

# ARMY SMARTBOOK

## FIFTH EDITION

**Unified Land Operations  
(ADP/ADRP 3-0)**

**Comprehensive Guide  
to Army Doctrine 2015**

**Mission Command  
Warfighting Function**

**Movement & Maneuver  
Warfighting Function**

**Intelligence  
Warfighting Function**

**Fires  
Warfighting Function**

**Sustainment  
Warfighting Function**

**Protection  
Warfighting Function**

# OPERATIONS & DOCTRINE

**Guide to Army Operations & the Six Warfighting Functions**

**The Lightning Press**  
Norman M Wade



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(Second Printing)

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# (AODS5) The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, 5th Ed.

## Guide to Army Operations & the Six Warfighting Functions

*SECOND PRINTING. This is the 2nd printing of AODS5 (1st printing ISBN 978-1-935886-29-7), featuring updated "lay-flat" binding with spine in place of the original plastic-comb binding.*

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
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**About our cover photo:** Pulling security. Pfc. Dustin Dean, an infantryman with the 82nd Airborne Division's 1st Brigade Combat Team, pulls security behind a machine gun while the rest of his platoon searches a farmhouse for intelligence during a platoon training and evaluation exercise April 27, 2011, at Fort Bragg, N.C. Dean's battalion, the 1st Battalion, 504th Parachute Infantry Regiment, has been tasked to augment a brigade of paratroopers currently on the short-notice global response force. U.S. Army photo by Sgt. Michael J. MacLeod.

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# (AODS5) Notes to Reader

## Guide to Army Operations & the Six Warfighting Functions

Unified land operations describes how the **Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative** to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to **unified action**.

Combined arms maneuver and wide area security, executed through simultaneous **offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks**, require continuously generating and applying combat power, often for extended periods.

**Combat power** is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, intelligence, fires, **sustainment**, and protection.

The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the **warfighting functions**. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.

Comprehensive Doctrine 2015 changes and material include ADP/ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, ADP/ADRP 2-0 Intelligence, ADP/ADRP 3-09 Fires, ADP/ADRP 4-0 Sustainment, ADP/ADRP 6-0 Mission Command and ADP/ADRP 3-37 Protection. Also includes new material from ADP 3-90, ADP 3-07 Stability, ADP 3-28 DSCA and ADP 3-05 Special Operations, plus more (see the references page)!

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# Army “Doctrine 2015” Overview

Under the previous doctrine management program, the Army maintained 625 publications on the Army Publishing Directorate website and the Reimer Digital Library. Many of these manuals remained unchanged for years. In 2009, the Commander, U.S. Army Training and Doctrine Command (TRADOC), directed a reengineering of doctrine. The primary goals of the reengineering project were to reduce the number of field manuals (FM), standardize the content of manuals to less than 200 pages, and establish a more efficient doctrine management program.

In the past, the average life cycle of a doctrine publication was about three to five years. Once proponent authors begin revising it, the revision process takes from three to 24 months to complete, depending on the needs of the field. The current cycle has come a long way in adjusting to the needs in theater; however, when a rapid change is required, the system requires significant time to update a manual. The current method is viewed by many as cumbersome, slow, and unable to keep up with rapidly changing unified land operations. The primary focus of Doctrine 2015 is to produce a body of knowledge related to the conduct of operations that uses technology to leverage and incorporate leader input, especially on mission essential tasks. Doctrine development will become faster and the system will create fewer publications which will be shorter, clearer, and more digitally accessible than the current system.

Doctrine 2015 will have four categories of operational knowledge: Army doctrine publications (ADPs), Army doctrine reference publications (ADRP), field manuals (FMs), Army techniques publications (ATPs) and digital applications (APPs).

## Army Doctrine Publications (ADP)

[~15ADPs]

### Fundamental principles



## Army Doctrine Reference Publications (ADRP)

[1 per ADP]

### Detailed information on fundamentals



## Field Manuals (FM)

[50 FMs]

### Tactics and Procedures



## Army Techniques Pubs (ATP)

### Authenticated version on APD Input through wiki version



## Applications

(Interactive Media,  
Podcasts, Mobile APPs)



As the window on real-world operations and actual combat knowledge starts to close, the drive to capture the lessons from over a decade of persistent conflict is strong. Doctrine 2015 will be the vehicle for gaining and capturing that knowledge and transmitting it to the Army of the future. By breaking up doctrine into its basic components, the Army will be able to make revisions faster, retain enduring concepts, and gain lessons from battle-field experienced warriors.

Doctrine 2015 is a significant departure from the way doctrine has been developed in the past. Changing times, technical advances, demands from the field and the ever changing battlefield environment prompted these significant and necessary changes. The Army's need to teach both enduring lessons and new concepts remains constant. It will be how the Army obtains and delivers information that must change. The Doctrine 2015 system will allow this change to happen.

# The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook

## Doctrine 2015 Guide to Unified Land Operations & the Six Warfighting Functions

This is the fifth revised edition of The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, fully incorporating the new material from Change 1 (ADP 3-0 & Doctrine 2015) SMARTupdate to AODS4, along with the full scope of **complete and comprehensive** additional "Doctrine 2015" reference citation, terminology and material changes throughout!

Comprehensive Doctrine 2015 changes and material include ADP/ADRP 3-0 Unified Land Operations, ADP/ADRP 2-0 Intelligence, ADP/ADRP 3-09 Fires, ADP/ADRP 4-0 Sustainment, ADP/ADRP 6-0 Mission Command and ADP/ADRP 3-37 Protection. Also includes new material from ADP 3-90, ADP 3-07 Stability, ADP 3-28 DSCA and ADP 3-05 Special Operations, plus more (see the references page)!

## Foundations of Doctrine

*Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to **unified action**.*




Chapter 1

"The Leader's SMARTbook"

## Decisive Action

*Editor's note: For the purposes of The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, an overview of the following elements of decisive action are represented as they relate to the movement and maneuver warfighting function (including Special Operations):*



Chapter 3 - (Movement & Maneuver)

"The Battle Staff SMARTbook"

## The Six Warfighting Functions

*A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. The Army's warfighting functions link directly to the joint functions.*



Chapter 2


Chapter 3

Chapter 4

Chapter 5

Chapter 6

Chapter 7



# (AODS5) References

The following references were used to compile The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook. All references are available to the general public and designated as "approved for public release; distribution is unlimited." The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook does not contain classified or sensitive material restricted from public release.

## Army Doctrinal Publications (ADPs) and Army Doctrinal Reference Publications (ADRP)

|               |          |   |
|---------------|----------|---|
| ADRP 1-02*    | Feb 2015 | Operational Terms and Military Symbols  |
| ADP/ADRP 2-0  | Aug 2012 | Intelligence                            |
| ADP 3-0       | Oct 2011 | Unified Land Operations                 |
| ADRP 3-0      | May 2012 | Unified Land Operations                 |
| ADP 3-05      | Aug 2012 | Special Operations                      |
| ADP 3-07      | Aug 2012 | Stability                               |
| ADP/ADRP 3-09 | Aug 2012 | Fires                                   |
| ADP 3-28      | Jul 2012 | Defense Support of Civil Authorities    |
| ADP/ADRP 3-37 | Aug 2012 | Protection                              |
| ADP/ADRP 3-90 | Aug 2012 | Offense and Defense                     |
| ADP/ADRP 4-0  | Jul 2012 | Sustainment                             |
| ADP/ADRP 5-0  | May 2012 | The Operations Process                  |
| ADP/ADRP 6-0  | May 2012 | Mission Command (with Chg 1, Sept 2012) |


## Field Manuals (FMs)

|          |          |  |
|----------|----------|--|
| FM 3-34  | Aug 2011 | Engineer Operations  |
| FM 3-35  | Apr 2010 | Army Deployment and Redeployment                             |
| FM 3-52* | Feb 2013 | Airspace Control   |
| FM 5-102 | Mar 1985 | Countermobility  |
| FM 6-0*  | May 2015 | Commander and Staff Organization and Operations (w/change 1) |

## Joint Publications (JPs)

|        |          |  |
|--------|----------|--|
| JP 1*  | Mar 2013 | Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States |
| JP 3-0 | Aug 2011 | Joint Operations                                   |

\* New/updated since last publication.



