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RED TEAM ARMY

Forces, Operations & Tactics



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OPFOR SMARTbook 3: RED TEAM ARMY

Forces, Operations & Tactics

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Note to Readers

In today's **complicated and uncertain world**, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve U.S. forces. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.

It has been nearly **thirty years** since a holistic explanation of the Soviet-based Opposing Force (OPFOR) was examined in the U.S. Army Field Manual 100-2 series. Recognizing this, "OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army" re-examines and outlines the doctrinal operational construct and **historical foundations of Soviet-era military forces** from the FM 100-2 series, which is now out-of-print and largely unavailable.

Second, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 reorganizes that foundational material and aligns it in keeping with **contemporary military doctrinal taxonomy** to include ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations and ADRP 3-90 Offense and Defense (Tactics).

Third, OPFOR SMARTbook 3 **translates and bridges** the strategic- and operational-level doctrine into **tactical application at the small-unit level**.

Through this triangulation, a more modern rendition of **Red Team Armies** emerges.

Opposing Forces (OPFOR)

From the U.S. doctrinal perspective, an **enemy** is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. A potential adversary is sometimes **designated as a threat**. Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the **enemy**. (FM 7-100 series)

An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow U.S. forces to train against a challenging and **plausible sparring partner** that represents the wide range of possible opponents the **military could face** in actual conflict. It enables training of all branches of the military and prepares forces for potential combat operations.

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Prologue: Opposing Forces (OPFOR) Doctrine and the Historical “Soviet Threat” Model

When the Army established its OPFOR program in 1976 with Army Regulation 350-2, it defined an OPFOR simply as “an organized force created by and from U.S. Army units to portray a unit of a potential adversary armed force.” Thus, all OPFORs were originally threat-based, in the sense that they replicated the forces, capabilities, and doctrine of a particular country officially recognized as a threat or potential adversary. In the midst of the Cold War, the 1976 regulation identified only one potential adversary against which to train: the Soviet Union. Over time, the Army developed other OPFORs.

The Soviet threat was described in great detail in the 80s with the FM 100-2 series. The three-volume set was the definitive source of unclassified information on Soviet ground forces and the Soviet model of combined arms warfare. Used together, the series provided a thorough reference on the Soviet Army. Initially, these publications were distribution-restricted publications limited to US Government agencies. In Sept ‘94, they were marked as “Approved for Public Release, Distribution is Unlimited” by TRADOC. The series is now out-of-print and largely unavailable.



FM 100-2-1: The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul ‘84)

This field manual describes the operations and tactics of Soviet general purpose ground forces. The content is based on information in Soviet writings and other open source literature. Most available information is focused on potential battle in Central Europe. This manual reflects that focus. Though Soviet military activity extends to other parts of the world, the Soviet forces opposite NATO represent a general model for Soviet forces elsewhere, as well as for forces of Soviet allies and surrogates.



FM 100-2-2: The Soviet Army: Specialized Warfare and Rear Area Support (Jul ‘84)

The term “specialized warfare,” used in the title of this FM, is intended to be an abbreviated, collective description of combat actions which, in US terminology, may be described as “special operations.” or “operations in special conditions.” Special operations include airborne, heliborne, and amphibious operations, and unconventional warfare in the enemy rear. The Soviet concept of the “rear area” visualizes modern war in an unprecedented spatial scope. This rear area concept stretches from the forward edge of the battle area (FEBA) back to the national capital.



FM 100-2-3: The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization, and Equipment (Jul ‘91)

The Soviet armed forces include five separate components: the strategic rocket forces, the ground forces, the air forces, the air defense forces, and naval forces. The generic term “Soviet Army” normally includes all but naval forces. This manual concentrates on the largest of these components, the Soviet ground forces. Highly modernized organization and equipment combine to make the Soviet ground forces the most powerful land army in the world, with unprecedented flexibility, mobility, and firepower.

In today's complicated and uncertain world, it is impossible to predict the exact nature of future conflict that might involve U.S. forces. So the military must be ready to meet the challenges of any type of conflict, in all kinds of places, and against all kinds of threats. This is the nature of the contemporary operational environment (COE), and training for such an environment requires a different type of Opposing Force (OPFOR) than that of the past.

