposes for forming a JPG are to conduct CAP, assist in OPLAN and OPORD development, and perform future planning. As a JPG works through the CAP process towards development of an OPORD, it is important that the head of a JPG devise a system that analyzes COAs. There has to be a synchronization process to ensure that "all parts" of the JTF will work in unison from planning through operations. Early designation of a JTF will facilitate the forming of the JPG and commencement of the planning process.

I. Information Operations Overview

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, *Information Operations* (Nov '14), chap. I & exec. summary.

The instruments of national power (diplomatic, informational, military, and economic) provide leaders in the US with the means and ways of dealing with crises around the world. Employing these means in the information environment requires the ability to securely transmit, receive, store, and process information in near real time. The nation's state and non-state adversaries are equally aware of the significance of this new technology, and will use **information-related capabilities (IRCs)** to gain advantages in the information environment, just as they would use more traditional military technologies to gain advantages in other operational environments. As the strategic environment continues to change, so does **information operations (IO)**.

Based on these changes, the Secretary of Defense now characterizes IO as the integrated employment, during military operations, of IRCs in concert with other lines of operation to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of adversaries and potential adversaries while protecting our own.

The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the Application of Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the information provided to or disseminated from the target audience (TA) in the physical and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making.

The change in the TA conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counterdeception, physical security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection.

These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC's C2 of forces.

The relational framework describes the application, integration, and synchronization of IRCs to influence, disrupt, corrupt, or usurp the decision making of TAs to create a desired effect to support achievement of an objective.

See following pages for further discussion of the relational framework and the IRCs.

Information Operations (IO)

Joint force commanders (JFCs) may establish an IO staff to provide command-level oversight and collaborate with all staff directorates and supporting organizations on all aspects of IO. Most combatant commands (CCMDs) include an IO staff to serve as the focal point for IO. Faced with an ongoing or emerging crisis within a geographic combatant commander's (GCC's) area of responsibility, a JFC can establish an IO cell to provide additional expertise and coordination across the staff and interagency.

IO is not about ownership of individual capabilities but rather the use of those capabilities as force multipliers to create a desired effect. There are many military capabilities that contribute to IO and should be taken into consideration during the planning process. These include: strategic communication, joint interagency coordination group, public affairs, civil-military operations, cyberspace operations (CO), information assurance, space operations, military information support operations (MISO), intelligence, military deception, operations security, special technical operations, joint electromagnetic spectrum operations, and key leader engagement.

I. The Information and Influence Relational Framework and the IRCs

Ref: JP 3-13 w/change 1, *Information Operations* (Nov '14), pp. I-8 to I-10.

Information-Related Capabilities (IRCs)

IRCs are the tools, techniques, or activities that affect any of the three dimensions of the information environment. They affect the ability of the target audience (TA) to collect, process, or disseminate information before and after decisions are made. The TA is the individual or group selected for influence. The joint force (means) employs IRCs (ways) to affect the information provided to or disseminated from the TA in the physical and informational dimensions of the information environment to affect decision making.

The change in the target audience (TA) conditions, capabilities, situational awareness, and in some cases, the inability to make and share timely and informed decisions, contributes to the desired end state. Actions or inactions in the physical dimension can be assessed for future operations. The employment of IRCs is complemented by a set of capabilities such as operations security (OPSEC), information assurance (IA), counterdeception, physical security, electronic warfare (EW) support, and electronic protection. These capabilities are critical to enabling and protecting the JFC's C2 of forces. Key components in this process are:

- **Information.** Data in context to inform or provide meaning for action.
- **Data.** Interpreted signals that can reduce uncertainty or equivocality.
- **Knowledge.** Information in context to enable direct action. Knowledge can be further broken down into the following:
 - **Explicit Knowledge.** Knowledge that has been articulated through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.
 - **Tacit Knowledge.** Knowledge that cannot be or has not been articulated through words, diagrams, formulas, computer programs, and like means.
- **Influence.** The act or power to produce a desired outcome or end on a TA.
- **Means.** The resources available to a national government, non-nation actor, or adversary in pursuit of its end(s). These resources include, but are not limited to, public- and private-sector enterprise assets or entities.
- **Ways.** How means can be applied, in order to achieve a desired end(s). They can be characterized as persuasive or coercive.
- **Information-Related Capabilities.** Tools, techniques, or activities using data, information, or knowledge to create effects and operationally desirable conditions within the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment.
- **Target Audience.** An individual or group selected for influence.
- **Ends.** A consequence of the way of applying IRCs.
- Using the framework, the physical, informational, and cognitive dimensions of the information environment provide access points for influencing TAs.