# Table of Contents

## Chap 1

# Unified Land Operations (ADP/ADRP 3-0)

|   |            |
|---|------------|
| <b>I. Unified Land Operations</b>                                     | <b>1-1</b> |
| I. Unified Land Operations (Defined)                                  | 1-1        |
| - ADRP 3-0: Major Changes (from FM 3-0)                               | 1-3        |
| - Unified Land Operations (Underlying Logic)                          | 1-5        |
| II. An Operational Environment  | 1-1        |
| A. Operational and Mission Variables                                  | 1-4        |
| 1. Operational Variables (PMESII-PT)                                  | 1-4        |
| 2. Mission Variables (METT-TC)  | 1-4        |
| B. Strategic Context for Unified Land Operations                      | 1-6        |
| - The Operational Environment   | 1-6        |
| - Threats   | 1-9        |
| III. Unified Action   | 1-8        |
| A. Cooperation With Civilian Organizations                            | 1-10       |
| B. Multinational Operations   | 1-11       |
| - Alliance  | 1-11       |
| - Coalition   | 1-11       |
| IV. Joint Operations  | 1-12       |
| - The Range of Military Operations (ROMO)                             | 1-12       |
| - Joint Ops, Unified Action & the Range of Military Operations (ROMO) | 1-14       |
| A. Military Engagement, Security Cooperation, and Deterrence          | 1-15       |
| B. Crisis Response & Limited Contingency Operations                   | 1-15       |
| C. Major Operations and Campaigns                                     | 1-15       |
| V. Land Operations  | 1-13       |
| A. Expeditionary Capability and Campaign Quality                      | 1-13       |
| B. Close Combat   | 1-16       |
| VI. Operations Structure  | 1-16       |
| A. Operations Process   | 1-16       |
| - Activities of the Operations Process                                | 1-17       |
| - Army Planning Methodologies   | 1-19       |
| B. The Warfighting Functions  | 1-18       |
| - The Six Warfighting Functions                                       | 1-23       |
| C. Operational Framework  | 1-18       |
| - The Operational Framework   | 1-19       |
| - Area of Operations  | 1-20       |
| - Area of Influence   | 1-20       |
| - Area of Interest  | 1-20       |
| - Deep–Close–Security   | 1-21       |
| - Decisive–Shaping–Sustaining   | 1-21       |
| - Main and Supporting Efforts   | 1-21       |
| VII. The Law of War & Rules of Engagement                             | 1-18       |
| A. The Law of War   | 1-18       |
| B. Rules of Engagement  | 1-22       |
| VIII. Combined Arms   | 1-22       |



|   |             |
|---|-------------|
| <b>II. The Army's Operational Concept.....</b>                  | <b>1-25</b> |
| I. Goal of Unified Land Operations .....                        | 1-25        |
| II. Foundations of Unified Land Operations .....                | 1-25        |
| A. Initiative.....  | 1-25        |
| B. Decisive Action.....   | 1-27        |
| - Tasks of Decisive Action .....                                | 1-28        |
| 1. Offensive Tasks.....   | 1-28        |
| 2. Defensive Tasks.....   | 1-28        |
| 3. Stability Tasks .....  | 1-29        |
| 4. Defense Support of Civil Authority Tasks .....               | 1-29        |
| - Transitioning in Decisive Action .....                        | 1-30        |
| C. Army Core Competencies.....                                  | 1-33        |
| 1. Combined Arms Maneuver .....                                 | 1-34        |
| 2. Wide Area Security .....                                     | 1-35        |
| D. Mission Command .....  | 1-33        |
| 1. Art of Command .....   | 1-38        |
| 2. Science of Control.....                                      | 1-38        |
| III. Tenets of Unified Land Operations .....                    | 1-36        |
| A. Flexibility .....  | 1-36        |
| B. Integration .....  | 1-36        |
| C. Lethality .....  | 1-37        |
| D. Adaptability .....   | 1-37        |
| E. Depth .....  | 1-37        |
| F. Synchronization .....  | 1-37        |
| <b>III. Combat Power (&amp; the Warfighting Functions).....</b> | <b>1-39</b> |
| I. The Elements of Combat Power .....                           | 1-39        |
| II. The Six Warfighting Functions .....                         | 1-40        |
| 1. Mission Command.....   | 1-41        |
| 2. Movement and Maneuver.....                                   | 1-41        |
| 3. Intelligence .....   | 1-41        |
| 4. Fires .....  | 1-41        |
| 5. Sustainment .....  | 1-41        |
| 6. Protection.....  | 1-41        |
| III. Organizing Combat Power.....                               | 1-42        |
| A. Force Tailoring .....  | 1-42        |
| B. Task-Organizing.....   | 1-42        |
| C. Mutual Support .....   | 1-42        |
| <b>IV. Operational Art .....</b>                                | <b>1-43</b> |
| I. The Application of Operational Art .....                     | 1-43        |
| - Developing an Operational Approach .....                      | 1-44        |
| - Operational Art and Planning .....                            | 1-47        |
| - Elements of Operational Design .....                          | 1-47        |
| - Elements of Operational Art.....                              | 1-47        |
| - Principles of Joint Operations .....                          | 1-49        |
| II. The Elements of Operational Art.....                        | 1-46        |
| A. End State and Conditions .....                               | 1-46        |
| B. Centers of Gravity .....                                     | 1-46        |
| C. Decisive Points .....  | 1-48        |
| D. Lines of Operations and Lines of Effort .....                | 1-48        |
| E. Operational Reach .....                                      | 1-50        |
| F. Basing.....  | 1-51        |
| G. Tempo .....  | 1-52        |
| H. Phasing and Transitions .....                                | 1-53        |
| I. Culmination .....  | 1-54        |
| J. Risk.....  | 1-54        |