From the U.S. perspective, an enemy is an individual, group of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military force, national entity, or national alliance that is in opposition to the United States, its allies, or multinational partners. A potential adversary is sometimes designated as a threat. In this sense, the military defines threat as "any specific foreign nation or organization with intentions and military capabilities that suggest it could become an adversary or challenge the national security interests of the United States or its allies." Once hostilities actually begin, the threat becomes the enemy.

An Opposing Force (OPFOR) is a training tool that should allow U.S. forces to train against a challenging and plausible sparring partner that represents the wide range of possible opponents the military could face in actual conflict. It enables training of all branches of the military and prepares forces for potential combat operations.


In its time, the threat-based OPFOR served the Army very well, particularly for units targeted against specific threats. The benefits of this training were borne out, for example, in Operation Desert Storm. Techniques and doctrine, including deep attack and the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, developed to cope with specific threats and honed against the OPFOR, enabled the Army to achieve decisive results on the battlefield.

More recent recent endeavors to describe threats include a strategic perspective explored in FM 7-100 Opposing Force Doctrinal Framework and Strategy (MAY 2003). Contemporary operational warfighting capabilities of the OPFOR are described in FM 7-100.1 Opposing Force Operations (DEC 2004); TC 7-100 Hybrid Threat (NOV 2010); and TC 7-100.3 Irregular Opposing Forces (JAN 2014). Additional OPFOR resources include Red Team University and the Foreign Military Studies Office (FMSO).

In the FM 7-100 series, TRADOC has created a flexible baseline for an OPFOR that can be adapted to meet a variety of different training requirements in a number of different scenarios that reflect the current operational environment. The OPFOR operational doctrine outlined represents a realistic composite of potential adversaries the Army might encounter in the real-world situations of the foreseeable future. However, the world is continually changing, as are the threats and challenges for which the Army must be prepared. The Army must remain flexible, as must the OPFOR designed to serve as a challenging sparring partner in the training environment.

Glaringly, a gap exists in our explanation of small-unit tactics, techniques and procedures of potential adversaries, threats, and enemies – particularly regarding how those tactics bridge up to operational and strategic frameworks. This gap of tactical description encompasses "state actors" within Red Team Army doctrine, as well as "non-state actors" such as insurgents, guerillas, terrorists, pirates, bandits, and crime cartels. One of the goals of this work, therefore, is to enable the development of a robust OPFOR at the small unit level in live tactical simulation, based on the construct of the historical foundations and doctrinal underpinnings of available OPFOR doctrine.

This work does not purport to define a single military by name. However, it assumes that contemporary Red Team Army doctrine has evolved from the Soviet tradition. And while the now-defunct Soviet Army is not inherently synonymous with Red Team Army, the doctrinal underpinnings, historical foundations and cultural lineage of the military forces is established. For editorial convenience, this manual may refer to the two as if synonymous. When "Soviet" is used, it is based on the historical foundations from the FM 100-2 series of the 80s and 90s (and is used in the present tense); when "Red Team Army (RTA)" is used, it refers to an amalgamation of historic enemies and current antagonists. Through a triangulation of potential, actual and historic threats, a credible OPFOR may be scripted, trained, and developed into a robust training simulation scenario.



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The following references were used in part to compile "OPFOR SMARTbook 3: Red Team Army." All military references used to compile SMARTbooks are in the public domain and are available to the general public through official public websites and designated as approved for public release with unlimited distribution. The SMARTbooks do not contain ITAR-controlled technical data, classified, or other sensitive material restricted from public release. SMARTbooks are reference books that address general military principles, fundamentals and concepts rather than technical data or equipment operating procedures.

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


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Ref: FM 100-2-1 The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics (Jul '84), chapter 2.

I. The Soviet Concept of War

To the Soviets, war is a manifestation of the class struggle. It is an expression of the conflict between the “progressive forces of socialism” and the “reactionary forces of imperialistic capitalism,” which they feel will be ultimately resolved in favor of socialism. The Soviet concept of war represents a continuation of politics. In Western perceptions, war occurs when politics fail to resolve conflicts nonviolently. The Soviets feel that war is the least desirable method by which the forces of history will move toward complete victory for socialism.