The first step in achieving an end(s) through use of the information-influence relational framework is to identify the TA. Once the TA has been identified, it will be necessary to develop an understanding of how that TA perceives its environment, to include analysis of TA rules, norms, and beliefs. Once this analysis is complete, the application of means available to achieve the desired end(s) must be evaluated. Such means may include (but are not limited to) diplomatic, informational, military, or economic actions, as well as academic, commercial, religious, or ethnic pronouncements. When the specific means or combinations of means are determined, the next step is to identify the specific ways to create a desired effect.

III. Nature of Multinational Operations

Ref: JP 3-16, *Multinational Operations* (Jul '13), pp. I-3 to I-4.

After World War II, General Dwight D. Eisenhower noted that “mutual confidence” is the “one basic thing that will make allied commands work.” While the tenets discussed below cannot guarantee success, ignoring them may lead to mission failure due to a lack of unity of effort.

1. Respect

In assigning missions and tasks, the commander should consider that national honor and prestige may be as important to a contributing nation as combat capability. All partners must be included in the planning process, and their opinions must be sought in mission assignment. Understanding, discussion, and consideration of partner ideas are essential to building effective relationships, as are respect for each partner's culture, customs, history, and values.

2. Rapport

US commanders and staffs should establish rapport with their counterparts from partner countries, as well as the multinational force commander (MNFC). This requires personal, direct relationships that only they can develop. Good rapport between leaders will improve teamwork among their staffs and subordinate commanders and overall unity of effort. The use of liaisons can facilitate the development of rapport by assisting in the staffing of issues to the correct group and in monitoring responses.

3. Knowledge of Partners

US commanders and their staffs should have an understanding of each member of the MNF. Much time and effort is spent learning about the enemy; a similar effort is required to understand the doctrine, capabilities, strategic goals, culture, customs, history, and values of each partner. This will facilitate the effective integration of multinational partners into the operation and enhance the synergistic effect of their forces.

4. Patience

Effective partnerships take time and attention to develop. Diligent pursuit of a trusting, mutually beneficial relationship with multinational partners requires untiring, evenhanded patience. This is more difficult to accomplish within coalitions than within alliances; however, it is just as necessary. It is therefore imperative that US commanders and their staffs apply appropriate resources, travel, staffing, and time not only to maintain, but also to expand and cultivate multinational relationships. Without patience and continued engagement, established partnerships can easily dissolve.

5. Mission Focus

When dealing with other nations, US forces should temper the need for respect, rapport, knowledge, and patience with the requirement to ensure that the necessary tasks are accomplished by those with the capabilities and authorities to accomplish those tasks. This is especially critical in the security line of operation, where failure could prove to have catastrophic results. If operational necessity requires tasks being assigned to personnel who are not proficient in accomplishing those tasks, then the MNF commander must recognize the risks and apply appropriate mitigating measures.

6. Trust and Coordination

Commanders should engage other leaders of the MNF to build personal relationships and develop trust and confidence. Developing these relationships is a conscious collaborative act rather than something that just happens. Commanders build trust through words and actions. Trust and confidence are essential to synergy and harmony, both within the joint force and also with our multinational partners. Coordination and cooperation among organizations are based on trust.