**Chap 2**

# Mission Command Warfighting Function

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| <b>Mission Command Warfighting Function .....</b>          | <b>2-1</b>  |
| I. The Exercise of Mission Command .....                   | 2-2         |
| - ADRP 6-0: Changes (from FM 6-0) .....                    | 2-4         |
| II. Mission Command Warfighting Tasks .....                | 2-6         |
| A. Commander Tasks .....                                   | 2-8         |
| B. Staff Tasks .....                                       | 2-10        |
| C. Additional Tasks .....                                  | 2-12        |
| III. Mission Command System .....                          | 2-7         |
| <b>I. Mission Command Philosophy of Command .....</b>      | <b>2-13</b> |
| I. Principles of Mission Command .....                     | 2-13        |
| II. Art of Command .....                                   | 2-16        |
| A. Authority .....   | 2-16        |
| B. Decisionmaking .....                                    | 2-17        |
| - Understanding .....                                      | 2-18        |
| - Judgment .....   | 2-19        |
| C. Leadership .....  | 2-17        |
| III. Science of Control .....                              | 2-20        |
| A. Information .....                                       | 2-21        |
| B. Communication .....                                     | 2-22        |
| C. Structure .....   | 2-23        |
| D. Degrees of Control .....                                | 2-23        |
| IV. Application of the Mission Command Philosophy .....    | 2-23        |
| - Command Presence .....                                   | 2-24        |
| <b>II. Command and Support Relationships .....</b>         | <b>2-27</b> |
| I. Chain of Command .....                                  | 2-27        |
| A. Combatant Commands .....                                | 2-28        |
| B. Joint Task Forces and Service Components .....          | 2-28        |
| II. Task Organization .....                                | 2-29        |
| III. Joint Command & Support Relationships .....           | 2-30        |
| Command Relationships Overview .....                       | 2-30        |
| A. Combatant Command (COCOM) - Command Authority .....     | 2-31        |
| B. Operational Control (OPCON) .....                       | 2-31        |
| C. Tactical Control (TACON) .....                          | 2-31        |
| Support Relationships .....                                | 2-31        |
| A. General Support .....                                   | 2-31        |
| B. Mutual Support .....                                    | 2-31        |
| C. Direct Support .....                                    | 2-31        |
| D. Close Support .....                                     | 2-31        |
| IV. Army Command & Support Relationships .....             | 2-32        |
| A. Command Relationships .....                             | 2-32        |
| B. Support Relationships .....                             | 2-33        |
| V. Command Posts .....                                     | 2-34        |
| <b>III. Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2) .....</b> | <b>2-35</b> |
| I. Key Documents .....                                     | 2-35        |
| II. Airspace Control Measures .....                        | 2-36        |
| III. Key Positions and Responsibilities .....              | 2-37        |

**Chap 3**

# **Movement & Maneuver Warfighting Function**

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| <b>Movement &amp; Maneuver Warfighting Function .....</b>            | <b>3-1</b>  |
| I. Offense and Defense (Decisive Operations) .....                   | 3-2         |
| The Tactical Level of War .....                                      | 3-2         |
| The Offense.....   | 3-2         |
| The Defense.....   | 3-2         |
| Tactical Enabling Tasks .....  | 3-2         |
| II. Stability Operations (Decisive Operations) .....                 | 3-4         |
| - Primary Army Stability Tasks.....                                  | 3-4         |
| III. Defense Support of Civil Authorities (Decisive Operations)..... | 3-6         |
| - Army Support of Civil Authorities.....                             | 3-6         |
| - Primary Purposes of Army Support.....                              | 3-6         |
| - Primary Characteristics of Army Support .....                      | 3-6         |
| IV. Special Operations .....   | 3-8         |
| - Army Special Operations Forces Critical Capabilities .....         | 3-8         |
| - Special Warfare.....   | 3-8         |
| - Surgical Strike .....  | 3-8         |
| V. Deployment & Redeployment Operations .....                        | 3-10        |
| - Force Projection.....  | 3-10        |
| - Deployment .....   | 3-10        |
| - Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN).....                              | 3-10        |
| <b>I. Tactical Echelons .....</b>                                    | <b>3-11</b> |
| - Military Units and Echelons .....                                  | 3-13        |
| <b>II. Tactical Mission Tasks (ADRP 3-90) .....</b>                  | <b>3-17</b> |
| I. The Tactical Level of War.....                                    | 3-17        |
| II. The Science and Art of Tactics .....                             | 3-18        |
| III. Tactical Mission Tasks .....                                    | 3-18        |
| - Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy.....                                   | 3-19        |
| A. Effects on Enemy Forces.....                                      | 3-20        |
| B. Actions by Friendly Forces.....                                   | 3-21        |
| C. Mission Symbols.....  | 3-22        |
| <b>III. Mobility and Countermobility .....</b>                       | <b>3-23</b> |
| I. Mobility.....   | 3-23        |
| - Mobility Operations Primary Tasks .....                            | 3-23        |
| - Offensive Considerations .....                                     | 3-23        |
| - Assured Mobility.....  | 3-24        |
| - Defensive Considerations .....                                     | 3-26        |
| II. Countermobility.....   | 3-26        |
| - Offensive Considerations .....                                     | 3-26        |
| - Defensive Considerations .....                                     | 3-27        |
| - Obstacle Planning.....   | 3-28        |
| III. Engineer Support.....   | 3-30        |
| - Engineer Framework.....  | 3-31        |
| A. Engineer Activities Across the Levels of War.....                 | 3-32        |
| B. Engineer Disciplines .....  | 3-32        |
| C. Lines of Engineer Support .....                                   | 3-36        |

# **Intelligence Warfighting Function**

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| <b>Intelligence Warfighting Function.....</b>                  | <b>4-1</b>  |
| I. Intelligence Overview.....                                  | 4-2         |
| - Intelligence in Unified Land Operations .....                | 4-2         |
| - Logic Map.....   | 4-3         |
| II. ADRP 2-0: Changes (from FM 2-0) .....                      | 4-4         |
| III. The Purpose of Intelligence .....                         | 4-6         |
| - Facilitating Understanding.....                              | 4-6         |
| A. Threats and Hazards .....                                   | 4-6         |
| B. Terrain and Weather .....                                   | 4-6         |
| C. Civil Considerations and Social Understanding.....          | 4-10        |
| IV. Intelligence Support to Commanders and Decisionmakers..... | 4-7         |
| V. Reconnaissance and Surveillance .....                       | 4-8         |
| A. Route Reconnaissance.....                                   | 4-8         |
| B. Zone Reconnaissance .....                                   | 4-9         |
| C. Area Reconnaissance.....                                    | 4-9         |
| D. Reconnaissance in Force .....                               | 4-9         |
| - Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) Program.....                 | 4-9         |
| - Reconnaissance Objective.....                                | 4-9         |
| VI. Intelligence Warfighting Function Tasks .....              | 4-11        |
| VII. Characteristics of Effective Intelligence.....            | 4-12        |
| <b>I. The Intelligence Process .....</b>                       | <b>4-13</b> |
| - The Joint Intelligence Process.....                          | 4-13        |
| - The Army Intelligence Process.....                           | 4-13        |
| - Commander's Guidance.....                                    | 4-14        |
| I. Intelligence Process Steps.....                             | 4-14        |
| A. Plan and Direct.....  | 4-16        |
| - Intelligence Planning Considerations.....                    | 4-15        |
| - Requirements Management .....                                | 4-17        |
| B. Collect.....  | 4-18        |
| - Intelligence Reach .....                                     | 4-19        |
| C. Produce .....   | 4-18        |
| D. Disseminate .....   | 4-20        |
| - Dissemination Methods and Techniques .....                   | 4-21        |
| II. Intelligence Process Continuing Activities .....           | 4-22        |
| E. Analyze .....   | 4-22        |
| F. Assess .....  | 4-22        |
| <b>II. Army Intelligence Capabilities .....</b>                | <b>4-23</b> |
| I. All-Source Intelligence .....                               | 4-23        |
| II. Single-Source Intelligence .....                           | 4-24        |
| A. The Intelligence Disciplines .....                          | 4-24        |
| B. Complementary Intelligence Capabilities.....                | 4-24        |
| C. Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED).....      | 4-24        |
| - PED Activities within Intelligence Operations .....          | 4-25        |
| - PED Enablers within the Intelligence Architecture.....       | 4-30        |