The Soviet political and military theorists compare the socialist and capitalist camps by a concept called the “correlation of forces.” This concept compares the relative political, moral, economic, and military strengths of both sides. In the Soviet view, the correlation of forces has been shifting in favor of the socialist camp since the Soviet defeat of Nazi Germany in World War II. Soviet Marxist-Leninist ideology requires the correlation to shift continuously in favor of socialism. The correlation of forces may be advanced by both violent and nonviolent means. When it is advanced by violent means, the military component of the correlation is the dominant factor.

II. The Structure of Soviet Military Thought

Soviet military doctrine is the officially accepted set of concepts that delineate the ways and means to achieve military objectives in the interest of politics. This doctrine also specifies the structure of the Soviet armed forces, allocates industrial resources and output, and orients research and development efforts to support armed forces.

Military doctrine is the blueprint drawn up by the highest Soviet political leaders that describes in specific detail the shape of the armed forces and the way they are to be used.

The formulation of Soviet military doctrine is a continuous evolutionary process based on: communist ideology, soviet foreign policy, economic and military strengths of adversaries, soviet resources and geography, history, science and technology.

Soviet military doctrine is based on an elaborate, integrated system of thought. The doctrinal concepts are precisely defined, and each has its place in a hierarchy of importance that corresponds to its military decision-making level. The system deals with all military issues, ranging from national defense policy down to platoon tactics. Soviet military officers are quite familiar with the entire system of thought and routinely express themselves in these terms. They think and formulate decisions using these concepts.

Military Science

Military science is the study and analysis of the diverse psychological and material phenomena relevant to armed combat for developing practical recommendations for the achievement of victory in war. Unlike doctrine, military science is characterized by controversy and debate. In military science, there may be several points of view, diverse "scientific" concepts, and original hypotheses that are not selected as doctrine and therefore are not accepted as official state views on military issues. Military science encompasses virtually all things military.

Military Art

Military art is the most important and primary field within military science and is the basis for strategy, operational art, and tactics. It is the theory and practice of conducting armed conflict. The principles of military art are the basic ideas and the most important recommendations for the organization and conduct of battles, operations, and warfare.

The concept of military art and its role in military science are not just empty exercises in the Marxist-Leninist theory. Many Soviet military officers hold advanced degrees in military science and are serious and intense in their study. They are convinced of the superiority of this methodology for preparing the Soviet armed forces to achieve success in modern warfare. The structure of ideas, terminology, and concepts associated with this system of thought constitutes the very vocabulary through which Soviet officers express their perceptions of military problems and the measures they develop to resolve them.

Military art applies to three separate but interdependent levels of combat activity:

- Strategic - national and theater level.
- Operational - fronts and armies.
- Tactical - division and below.

Soviet perspectives on and prescriptions for armed conflict require that tactical success leads to operational success. Similarly, operational gains lead to strategic success.

It is often difficult to separate Soviet tactics from what the Soviets call "operational art" because the maneuver divisions that are the subject of tactics are the maneuver elements that achieve the operational" objectives of armies and fronts. Moreover, the two concepts are closely interrelated in Soviet military thinking and planning. A recurring theme in Soviet military writing is the need for the commander to keep the "operational" goal in mind. The overriding objective of the combined arms offensive is to rapidly turn tactical success into operational success by a well-orchestrated combination of massive fire, maneuver, and deep, violent strikes.

III. Principles of Military Art (& Laws of War)

Ref: FM 100-2-1 *The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* (Jul '84), p. 2-2.

Soviet military theorists consider the following points to be the general principles of military art. They do not represent any special revelation of truth or radical departure from traditional military thought. However, by their emphasis on these particular points, Soviet military leaders reveal the character of their military thinking and predict the basic characteristics of future Soviet military operations.