IV. Train, Advise & Assist in a Culturally Sensitive Manner



(U.S. Army photo by Staff Sgt. Shane Hamann)

The American Experience with Stability


During the relatively short history of the United States, military forces have fought only eleven wars considered conventional. From the American Revolution through Operation Enduring Freedom, these wars represented significant or perceived threats to national security interests. Traditionally, the military prepared for these wars since these wars endangered America's way of life. Of the hundreds of other military operations conducted in those intervening years, most have been operations where the majority of effort consisted of stability tasks.

In the two decades after the fall of the Berlin Wall, Army forces have led or participated in more than fifteen operations, intervening in places such as Haiti, Liberia, Somalia, the Balkans, Iraq, and Afghanistan. These operations revealed a disturbing trend throughout the world—the collapse of established governments, the rise of international criminal and terrorist networks, a seemingly endless array of humanitarian crises, and grinding poverty. The global implications of such destabilizing issues are staggering.

In the complex, dynamic operational environments of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security exist. Sources of instability that push parties toward violence include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. These factors create belts of state fragility and instability that threaten U.S. national security. While journeying into this uncertain future, leaders increasingly call on operations to reduce drivers of conflict and instability and to support social and institutional resiliencies. Such resiliencies can counter instability by building local institutional capacity to forge sustainable peace, security, and economic growth. This environment requires the military to conduct missions, tasks, and activities across the range of military operations to establish conditions for long-term stability.

Security Relationships

A complex relationship exists among security cooperation, security assistance, and the military instrument of foreign internal defense. The left side of the illustration below depicts this relationship, including how aspects of foreign internal defense and security assistance overlap. The right side illustrates how foreign internal defense focuses on internal threats to a host nation and how security assistance focuses on external threats. The column depicts how security (military, intelligence, and civilian), economic, and governance are considerations common to both foreign internal defense and security assistance. Security Force Assistance supports the military instrument of foreign internal defense, much of security assistance efforts, and some security cooperation efforts.



Ref: FM 3-07.1, *Security Force Assistance*, fig. 1-3, p. 1-7.

Cultural Awareness and Understanding

The social, economic, and political environments in which security cooperation activities are conducted requires a great degree of cultural understanding. Military support and operations that are intended to support a friendly HN require a firm understanding of the HN's cultural and political realities. History has shown that cultural awareness cannot be sufficiently developed after a crisis emerges, and must be a continuous, proactive element of theater intelligence and engagement strategies.

Cultural awareness has become an increasingly important competency for leaders at all levels. Perceptive leaders learn how cultures affect operations. Effective leaders adapt to new situations, realizing their words and actions may be interpreted differently in different cultures.



Refer to Cultural Guide SMARTbook 1 – Afghanistan (Train, Advise and Assist in a Culturally-Sensitive Manner) for three chapters on training, advising and assisting foreign security forces. Train, Advise and Assist topics include: working with host-nation forces, developing host-nation security forces, working effectively with foreign security forces, conflict resolution and meetings, linguist support and interpreters.

Chap 8

(Interorganizational Coordination) I. Fundamentals

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Jun '11), chap. I.

JP 3-08 sets forth joint doctrine to govern the activities and performance of the Armed Forces of the United States in joint operations and provides the doctrinal basis for interagency coordination and for US military involvement in multinational operations. It provides military guidance for the exercise of authority by combatant commanders and other joint force commanders (JFCs) and prescribes joint doctrine for operations, education, and training. It provides military guidance for use by the Armed Forces in preparing their appropriate plans. It is not the intent of this publication to restrict the authority of the JFC from organizing the force and executing the mission in a manner the JFC deems most appropriate to ensure unity of effort in the accomplishment of the overall objective.

I. Foundations of Interorganizational Coordination

The Department of Defense (DOD) conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. This is especially pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are governed by different authorities and have considerably different US Government (USG) governing structures and stakeholders. Interorganizational coordination aids in this by enabling participants to do one or more of the following:

- **Facilitate Unity of Effort.** Achieving national strategic objectives requires the effective and efficient use of diplomatic, informational, military, and economic instruments of national power supported by interorganizational coordination.
- **Achieve Common Objectives.** Successful interorganizational coordination enables the USG to build international and domestic support, conserve resources, and conduct coherent operations that more effectively and efficiently achieve common objectives.
- **Provide Common Understanding.** Interorganizational coordination is critical to understanding the roles and relationships of participating military commands and relevant stakeholders as well as their interests, equities, and insight into the challenges faced.