# **Fires Warfighting Function**

|   |             |
|---|-------------|
| <b>Fires Warfighting Function .....</b>                             | <b>5-1</b>  |
| I. Fires Warfighting Function .....                                 | 5-1         |
| A. Deliver Fires .....  | 5-1         |
| B. Integrate All Forms of Army, Joint and Multinational Fires ..... | 5-1         |
| C. Conduct Targeting .....  | 5-4         |
| II. Fires Overview .....  | 5-2         |
| - ADRP 3-09: Overview/Changes (from FM 3-09 and FM 3-01) .....      | 5-2         |
| - Fires Logic Diagram .....   | 5-3         |
| <b>I. Fires in Support of Unified Land Operations .....</b>         | <b>5-5</b>  |
| I. Roles .....  | 5-5         |
| II. Core Competencies .....   | 5-5         |
| A. Air Defense Artillery .....                                      | 5-5         |
| B. Field Artillery .....  | 5-5         |
| III. Fires and Joint Principles .....                               | 5-6         |
| IV. Fires - Principles and Characteristics .....                    | 5-7         |
| V. Fires in Support of Unified Land Operations .....                | 5-9         |
| VI. Fires in Support Decisive Operations .....                      | 5-10        |
| VII. Employment of Fires .....                                      | 5-12        |
| A. Air and Missile Defense Employment .....                         | 5-12        |
| B. Field Artillery Employment .....                                 | 5-13        |
| VIII. Fires and Operational Framework .....                         | 5-14        |
| A. Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining Framework .....                      | 5-14        |
| B. Deep-Close-Security Framework .....                              | 5-14        |
| <b>II. Fires Organizations and Key Personnel .....</b>              | <b>5-15</b> |
| I. Strategic Level (Fires Organizations and Personnel) .....        | 5-16        |
| II. Operational Level (Fires Organizations and Personnel) .....     | 5-17        |
| III. Tactical Level (Fires Organizations and Personnel) .....       | 5-20        |
| IV. Fires Brigade (FIB) (Fires Organizations and Personnel) .....   | 5-22        |
| V. ADA Brigade .....  | 5-24        |
| <b>III. Fires in the Operations Process .....</b>                   | <b>5-25</b> |
| I. The Operations Process .....                                     | 5-25        |
| - Operations Process & Targeting Relationship .....                 | 5-27        |
| II. Fires and Targeting (D3A) .....                                 | 5-25        |
| - Dynamic Targeting .....   | 5-26        |
| - Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate (F3EAD) ..... | 5-26        |
| A. Decide .....   | 5-26        |
| B. Detect .....   | 5-26        |
| C. Deliver .....  | 5-26        |
| D. Assess .....   | 5-26        |
| III. Fires Planning .....   | 5-28        |
| IV. Air Defense Planning .....                                      | 5-30        |
| - Defended Asset Development (CAL and DAL) .....                    | 5-30        |



**Chap 6**

# Sustainment Warfighting Function

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| <b>Sustainment Warfighting Function .....</b>            | <b>6-1</b>  |
| I. Sustainment Warfighting Function .....                | 6-1         |
| A. Logistics .....                                       | 6-1         |
| B. Personnel Services .....                              | 6-1         |
| C. Health Service Support .....                          | 6-4         |
| II. Sustainment Overview .....                           | 6-2         |
| - Sustainment Underlying Logic .....                     | 6-3         |
| <b>I. Sustainment of Unified Land Operations .....</b>   | <b>6-5</b>  |
| I. Strategic Context .....                               | 6-5         |
| II. Joint Interdependence .....                          | 6-5         |
| III. Army Sustainment Responsibilities .....             | 6-7         |
| A. Army Title 10 Sustainment Requirements .....          | 6-7         |
| B. Executive Agent (EA) .....                            | 6-7         |
| C. Lead Service .....                                    | 6-7         |
| D. Joint Command for Logistics .....                     | 6-8         |
| E. Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL) .....        | 6-8         |
| IV. Generating Forces .....                              | 6-8         |
| V. Operating Forces .....                                | 6-12        |
| VI. Intergovernmental and Interagency Coordination ..... | 6-16        |
| VII. Sustainment in Multinational Operations .....       | 6-17        |
| VIII. Joint Logistics .....                              | 6-20        |
| <b>II. Sustainment of Decisive Action .....</b>          | <b>6-21</b> |
| I. Operational Reach .....                               | 6-26        |
| - Army Prepositioned Stocks .....                        | 6-27        |
| A. Theater Opening .....                                 | 6-28        |
| B. Theater Closing .....                                 | 6-28        |
| II. Freedom of Action .....                              | 6-34        |
| A. Sustainment Preparation .....                         | 6-34        |
| B. Sustainment Execution .....                           | 6-34        |
| III. Endurance .....                                     | 6-34        |
| - Distribution .....                                     | 6-35        |
| <b>IIIA. Logistics .....</b>                             | <b>6-37</b> |
| A. Maintenance .....                                     | 6-37        |
| B. Transportation Operations .....                       | 6-37        |
| C. Supply .....  | 6-40        |
| D. Field Services .....                                  | 6-42        |
| E. Operational Contract Support .....                    | 6-42        |
| F. General Engineering Support .....                     | 6-44        |
| <b>IIIB. Personnel Services .....</b>                    | <b>6-45</b> |
| A. Human Resources Support .....                         | 6-45        |
| B. Financial Management .....                            | 6-46        |
| C. Legal Support .....                                   | 6-48        |
| D. Religious Support .....                               | 6-48        |
| E. Band Support .....                                    | 6-50        |
| <b>IIIC. Health Service Support .....</b>                | <b>6-51</b> |
| A. Casualty Care .....                                   | 6-51        |
| B. Medical Evacuation .....                              | 6-54        |
| C. Medical Logistics .....                               | 6-54        |

**Chap 7**

# Protection Warfighting Function

|  |             |
|--|-------------|
| <b>Protection Warfighting Function.....</b>                                | <b>7-1</b>  |
| I. Protection Warfighting Function.....                                    | 7-1         |
| II. The Role of Protection.....  | 7-2         |
| III. ADRP 3-37: Overview (What's New!).....                                | 7-4         |
| IV. Protection Integration in the Operations Process.....                  | 7-6         |
| V. Protection in Support of Unified Land Operations (Principles).....      | 7-10        |
| <b>I. Protection Supporting Tasks.....</b>                                 | <b>7-11</b> |
| I. Supporting Tasks.....   | 7-11        |
| A. Conduct Operational Area Security.....                                  | 7-12        |
| B. Employ Safety Techniques (Including Fratricide Avoidance).....          | 7-12        |
| C. Implement OPSEC.....  | 7-16        |
| D. Provide Intelligence Support to Protection.....                         | 7-16        |
| E. Apply Antiterrorism (AT) Measures.....                                  | 7-16        |
| F. Implement Physical Security Procedures.....                             | 7-17        |
| G. Conduct Law and Order Operations.....                                   | 7-18        |
| H. Conduct Survivability Operations.....                                   | 7-19        |
| I. Provide Force Health Protection.....                                    | 7-19        |
| J. Provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Protection Support.....   | 7-20        |
| K. Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Ops..... | 7-21        |
| L. Coordinate Air and Missile Defense.....                                 | 7-22        |
| M. Conduct Personnel Recovery.....   | 7-23        |
| N. Conduct Internment and Resettlement.....                                | 7-24        |
| II. Tasks and Systems Integration.....                                     | 7-24        |
| <b>II. Protection Planning.....</b>  | <b>7-25</b> |
| - Risk Management Process.....   | 7-25        |
| I. Initial Assessments.....  | 7-25        |
| II. Integrating Processes.....   | 7-25        |
| III. Protection Priorities.....  | 7-31        |
| IV. Critical and Defended Assets Lists (CAL and DAL).....                  | 7-32        |
| V. Scheme of Protection Development.....                                   | 7-33        |
| VI. Protection Cell and Working Group.....                                 | 7-34        |
| <b>III. Protection in Preparation.....</b>                                 | <b>7-39</b> |
| I. Protection Cell and Working Group.....                                  | 7-39        |
| II. Protection Considerations (Preparation).....                           | 7-40        |
| <b>IV. Protection in Execution.....</b>                                    | <b>7-43</b> |
| I. Protection in Unified Land Operations.....                              | 7-43        |
| II. Protection Considerations (Execution).....                             | 7-44        |
| <b>V. Protection Assessment.....</b>                                       | <b>7-45</b> |
| I. Continuous Assessment.....  | 7-45        |
| II. Lessons-Learned Integration.....                                       | 7-45        |
| III. Protection Considerations (Assessment).....                           | 7-46        |