According to the Soviets, their armed forces must:

- Be fully prepared to accomplish the mission regardless of the conditions under which war begins or must be conducted.
- Achieve surprise whenever possible. Military operations must be characterized by decisiveness and aggressiveness. Forces must strive continuously to seize and to hold the initiative.
- Make full use of all available military assets and capabilities to achieve victory.
- Insure that major formations and units of all services, branches, and arms effect thorough and continuous coordination.
- Select the principal enemy objective to be seized and the best routes for attacking it. Make a decisive concentration of combat power at the correct time.
- Maintain continuous and reliable command and control.
- Be determined and decisive in achieving the assigned mission.
- Maintain complete security of combat operations.
- Reconstitute reserves and restore combat effectiveness as quickly as possible.

These are general principles that apply to all three levels of military art: strategy, operations, and tactics. At each of these levels, there are more specific, detailed principles.

Laws of War

Soviet military thought subscribes to certain "laws of war" at the strategic level, and "principles of operational art and tactics" which apply to the actual conduct of combat.

In simple terms, these laws mean the following:

- **First Law: Be prepared.** Prepare in peacetime for the next war. Forces-in-being are the decisive factors. The side with the most and best troops and equipment at the start of war will win the war.
- **Second Law:** The side which can best sustain a protracted war will win the war.
- **Third Law:** The higher the political stakes of a war, the longer and more violent it will be.
- **Fourth Law:** War aims must be seen as just. Modern war cannot be waged without public support.

Soviet planning and preparation for war reflect a dominant feeling that war is inevitable. This is not to say that the USSR wants war, but that it is preparing for it continuously.

The Soviet state is autocratic, militarized, and centralized. Its political and economic systems give priority to military requirements. The state allocates resources and directs production for preparation and maintenance of a war footing.

The Soviet Union is prepared to exert itself at great expense to achieve its goals. It is a nation which through civil war, collectivization, attendant famine, and purges inflicted more than 20 trillion deaths on its own citizens from the Russian Revolution to the start of World War II. It is a nation that endured the loss of 20 million people during World War II. Its tolerance for sacrifice is high.

IV. Soviet Military Principles

Ref: FM 100-2-1 *The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* (Jul '84), pp. 2-3 to 2-4.

Classic Russian Military Principles

- Extreme exertion of force at the very beginning of a war.
- Simultaneity of actions.
- Economy of forces.
- Concentration.
- Chief objective - the enemy's army.
- Surprise.
- Unity of action.
- Preparation.
- Energetic pursuit.
- Security.
- Initiative and dominance over the enemy's will.
- Strength where the enemy is weak.

The most significant points of this list are:

- He who gets to the initial battle with the "most" wins.
- The enemy must be confronted with more than one situation to deal with.
- One should not be diverted by geographical objectives, but should concentrate on the destruction of the enemy's military forces.
- Detailed, exacting preparation must precede an attack.
- Design actions to preempt the opponent and keep him reacting to situations that you control.
- Concentrate on the enemy's weak points rather than his strengths.

Contemporary Soviet military theorists hold that nuclear weaponry and other means of modern warfare have modified the basic principles. By the early 1970's, the following principles dominated Soviet operational art and tactics:

Russian Military Principles of the 1970s

- Mobility and high rates of combat operations.
- Concentration of main efforts and creation of superiority in forces and means over the enemy at the decisive place and at the decisive time.
- Surprise and security.
- Combat activeness.
- Preservation of the combat effectiveness of friendly forces.
- Conformity of the goal to the actual situation.
- Coordination.

A melding of contemporary writings and those of the recent past, plus the influence of significant classical Russian principles, results in the following specific Soviet principles of operational art and tactics:

Modern Operational and Tactical Principles

- The offensive is the basic form of combat action. Only by a resolute offense conducted at a high tempo and to great depth is total destruction of the enemy achieved.
- Combat maneuver units must be mobile and capable of rapid movement.
- Fire support, command and control, and logistics must be as mobile as maneuver units.
- Conduct thorough and continuous reconnaissance. Find the enemy's weak points.
- Perform a thorough estimate of the situation and make timely, analytical decisions. Be realistic. Consider the mission, enemy, your own combat power, terrain, weather and light conditions, and time.
- Prepare and plan extensively and in detail.
- The planning and conduct of an operation must involve the full coordination and cooperation of all commanders involved.
- There must be unity of command, a single commander for any operation.
- Fully orchestrate all available combat means in a coordinated, cooperative, combined arms effort.
- Deceive the enemy. Attack from an unexpected direction at an unexpected time. Use terrain and weather to your advantage.
- Strike early with great force. Constantly strive to preempt and dominate the enemy.
- Attack the enemy violently and simultaneously throughout his depth. Carry the battle to the enemy rear with swift penetrations by maneuver units, fires, aviation, airborne and heliborne assaults and by unconventional warfare means.
- Be bold and decisive. Seize and hold the initiative.
- Prosecute an operation relentlessly, without pause, under all conditions of visibility or NBC contamination.
- Keep the enemy under constant pressure and off balance. Do not allow him to react effectively.
- Fully exploit the effects of nuclear or chemical strikes with deep attacks by all available forces.
- Whenever possible achieve mass by concentrated, massed nuclear or nonnuclear fires rather than by massing maneuver forces.
- If maneuver forces must be massed, do so rapidly. Disperse them as soon as possible after the task has been achieved.
- Maneuver first with firepower. Firepower is maneuver.
- Maneuver forces should attack the weakest points in enemy defenses. If necessary, create weak points or holes with nuclear or nonnuclear fires. Bypass enemy strongpoints to strike deeply into his rear.
- Avoid frontal attacks. Whenever possible strike the enemy in the flanks or rear.
- Maintain security of your own flanks and rear.
- Maintain sufficient follow-on force to assure achievement of the mission and to deal with contingencies.
- Maintain uninterrupted combat support.
- Maintain effective, continuous command, control, and communications. Loss of communications leads to loss of control and defeat. Maintain redundant communications at higher levels. Rely on audio and visual signals and well-rehearsed battle drills at lower levels.

VII. Chemical Warfare

Ref: FM 100-2-1 *The Soviet Army: Operations and Tactics* (Jul '84), pp. 2-9 to 2-10.

The Soviets do not perceive clear delineations between conventional, chemical, and nuclear warfare. It is possible that chemical weapons would be used early in an operation or from its onset. Chemical attacks would be directed principally against enemy positions in the forward battle area. Soviet military writings indicate that non-persistent agents would be used across the front of a Soviet attack, while persistent agents would be used to protect their flanks.

Simultaneously with strikes across the front, chemical strikes also could be expected throughout the depth of enemy defenses. These chemical strikes would be combined with other forms of conventional attack to neutralize enemy nuclear capability, command and control, and aviation. Subsequent chemical attacks might be conducted against logistic facilities.



Besides offensive chemical capability, Soviet forces are equipped with the best chemical protective and decontamination equipment in the world. They know that their chemical capability greatly exceeds that of any other nation. Not to use this capability would deprive them of a decisive advantage.

The vulnerability of densely concentrated formations to nuclear weapons caused the Soviets to alter their method of achieving mass. The "breakthrough" concept of World War II, with its massed troops and weapons, narrow frontages, and fixed echelons, is maladapted to the nuclear-threatened battlefield. Under nuclear-threatened conditions, the Soviet offensive concept would have the following features:

- Avoid concentrating forces
- Concentrate fires, but not firing weapons
- Attack across broader frontages, on multiple axes
- Avoid enemy strong points
- Probe for enemy weak points
- Penetrate where possible
- Commit follow-on forces when and where they can best contribute to success
- Drive rapidly and deeply into the enemy rear to destroy nuclear weapons and enemy defenses

[illegible]

C. Reserve Forces

A small combined arms reserve, approximately one-ninth the size of the parent unit, may be formed when two echelons are employed. Such a reserve is used primarily for security and reaction to enemy counterattack.

Ref: FM 100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment, chap. 2 and 3.

I. Historical Lineage

Red Team Armies (RTA) trace their historical lineage to the Soviet Union, which in turn was greatly influenced and shaped by German Blitzkrieg tactics of the Second World War and the linear tactics of the French and British prior to modern, mechanized warfare.



Because of these influences, RTA place enormous emphasis on the offense. So much so that if an RTA unit slows its momentum or stops to defend, resources of combat power are intentionally stripped from the stalled unit and diverted to other units still pushing the offense. Defense is not rewarded in RTA and may even be punished.

Incorporating much of the Blitzkrieg concepts of combined arms, RTA efficiently employs infantry and armor formations intermixed. Indirect fires from artillery units and also Close Air Support (CAS) from supporting helicopter gunship and fixed-wing aircraft support these formations.