II. The Need for Unity of Effort

Meeting the challenges of current and future operations requires the concerted effort of all instruments of US national power plus foreign governmental agencies and military forces and civilian organizations. Within the USG alone, achieving unity of effort is often complicated by organizational “stovepiping,” crisis-driven planning, and divergent organizational processes and cultures. These differences have certain benefits, but are not well-suited for addressing the range of conventional and



Refer to “Joint/Interagency SMARTbook 2: *Interagency Planning and Process*” for related discussion (projected late 2015). The Department of Defense conducts interorganizational coordination across a range of operations, with each type of operation involving different communities of interests and structures. This is especially pronounced for domestic and foreign operations, which are governed by different authorities and have considerably different US Government (USG) governing structures and stakeholders.

irregular challenges that cut across available organizational expertise. Problems arise when each USG agency interprets NSC and HSC policy guidance differently, sets different priorities for execution, and does not act in concert. These issues are exacerbated by the competing interests and practices of participating foreign governments and military forces, IGOs, NGOs, and private sector entities.

Consequently, there is a need to conduct integrated planning to effectively employ the appropriate instruments of national power. A comprehensive approach seeks to stimulate a cooperative culture within a collaborative environment, while facilitating a shared understanding of the situation. In its simplest form, a comprehensive approach should invigorate existing processes and strengthen interorganizational relationships. This approach should forward the respective goals of all parties, ensuring stakeholders do not negate or contradict the efforts of others.

In military (e.g., joint) operations, unity of effort is ensured by establishing unity of command. Unity of command is based on the designation of a single commander with the authority to direct and coordinate the efforts of all assigned forces in pursuit of a common objective. While unity of command and the exercise of C2 apply strictly to military forces and operations, unified action among all interorganizational participants is necessary to achieve unity of effort in military operations involving engaged civilian organizations and foreign military forces or military participation in civilian-led operations. Unified action is the DOD doctrinal term that represents a comprehensive approach. Achieving unity of effort requires the application of a comprehensive approach that includes coordination, consensus building, cooperation, collaboration, compromise, consultation, and deconfliction among all the stakeholders toward an objective. An inclusive approach of working closely with stakeholders is often more appropriate than a military C2 focused approach.

Whole-of-Government Approach

Within the USG, elements aspire to a whole-of-government approach. This approach implies the integration of USG efforts with a plan that identifies and aligns USG goals, objectives, tasks, and supporting structures, with designation of lead, primary, coordinating, cooperating, and supporting federal agencies.

See 8-7 to 8-8 for discussion of a "Whole of Government Approach."

III. Coordinating Efforts

A. Providing Strategic Direction

Strategic direction is the common thread that integrates and synchronizes the activities of JS, combatant commands, Services, and combat support agencies. As an overarching term, strategic direction encompasses the processes and products by which the President, SecDef, and Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff (CJCS) provide policy and strategic guidance to DOD. The President, assisted by the NSC and HSC, also provides strategic direction to guide the efforts of USG agencies that represent other instruments of national power.

See facing page for further discussion.

B. Applying the Military Component

Military forces have long coordinated with USG agencies to include, but not limited to, the Department of State (DOS), Department of Justice (DOJ), Department of Transportation (DOT), United States Agency for International Development (USAID), and the intelligence community (IC), along with the adjutants general (TAGs) of the 50 states, District of Columbia, and three territories. Increasingly, relationships are being developed and institutionalized with state and local government agencies, additional USG agencies (e.g., DHS), multinational partners, IGOs such as the United Nations (UN) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO), NGOs, and HN agencies.

V. Interagency, IGOs and NGOs

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Jun '11), II-15 to II-17, IV-7 to IV-15 and app. A - C.

JP 3-08 describes key US Government departments and agencies, IGOs and NGOs — their core competencies, basic organizational structures, and relationship, or potential relationship, with the Armed Forces of the United States.