**Chap 8**

# Doctrine 2015 (Army Operations) Glossary

|  |            |
|--|------------|
| <b>Doctrine 2015 (Army Operations) Glossary.....</b> | <b>8-1</b> |
|--|------------|

# I. Unified Land Operations

Ref: ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Oct '11) and ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), chap. 1.

## I. Unified Land Operations (Defined)

Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution (ADP 3-0). Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to unified action.

## II. An Operational Environment

An operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 3-0). Commanders at all levels have their own operational environments for their particular operations. An operational environment for any specific operation is not just isolated conditions of interacting variables that exist within a specific area of operations. It also involves interconnected influences from the global or regional perspective (for example, politics and economics) that impact on conditions and operations there. Thus, each commander's operational environment is part of a higher commander's operational environment. Likewise, operational environments of commanders at all levels are part of the overall strategic environment, which encompasses general conditions, circumstances, and influences throughout the world that can affect all operations.

Important trends such as globalization, urbanization, and failed or failing states can affect land operations. These trends can drive instability in an operational environment as well as a continuing state of persistent conflict. Persistent conflict is the protracted confrontation among state, non-state, and individual actors who are increasingly willing to use violence to achieve their political and ideological ends. In such an operational environment, commanders must seek opportunities for exploiting success. Opportunities may include greater cooperation among the local populace of a town, or perhaps the ability to advance forces along a previously unsecured route. To successfully exploit opportunities, commanders must thoroughly understand and appreciate the changing nature of an operational environment.

Modern information technology makes cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum indispensable for human interaction, including military operations and political competition. These two mediums inherently impact the influence of an operational environment and will be simultaneously congested and contested during operations. All actors—enemy, friendly, or neutral—remain potentially vulnerable to attack by physical means, cyberspace means, electronic means, or a combination thereof. Actions in and through cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum can affect the others.

An operational environment consists of many interrelated variables and sub-variables, as well as the relationships and interactions among those variables and subvariables. How the many entities and conditions behave and interact with each other within an operational environment is difficult to discern and

# ADRP 3-0: Major Changes (from FM 3-0)

*Ref: ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Oct '11), introduction.*

Army Doctrine Reference Publication (ADRP) 3-0, Unified Land Operations, is the first ADRP released under Doctrine 2015. ADRP 3-0 expands on the foundations and tenets found in Army Doctrine Publication (ADP) 3-0. This ADRP expands on the doctrine of unified land operations found in ADP 3-0. The publication of ADP 3-0 shifted the Army's operational concept from full spectrum operations to unified land operations.

ADRP 3-0 makes numerous changes from the now obsolete 2011 Field Manual (FM) 3-0, Change 1. The most significant change is the introduction of unified land operations as the Army's operational concept. The doctrine of unified land operations describes how the Army demonstrates its core competencies of combined arm maneuver and wide area security through decisive action. The term decisive action replaces the term full spectrum operations as the concept of continuous, simultaneous offense, defense, stability, or defense support of civil authorities. Defense support of civil authorities replaces civil support as a task under decisive action. ADRP 3-0 expands the discussion of the foundations and tenets of unified land operations, as well as the operational framework found in ADP 3-0.

Additional changes in ADRP 3-0 from the now obsolete 2011 FM 3-0, Change 1, includes a discussion of the range of military operations replacing the spectrum of conflict as well as a discussion of information collection replacing intelligence, reconnaissance, and surveillance (known as ISR). These changes in ADRP 3-0 now better align Army doctrine with the joint discussion of the principles of joint operations.

ADRP 3-0 remains generally consistent with the now obsolete 2011 FM 3-0, Change 1, on key topics while adopting updated terminology and concepts as necessary. These topics include the discussion of an operational environment and the operational and mission variables, as well as the discussions of unified action, law of land warfare, and combat power. As in the now obsolete 2011, FM 3-0, Change 1, mission command remains both a philosophy of command and a war fighting function. Finally, ADRP 3-0 maintains combined arms as the application of arms that multiplies Army forces' effectiveness in all operations.

ADRP 3-0 contains four chapters:

## Chapter 1

Chapter 1 shortens the discussion of the operational environment found on the now obsolete 2011 FM 3-0, Change 1, and emphasizes military operations. This chapter provides a framework of variables of an operational environment that shape their nature and affect outcomes. The chapter then discusses unified action and joint operations as well as land operations. Finally, this chapter discusses law of land warfare and combined arms.

## Chapter 2

Chapter 2 introduces the Army's new operational concept of unified land operations. It discusses how commanders apply land power as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander's end state. Chapter 2 discusses how commanders demonstrate the Army's new core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security conducted through decisive action.

## Chapter 3

Chapter 3 discusses combat power and the war fighting functions used to generate combat power in support of unified land operations. As in the now obsolete 2011 FM 3-0, Change 1, chapter 3 discusses the eight elements of combat power that include the six war fighting functions with leadership and information. Lastly, it discusses how Army forces achieve combined arms through force tailoring, task organization, and mutual support.

## Chapter 4

Chapter 4 discusses the elements of operational art and the meaning of operational art to Army forces. It elaborates on commanders and staffs applying the elements of operational art to understand, visualize, and describe how to establish conditions to achieve a desired end state. It discusses how operational art represents a creative approach to dealing with the direction of military forces and expresses an informed vision across the levels of war.

## New and Rescinded Terms

Based on current doctrinal changes, certain terms for which ADRP 3-0 is proponent have been added, rescinded, or modified for purposes of this manual. The glossary contains defined terms.

Introductory Table-1. New Army terms

| Term                             | Remarks                        |
|----------------------------------|--------------------------------|
| close area                       | New term and definition.       |
| cyber electromagnetic activities | New term and definition.       |
| decisive action                  | New term and definition.       |
| deep area                        | New term and definition.       |
| defensive task                   | Replaces defensive operations. |
| offensive task                   | Replaces offensive operations. |
| supporting effort                | New term and definition.       |
| threat                           | New term and definition.       |
| unified action partners          | New term and definition.       |

Introductory Table-2. Rescinded Army terms

| Term   | Remarks                             |
|--|-------------------------------------|
| full spectrum operations                                       | Rescinded.                          |
| intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance                 | Replaced by information collection. |
| intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance integration     | Rescinded.                          |
| intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance synchronization | Rescinded.                          |
| operational adaptability                                       | Rescinded.                          |
| operational theme  | Rescinded.                          |
| peacetime military engagement                                  | Rescinded.                          |

## Modified Terms

The following terms were either modified, retained based on common English usage but no longer formally defined, or adopted the joint definition. Refer to the glossary defined terms.