III. Process-driven Tactics, Techniques, & Procedures (TTPs)

To ensure success in this complex synchronized form of mechanized maneuver warfare, RTA depends wholly on established and prescriptive processes. Such conventional processes make up the doctrine. Doctrine is studied in depth and is adhered to faithfully, unquestionably.

The Soviet military tradition is far from the only military to rely on process-driven tactics. Indeed, British Commonwealth armies only began to wean away from linear process-driven tactics in the Second World War.

Today numerous nations around the world still employ the process-driven tactics of RTA – Russia, China, North Korea, Iran, and numerous armies throughout the Middle East, North Africa, plus Central and South America. Rightfully so.

To understand why, one has to grasp the composite nature of the RTA. Nations who build RTA often have either a strict autocratic leadership that refuses to share power, or diverse ethnic groups who do not speak a common language, or both.



*RTA prescriptive drill is a viable solution for language barriers between diverse ethnicities..
(Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)*



RTA sergeants are responsible for enforcing fire and march discipline in battle, as well enforcing unit regulations in day-to-day routine. Yet sergeants are not viewed as professional leaders in RTA forces. Instead they are trusted warriors. (Courtesy of Hae-jung Larsen and OP EASTWIND.)

If the six artillery troops working on a gun cannot speak to each other except through the most rudimentary battle drill, that very prescriptive process becomes critically important for success.

Likewise, if an infantry platoon commander lacks the decision-making authority to vary from any plan, the prescriptive process of the battle order must be adhered to faithfully and without question.

It's easy to be critical of this overly prescriptive, process-driven tactical tradition from a Western military perspective. The battlespace is incredibly and inexplicably dynamic. Strict adherence to any single set of orders would seem to be doomed to failure.

To offset this probability, RTA officers are highly educated men who develop a simple plan, but a complex series of branches and sequences. For every contingency the RTA leader creates a new plan. It is an exhaustive but workable solution, placing enormous emphasis on the commander's capability and shares none of the authority or decision-making with subordinates.

Additionally, subordinate teams, crews and individuals understand the system. As such they know they must rehearse their drill until it becomes second nature. After all, battle drills are not tactics, but they are the micro-tactics that make up the larger scheme of fire and maneuver. In this manner, through exhaustively rehearsed battle drills, subordinate teams, crews and individuals learn to quickly adjust to the commander's new battle order for contingencies, branches and sequels.

Decision-making authority is not shared in the RTA. It belongs to the commander alone. Subordinate leaders and sergeants enforce the commander's authority, but do not share in it.

Because of this, RTA doctrine values prescriptive, process-driven tactics and battle drill. And again, this approach has been found to alleviate language and educational barriers between diverse ethnic groups when working closely together. But the plan must be simple, and it must be redundant.

Chap 1

V. The Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR)

Ref: FM-100-2-3 The Soviet Army: Troops, Organization and Equipment, chap. 4 and 5, and FM 100-63 Infantry-Based Opposing Force, chap 3.

I. The Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR)


At the heart of the RTA is the Motorized Rifle Regiment (MRR). The MRR is the default maneuver organization. The MRR offers far greater mobility and logistical capacity over light infantry units, which are employed only within a very narrow scope of missions and therefore are not favored.

Motorized infantry formations employ costly armored vehicles; air assault infantry units require much more expensive helicopter formations. Even the relatively cheap paratroop infantry units require expensive fixed-wing transport aircraft, plus the airfields and instillations necessary to store and repair these vehicles.



Whether the MRR is equipped with heavy tracked or lighter wheeled armored vehicles, or heavy, medium, or light all-wheel drive trucks, the MRR retains mobility as its primary asset. Whereas a light infantry formation may cover 20 miles in a day's march, the MRR can cover 200 miles just as quickly. It arrives with rested troops, ready to fight. And the MRR arrives with greater capacity in terms of small arms capability and logistical supplies to keep it in the fight longer than any light infantry formation.

Yet again, the MRR costs just a fraction of the cost of expensive airmobile formations. So the MRR just makes good sense from a cost to benefit ratio.



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


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