A. Interagency

Interagency is defined as of or pertaining to United States Government agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense. JP 3-08, appendix A provides descriptions of United States Government (USG) agencies with which the Department of Defense (DOD) has frequent interaction or that a deployed joint task force may encounter during the course of contingency operations.

B. Intergovernmental Organizations (IGOs)

An IGO is an organization created by a formal agreement between two or more governments on a global, regional, or functional basis to protect and promote national interests shared by member states. There are over 30 IGOs throughout the globe. These organizations represent a variety of global and regional issues and concerns. Unlike NGOs, IGOs represent political entities (e.g., the European Union, African Union); however both can have a significant impact on multinational military-related operations. US military participation in multinational efforts directed or supported by IGOs is primarily an Executive Branch decision subject to numerous constraints and restrictions.

JP 3-08, appendix C provides a summary of selected IGOs.

The United Nations

The UN is a unique international organization of 192 sovereign states, representing virtually every country in the world. It was founded towards the end of the Second World War. The member states are bound together by the principles of the UN Charter, an international treaty that spells out their rights and duties as members of the world community.

Coordination with the UN begins at the national level with DOS, through the US ambassador to the UN, officially titled the Permanent Representative. The ambassador has the status of cabinet rank and is assisted at the US Mission to the UN by a military assistant who coordinates appropriate military interests primarily with the UN Department of Peacekeeping Operations (UNDPKO) and UN Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs (UNOCHA). USG coordination with UN PO missions or agencies in-theater is through the US country team.

- The UN normally conducts PO under the provisions of a resolution or mandate from the Security Council or the General Assembly. FHA is conducted under standing authority from the General Assembly and does not require a resolution to authorize each response.
- As part of a broader UN strategy, the Integrated Mission Planning Process (IMPP) provides guidelines for a comprehensive and inclusive UN system approach to the planning of integrated PO (hereafter “integrated missions”).
- **United States Military Support.** The Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, the United Nations Participation Act of 1945, and Executive Order 10206 (Support of Peaceful Settlements of Disputes) authorize various types of US military support to the UN, either on a reimbursable or non-reimbursable basis. US military operations in support of the UN usually fall within Chapter VI (Pacific Settlement of Disputes) or Chapter VII (Action with Respect to Threats to the Peace, Breaches of the Peace, and Acts of Aggression) of the UN Charter.

Refer to JP 3-08, Annex B, "United Nations," of Appendix B, "Intergovernmental Organizations," for details regarding the UN Charter.

The North Atlantic Treaty Organization

NATO is an alliance of 28 countries from North America and Europe committed to fulfilling the goals of the North Atlantic Treaty. In accordance with the Treaty, the fundamental role of NATO is to safeguard the freedom and security of its member countries by political and military means. It provides a forum in which countries from North America and Europe can consult together on security issues of common concern and take joint action in addressing them. The Alliance is committed to defending its member states against aggression or the threat of aggression and to the principle that an attack against one or several members would be considered as an attack against all. NATO remains an IGO in which each member country retains its sovereignty. All NATO decisions are taken jointly by the member countries on the basis of consensus. NATO's most important decision-making body is the North Atlantic Council (NAC), which brings together representatives of all the Allies at the level of ambassadors, ministers, or heads of state and government. NATO has no operational forces of its own other than those assigned to it by member countries or contributed by partner countries for the purpose of carrying out a specific mission. It has a number of mechanisms available to it for this purpose – the defense planning and resource planning processes that form the basis of cooperation within the Alliance, the implementation of political commitments to improved capabilities, and a military structure that combines the functions of a MNF planning organization with an Alliance-wide system of C2 of the military forces assigned to it.

For more information, refer to Allied Joint Publication (AJP)-01(C), Allied Joint Doctrine, and JP 3-08, Annex A, "North Atlantic Treaty Organization," and Appendix B, "Intergovernmental Organizations."