### Modified the definition

close combat  
combat power  
combined arms  
decisive operation  
exterior lines  
fires warfighting function  
hybrid threat  
inform and influence activities  
intelligence warfighting function  
interior lines  
line of effort  
line of operations  
main effort  
mission command warfighting function

movement and maneuver  
warfighting function  
phase  
shaping operation  
support area  
task-organizing

### Adopts the joint definition

assessment  
commander's intent  
support

### Retained based on common English usage. No longer formally defined.

approach  
compel

defensive operations  
depth  
direct approach  
disintegrate  
dislocate  
forward operating base  
indirect approach  
irregular warfare  
offensive operations  
operational pause  
persistent conflict  
rear area  
situational awareness  
supporter  
unassigned area  
urban operation



always results in differing circumstances. Different actor or audience types do not interpret a single message in the same way. Therefore, no two operational environments are the same.

In addition, an operational environment continually evolves. This evolution results from humans interacting within an operational environment as well as from their ability to learn and adapt. As people take action in an operational environment, they change that environment. Other variables may also change an operational environment. Some changes are anticipated while others are not. Some changes are immediate and apparent while other changes evolve over time or are extremely difficult to detect.

The complex and dynamic nature of an operational environment may make determining the relationship between cause and effect difficult and may contribute to the uncertainty of military operations. Commanders must continually assess and reassess their operational environments. They seek a greater understanding of how the changing nature of threats and other variables affect not only their forces but other actors as well. Commanders with their staffs use the Army design methodology, operational variables, and mission variables to analyze an operational environment in support of the operations process.

## A. Operational and Mission Variables

An operational environment for each operation differs and evolves as each operation progresses. Army leaders use operational variables to analyze and understand a specific operational environment in which they are conducting operations. They use mission variables to focus on specific elements of an operational environment during mission analysis.

### 1. Operational Variables (PMESII-PT)

Army planners describe conditions of an operational environment in terms of operational variables. Operational variables are those aspects of an operational environment, both military and nonmilitary, that may differ from one operational area to another and affect operations. Operational variables describe not only the military aspects of an operational environment but also the population's influence on it. Army planners analyze an operational environment in terms of eight interrelated operational variables: **political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, and time (PMESII-PT)**. As soon as a commander and staff have an indication of where their unit will probably deploy, they begin analyzing the operational variables associated with that location. They continue to refine and update that analysis even after receiving a specific mission and throughout the course of the ensuing operation.

### 2. Mission Variables (METT-TC)

Upon receipt of a warning order or mission, Army leaders filter relevant information categorized by the operational variables into the categories of the mission variables used during mission analysis. They use the mission variables to refine their understanding of the situation. The mission variables consist of **mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC)**. Incorporating the analysis of the operational variables with METT-TC ensures Army leaders consider the best available relevant information about conditions that pertain to the mission.



*Refer to The Battle Staff SMARTbook (Leading, Planning & Conducting Military Operations) for discussion of operational and mission variables (PMESII-PT and METT-TC), as well as the operations process. The operations process (p. 1-17) is used to drive the conceptual and detailed planning necessary to understand, visualize, and describe the operational environment; make and articulate decisions; and direct, lead, and assess military operations.*


## 1-4 (Unified Land Operations) I. Military Operations

# Unified Land Operations

Ref: ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (Oct '11).

Unified land operations describes how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability operations in order to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, is the Army's basic warfighting doctrine and is the Army's contribution to unified action.

## Unified Land Operations (Underlying Logic)



Ref: ADP 3-0, Unified Land Operations, fig. 1, pp. iii to iv.

See pp. 1-26 to 1-31 for discussion of decisive action; 1-34 to 1-35 for Army core competencies; chap. 6 for mission command; 1-36 to 1-37 for tenets; 1-43 to 1-54 for operational art; 1-16 to 1-17 for the operations process; 1-20 to 1-21 for the operational framework; and 1-40 to 1-41 for the six warfighting functions.

## B. Strategic Context (Unified Land Operations)

Ref: ADP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (Oct '11), pp. 2 to 4.

Army forces are employed within a strategic context defined by the specific operational environment, the character of the friendly force, and the character of the threat. Underpinning the strategic context enables Army forces to preserve vital national interests; foremost among these are sovereignty in the homeland and the United States Constitutional form of government.

### The Operational Environment

The operational environment is a composite of the conditions, circumstances, and influences that affect the employment of capabilities and bear on the decisions of the commander (JP 1-02).

Army leaders plan, prepare, execute, and assess operations by analyzing the operational environment in terms of the operational variables and mission variables. The operational variables consist of political, military, economic, social, information, infrastructure, physical environment, time (known as PMESII-PT). The mission variables consist of mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, civil considerations (known as METT-TC). How these variables interact in a specific situation, domain (land, maritime, air, space, or cyberspace), area of operations, or area of interest describes a commander's operational environment but does not limit it. No two operational environments are identical, even within the same theater of operations, and every operational environment changes over time. Because of this, Army leaders consider how evolving relevant operational or mission variables affect force employment concepts and tactical actions that contribute to the strategic purpose.

*See pp. 1-20 to 1-21 for further discussion of the operational environment.*

Operational environments are not static. Within an operational environment, an Army leader may conduct major combat, military engagement, and humanitarian assistance simultaneously. Army doctrine has always stated that Army forces must be prepared to transition rapidly from one type of operation to another. A decade of sustained combat and deployments has refined that understanding. Army forces simultaneously and continuously combine offensive, defensive, and stability operations through a blend of combined arms maneuver and wide area security.

The homeland is a distinct part of the operational environment for Army forces. Homeland defense requires simultaneous and continuous application of combined arms maneuver and wide area security in coordination with designated civil authorities. Continuous assessment of the mission variables enables Army leaders to adjust the mix of core competencies to gain a position of relative advantage over the threat (whether natural disaster or enemy attack) against populations and infrastructure.

### Character of the Friendly Force

Army forces operate as part of a larger national effort characterized as unified action. Army leaders must integrate their actions and operations within this larger framework, collaborating with entities outside their direct control. All echelons are required to incorporate such integration, but it tends to become markedly more demanding at higher echelons. Senior Army leaders may find that integration within unified action requires more of their time and energy than the synchronization of their own operations.

Effective unified action requires Army leaders who can understand, influence, and cooperate with unified action partners. The Army depends on its joint partners for capabilities that do not reside within the Army, and it cannot operate effectively without their support. Likewise, government agencies outside the Department of Defense possess knowledge, skills, and capabilities necessary for success. The active cooperation of partners often allows Army leaders to capitalize on organizational strengths while offsetting weaknesses. Only by creating a shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with all elements of the friendly force—a key element of mission command—can Army leaders integrate their actions within unified action and synchronize their own operations.

Unified action may require inter-organizational efforts to build the capacity of partners to secure populations, protect infrastructure, and strengthen institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive inter-organizational activities, programs, and engagements that enhance the ability of partners for security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates the capabilities of the operating and generating forces, to include special operations forces, to support capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation activities. Supported by the appropriate policy, legal frameworks, and authorities, the Army leads security force assistance for partner units, institutions, and security sector functions. Army operating and special operations forces units train and advise partner units to develop individual and unit proficiency in security operations. Army security cooperation activities enable other inter-organizational coordination to build partner capacity for governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions.

## Character of the Threat

Threats are not static or monolithic. Threats can arise from divergent interests or competition among states, groups, or organizations in an operational environment. While it is possible to anticipate characteristics of potential future conflict, dynamics of the operational variables preclude making completely accurate predictions about whom and where Army forces might fight. The most likely security threats that Army forces will encounter are best described as hybrid threats. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, criminal elements, or a combination of these forces and elements all unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. Hybrid threats may involve nation-state adversaries that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with nation-states.

Threats may use sophisticated weapons in specific niches to create or exploit vulnerabilities. Threats may organize themselves for operations over many months. They often work to secure the active support of other regional powers. In the theater of operations or homeland, threats may seek to disrupt U.S. activities through cyber attacks and terrorism. Threats attempt to isolate and defeat U.S. tactical formations while avoiding battle under unfavorable conditions. They seek to be decisive by using tactical engagements to erode U.S. national or political commitment to the strategic purpose of the operation. Hybrid threats may choose to fight a protracted conflict in populated areas. Often they use people and urban settings to their advantage. They seek populations for refuge, for support, and to shield against attack and detection by U.S. forces. The theater of operations often contains more space and people than U.S. forces can directly control. Army leaders make risk mitigation decisions about where and how to employ their forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy without alienating or endangering noncombatants.

The most challenging potential enemy comes in two forms. One form is a non-state entity possessing weapons of mass destruction or other unique methods to challenge U.S. dominance by attacking public will. This enemy could lack a clearly defined organization or geographic location on which U.S. forces can focus. This enemy presents a formidable challenge for decisive operations.

The other form is a nuclear-capable nation-state partnered with one or more non-state actors through ideological, religious, political, or other ties. This enemy can employ advanced information technology, conventional military forces armed with modern equipment, and irregular forces at various levels of organization, training, and equipment. This enemy often retains control of conventional forces and operates irregular forces at various levels of autonomy, with some groups sharing only one or more objectives with the state actor. In some cases, defeating U.S. forces may be the only objective uniting the cooperating actors.

*See p. 1-9 for further discussion.*

### III. Unified Action

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve unity of effort (JP 1). As military forces synchronize actions, they achieve unity of effort. Unified action includes actions of military forces synchronized with activities of other government agencies, nongovernmental and intergovernmental organizations, and the private sector. Military forces play a key role in unified action before, during, and after operations through engagement. The Army's contribution to unified action is unified land operations. Army forces coordinate operations with unified action partners. Unified action partners are those military forces, governmental and nongovernmental organizations, and elements of the private sector with whom Army forces plan, coordinate, synchronize, and integrate during the conduct of operations. Unified action partners include joint forces and components, multinational forces, and U.S. government agencies and departments.

Interagency coordination is inherent in unified action. Within the context of Department of Defense involvement, interagency coordination is the coordination that occurs between elements of Department of Defense, and engaged US Government agencies and departments for the purpose of achieving an objective (JP 3-0). Army forces conduct and participate in interagency coordination using strategic communication and defense support to public diplomacy. Combatant commanders play a pivotal role in unified action. However, subordinate commanders also integrate and synchronize their operations directly with the activities and operations of other military forces and nonmilitary organizations in their areas of operations. Additionally, activities of the host nation and local populace should be considered. For the Army, this is unified land operations.

Unified action may require interorganizational coordination to build the capacity of our partners. Interorganizational coordination is the interaction that occurs among elements of the Department of Defense; engaged United States Government agencies; state, territorial, local, and tribal agencies; foreign military forces and government agencies; intergovernmental organizations; nongovernmental organizations; and the private sector (JP 3-08). Building partner capacity secures populations, protects infrastructure, and strengthens institutions as a means of protecting common security interests. Building partner capacity is the outcome of comprehensive interorganizational activities, programs, and military-to-military engagements that enhance the ability of partners to establish security, governance, economic development, essential services, rule of law, and other critical government functions. The Army integrates capabilities of the operating and generating forces to support interorganizational capacity-building efforts, primarily through security cooperation interactions.

Security cooperation is all Department of Defense interactions with foreign defense establishments to build defense relationships that promote specific US security interests, develop allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations, and provide US forces with peacetime and contingency access to a host nation (JP 3-22). Security cooperation provides the means to build partner capacity. The interactions of security cooperation encourage and enable international partners to work with the United States to achieve strategic objectives. These objectives include:

- Building defensive and security relationships that promote specific U.S. security interests, including all international armaments cooperation activities and security assistance activities
- Developing allied and friendly military capabilities for self-defense and multinational operations
- Providing U.S. forces with peacetime and contingency access to host nations



# Threats

Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), pp. 1-2 to 1-3.

Threats are a fundamental part of an overall operational environment for any operation but are discussed separately here simply for emphasis. A threat is any combination of actors, entities, or forces that have the capability and intent to harm United States forces, United States national interests, or the homeland. Threats may include individuals, groups of individuals (organized or not organized), paramilitary or military forces, nation-states, or national alliances. When threats execute their capability to do harm to the United States, they become enemies.

In general, the various actors in any operational area can qualify as a threat, an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend.

## Enemy

An enemy is a party identified as hostile against which the use of force is authorized. An enemy is also called a combatant and is treated as such under the law of war.

## Adversary

An adversary is a party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged (JP 3-0).

## Neutral

A neutral is a party identified as neither supporting nor opposing friendly or enemy forces. Land operations often prove complex because a threat, an enemy, an adversary, a neutral, or a friend intermix, often with no easy means to distinguish one from another.

## \* Hybrid Threat

The term hybrid threat has evolved to capture the seemingly increased complexity of operations, the multiplicity of actors involved, and the blurring between traditional elements of conflict. A hybrid threat is the diverse and dynamic combination of regular forces, irregular forces, terrorist forces, and/or criminal elements unified to achieve mutually benefiting effects. Hybrid threats combine regular forces governed by international law, military tradition, and custom with unregulated forces that act with no restrictions on violence or their targets. These may involve nation-state actors that employ protracted forms of warfare, possibly using proxy forces to coerce and intimidate, or non-state actors using operational concepts and high-end capabilities traditionally associated with states. Such varied forces and capabilities enable hybrid threats to capitalize on perceived vulnerabilities, making them particularly effective.

Enemies may employ sophisticated weapons in specific niches to attack perceived U.S. weaknesses. They may threaten to employ chemical, biological, radiological, or nuclear weapons, targeting concentrations of U.S. forces and urban centers. When projecting power into a region, Army leaders may find themselves without one or more of the advantages they normally have. U.S. forces encountering new and unanticipated enemy capabilities have to rapidly adapt while engaging in operations. Enemies may organize themselves for highly decentralized operations over a protracted period. They will work to secure the active support of other regional powers and supporters. Enemies seek to create disruptive effects oriented toward U.S. activities within the homeland through cyber attacks and terrorism.



Refer to *The Counterterrorism & Hybrid Threat SMARTbook (Guide to Terrorism in the 21st Century)*. Terrorism has evolved as a preferred tactic for ideological extremists around the world. In joint doctrine, CT is simply defined as operations that include the offensive measures taken to prevent, deter, preempt, and respond to terrorism. In addition to any diplomatic and law enforcement actions, the US has typically viewed CT missions as special operations by covert, clandestine, or low visibility means.

times rests heavily on small-unit and company-grade leaders charged with maintaining good order and discipline within their respective units. The Soldier's Rules in Army Regulation (AR) 350-1 distill the essence of the law of war. They outline the ethical and lawful conduct required of Soldiers in operations.