C. Nongovernmental Organizations (NGOs)

An NGO is a private, self-governing, not-for-profit organization dedicated to alleviating human suffering; and/or promoting education, health care, economic development, environmental protection, human rights, and conflict resolution; and/or encouraging the establishment of democratic institutions and civil society. Working alone, alongside the US military, with other US agencies, or with multinational partners, NGOs are assisting in many of the world's trouble spots where humanitarian or other assistance is needed. NGOs may range in size and experience from those with multimillion dollar budgets and decades of global experience in developmental and humanitarian relief to newly created small organizations dedicated to a particular emergency or disaster. The capability, equipment and other resources, and expertise vary greatly from one NGO to another. NGOs are involved in such diverse activities as education, technical projects, relief activities, refugee assistance, public policy, development programs, human rights, and conflict resolution. The sheer number of lives they affect, the resources they provide, and the moral authority conferred by their humanitarian focus enable NGOs to wield a great deal of influence within the interagency and international communities.

NGOs are playing an increasingly important role in both the domestic and international arenas. Where long-term problems precede a deepening crisis, NGOs are frequently on scene before the US military. They may have a long-term established presence in the crisis area. NGOs frequently work in areas where military forces conduct military engagement, security cooperation, and deterrence activities. They will most likely remain long after military forces have departed. NGOs are independent, diverse, flexible, grassroots-focused organizations that range from primary relief and development providers to human rights, civil society, and conflict resolution organizations.

JP 3-08, appendix C provides a summary of selected NGOs.


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IV. Domestic Civil Support (Model for Coordination)

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Jun '11), pp. III-11 to III-21.

When an event occurs and the President or SecDef approves DSCA, the appropriate GCC is designated as the supported commander. In most situations, the CDRUS-NORTHCOM or CDRUSPACOM will be designated as the supported commander. As necessary, the GCC activates and deploys an initial C2 element and follow-on JTF to serve as the C2 node for the designated DOD forces responding to an event or incident. The figure below provides a model for coordination among military and nonmilitary organizations.



Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations*, fig. III-1, p. III-12.

D. Crisis Action Organization

Ref: JP 3-08, *Interorganizational Coordination During Joint Operations* (Jun '11), pp. IV-2 to IV-7.

The combatant command crisis action organization is activated upon receipt of the CJCS warning or alert order or at the direction of the CCDR. Activation of other crisis action cells to administer the specific requirements of task force operations may be directed shortly thereafter. These cells support not only functional requirements of the JTF such as logistics, but also coordination of military and nonmilitary activities and the establishment of a temporary framework for interagency coordination. Liaison and coordinating mechanisms that the CCDR may elect to establish to facilitate the synchronization of military and nonmilitary activities include:

Humanitarian Assistance Survey Team (HAST)

Early in a developing crisis, an assessment may be required to determine what resources are immediately required to stabilize a humanitarian crisis. The supported CCDR may organize and deploy a HAST to acquire information for planning. This information may include an assessment of existing conditions and requirements for FHA force structure. Before deploying, the HAST should be provided the current threat assessment; current relevant intelligence; geospatial information and services support; and embassy, DOS, and USAID points of contact. The disaster assistance response team (DART) and USAID mission can provide a great deal of this information to the HAST. Once deployed, the HAST can assess the relationship with and authority of the government of the affected country; identify primary points of contact for coordination and collaboration; determine the threat environment and survey facilities that may be used for FP purposes; and coordinate specific support arrangements for the delivery of food and medical supplies. The HAST works closely with the DART to prevent duplication of effort.

Disaster Assistance Response Team (DART)

USAID and its Office of US Foreign Disaster Assistance (OFDA) DART is the lead for foreign disaster response. OFDA may deploy a DART into the crisis area to assist coordination of the FHA effort and activate an on-call Washington, DC-based response management team. DART provides specialists trained in a variety of disaster relief skills to assist US embassies and USAID missions with the management of the USG response to a foreign disaster. The DART will also work closely with the US military during FHA operations. DARTs assess and report on the disaster situation and recommend follow-up actions.

Humanitarian Assistance Coordination Center (HACC)

The supported GCC may establish a HACC to assist with interagency coordination and planning. The HACC provides the critical link between the GCC and USG agencies, IGOs, and NGOs that may participate in an FHA operation at the theater strategic level. Normally, the HACC is a temporary body that operates during the early planning and coordination stages of the operation. Once a CMOC or civilian HOC has been established, the role of the HACC diminishes, and its functions are accomplished through the normal organization of the GCC's staff and crisis action organization. Staffing for the HACC should include a director appointed by the supported GCC, a CMO planner, an OFDA advisor or liaison if available, a public affairs officer (PAO), an NGO advisor, and other augmentation (e.g., POLAD, a preventive medicine physician, veterinarian) when required. Liaisons from USG agencies, US Army Corps of Engineers, key NGOs, IGOs, and HN agencies also may be members of the HACC in large-scale FHA operations.

Joint Logistics Operations Center (JLOC)

The JLOC supports the GCC's joint operations center (JOC) and the operations planning teams. The CCDR reviews requirements of the joint forces and establishes priorities to use supplies, facilities, mobility assets, and personnel effectively. The GCC may also

be responsible for provision of supplies for certain interagency personnel. Formed at the discretion of the GCC and operated by the GCC's J-4 current operations division, a JLOC functions as the single POC for coordinating timely and flexible logistic response into the AOR, relieving the JTF, if formed, of as much of this function as possible. The JLOC may also perform continuous coordination with strategic-level providers such as the Defense Logistics Agency, USTRANSCOM, the Services, and the GCC's staff to ensure the required flow of support to the JTF.

Liaison Section

The liaison section in foreign operations is crucial to coordination with USG agencies, NGOs, and IGOs. A liaison section assists the JFC in coordinating military activities among MNFs, other USG agencies, engaged IGOs and NGOs, the HN, and indigenous populations. Military forces, engaged agencies, and the HN should consider exchanging liaison personnel in order to maximize information flow and interagency coordination. Information should flow in both directions. NGO liaisons should have the opportunity to brief military commanders on NGO capabilities, plans, and infrastructure as well as disposition in the JOA. The CMOC facilitates coordination and exchange of information. Alternatively, the HN may establish a coordination center to organize and provide liaison personnel.

The Multinational Planning Augmentation Team (MPAT)

The MPAT program is a cooperative multinational effort to facilitate the rapid and effective establishment and/or augmentation of a multinational task force HQ. The MPAT provides responsive multinational expertise in CAP. It is a validated process for integration of other nation's militaries, IGOs, and NGOs. This structure reinforces the use of a trained cadre that have worked with IGOs and NGOs prior to a crisis within an AOR and that deploys to the task force HQ once a crisis occurs. The MPAT program develops and practices multinational planning and execution procedures for operational level task forces. By necessity, this includes coordination, collaboration, and cooperation with USG organizations, IGOs, NGOs, and HN government agencies.

Interagency Management System (IMS)


When IMS is activated, an integration planning cell may deploy from the CRSG and colocate with the designated GCC's HQ. The integration planning cell should be established in conjunction with the development of a US strategic plan. It supports the GCC in integrating the military plan with the civilian components of the US strategic and implementation plans and serves as the representation of all participating agencies and the CRSG to the GCC.

* JTF Assessment Team (JTF Considerations)

A valuable tool in the mission analysis process is the deployment of a JTF assessment team to the projected JOA. The purpose of the assessment team is to establish liaison with the ambassador or COM, country team, HN, and, if present, multinational members, UN representatives, and IGO and NGO representatives. USAID, because of the extensive contacts it develops in carrying out development work at the community level, can provide key situational awareness for JTF assessments. The JTF assessment team is similar in composition to the HAST and, if provided early warning of pending operations, may be able to conduct assessment in association with the HAST.



Refer to "Humanitarian Assistance & Disaster Relief SMARTbook" for related discussion (projected 2016). Humanitarian aid is material or logistical assistance provided for humanitarian purposes, typically in response to humanitarian crises including natural disaster and man-made disaster. Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the USAID or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.



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
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
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