## VIII. Combined Arms

Applying combat power depends on combined arms to achieve its full destructive, disruptive, informational, and constructive potential. Combined arms is the synchronized and simultaneous application of arms to achieve an effect greater than if each arm was used separately or sequentially. Combined arms integrates leadership, information, and each of the war fighting functions and their supporting systems. Used destructively, combined arms integrates different capabilities so that counter-acting one makes the enemy vulnerable to another. Used constructively, combined arms multiplies the effectiveness and efficiency of Army capabilities used in stability or defense support of civil authorities.

Combined arms uses the capabilities of each war fighting function and information in complementary and reinforcing capabilities.

- **Complementary Capabilities.** Complementary capabilities protect the weaknesses of one system or organization with the capabilities of a different war fighting function. For example, commanders use artillery (fires) to suppress an enemy bunker complex pinning down an infantry unit (movement and maneuver). The infantry unit then closes with and destroys the enemy. In this example, the fires war fighting function complements the movement and maneuver war fighting function.
- **Reinforcing Capabilities.** Reinforcing capabilities combine similar systems or capabilities within the same war fighting function to increase the function's overall capabilities. In urban operations, for example, infantry, aviation, and armor (movement and maneuver) often operate close to each other. This combination reinforces the protection, maneuver, and direct fire capabilities of each. The infantry protects tanks from enemy infantry and antitank systems; tanks provide protection and firepower for the infantry. Attack helicopters maneuver above buildings to fire from positions of advantage, while other aircraft help sustain the ground elements. Army space-enabled capabilities and services such as communications and global positioning satellites enable communications, navigation, situational awareness, protection, and sustainment of land forces.

### Joint Capabilities

Joint capabilities—such as close air support and special operations forces—can complement or reinforce Army capabilities throughout both the generating force and the operating force. The generating force consists of those Army organizations whose primary mission is to generate and sustain the operational Army's capabilities for employment by joint force commanders. Operating forces consist of those forces whose primary missions are to participate in combat and the integral supporting elements thereof. Often, commanders in the operating force and commanders in the generating force subdivide specific responsibilities. Army generating force capabilities and organizations are linked to operating forces through co-location and reach back.

Combined arms multiplies Army forces' effectiveness in all operations. Units operating without support of other capabilities generate less combat power and may not accomplish their mission. Employing combined arms requires highly trained Soldiers, skilled leadership, effective staff work, and integrated information systems. Commanders synchronize combined arms through mission command to apply the effects of combat power to the best advantage. They conduct simultaneous combinations of offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to defeat an opponent on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander's end state.

# II. The Army's Operational Concept

Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), chap. 2.

## I. Goal of Unified Land Operations

The goal of unified land operations is to apply land power as part of unified action to defeat the enemy on land and establish conditions that achieve the joint force commander's end state. Today's operational environments require commanders to demonstrate the core competencies of combined arms maneuver and wide area security conducted through offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to reach this goal.

Unified land operations is the Army's operational concept and the Army's contribution to unified action. The central idea of unified land operations is how the Army seizes, retains, and exploits the initiative to gain and maintain a position of relative advantage in sustained land operations through simultaneous offensive, defensive, and stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks to prevent or deter conflict, prevail in war, and create the conditions for favorable conflict resolution. Where possible, military forces working with unified action partners seek to prevent or deter threats. However, if necessary, military forces possess the capability in unified land operations to prevail over aggression.

## II. Foundations of Unified Land Operations

By integrating the four foundations of unified land operations—initiative, decisive action, Army core competencies, and mission command—Army commanders can achieve strategic success. Strategic success requires full integration of U.S. military operations with the efforts of unified action partners. The foundations of unified land operations begin and end with the exercise of individual and operational initiative. Initiative is used to gain a position of advantage that degrades and defeats the enemy throughout the depth of an organization. The Army demonstrates its core competencies through decisive action. The **Army's two core competencies—combined arms maneuver and wide area security**—provide the means for balancing the application of Army war fighting functions within the tactical actions and tasks inherent in the offense, defense, and stability overseas, or defense support of civil authorities in the United States. By demonstrating the two core competencies, Army forces defeat or destroy an enemy, seize or occupy key terrain, protect or secure critical assets and populations, and prevent the enemy from gaining a position of advantage. The philosophy of mission command—the exercise of authority and direction by the commander using mission orders to enable disciplined initiative within the commander's intent—guides leaders in the execution of unified land operations.

See pp. 1-34 to 1-35 for discussion of the Army's two core competencies.

### A. Initiative

All Army operations aim to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative and achieve decisive results. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation. Individual initiative is the willingness to act in the absence of orders, when existing orders no longer fit the situation, or when unforeseen opportunities or threats arise. Initiative gives all operations the spirit, if not the form, of the offense. It originates in the principle of war of the offensive. This principle goes beyond simply attacking. It requires action to change the situation on the ground. Risk and opportunity are intrinsic in seizing the initiative. To seize the initiative,

# III. Tenets of Unified Land Operations

Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), pp. 2-12 to 2-14.

The tenets of unified land operations describe the Army's approach to generating and applying combat power in campaigns and major operations. A campaign is a series of related major operations aimed at achieving strategic and operational objectives within a given time and space (JP 5-0). A major operation is a series of tactical actions (battles, engagements, strikes) conducted by combat forces of a single or several Services, coordinated in time and place, to achieve strategic or operational objectives in an operational area (JP 3-0). A single joint force commander conducts these actions simultaneously or sequentially according to a common plan. Subordinate Service and functional component commanders (and joint force commanders when subordinate joint forces are established) command and control their forces executing the campaign's major operations. For Army forces, an operation is a military action, consisting of two or more related tactical actions, designed to achieve a strategic objective, in whole or in part. A tactical action is a battle or engagement employing lethal and non-lethal actions designed for a specific purpose relative to the enemy, the terrain, friendly forces, or other entity. Tactical actions include widely varied activities. They can include an attack to seize a piece of terrain or destroy an enemy unit, the defense of a population, and the training of other militaries to assist security forces as part of building partner capacity. Army operations are characterized by six tenets:

## A. Flexibility

To achieve tactical, operational, and strategic success, commanders seek to demonstrate flexibility in spite of adversity. They employ a versatile mix of capabilities, formations, and equipment for conducting operations. Flexibility is an important trait of effective leaders. Commanders enable adaptive forces through flexibility, which facilitates collaborative planning and decentralized execution. They exercise mission command to achieve maximum flexibility and foster individual initiative. To adapt, leaders constantly learn from experience (their own and that of others) and apply new knowledge to each situation. Flexible plans help units adapt quickly to changing circumstances in operations. Commanders build opportunities for initiative by anticipating events that allow them to operate inside of the enemy's decision cycle or react promptly to deteriorating situations. Flexibility and innovation are at a premium, as are creative and adaptive leaders. As knowledge increases, the Army continuously adapts to changes in an operational environment. Such adaptation enhances flexibility across the range of military operations. The Army requires flexibility in thought, plans, and operations to be successful in unified land operations.

## B. Integration

Army forces do not operate independently but as a part of a larger unified action. Army leaders integrate Army operations within this larger effort. Through the mission command war fighting function, commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force. Integration involves efforts to exercise inform and influence activities with unified action partners and efforts to conform Army capabilities and plans to the larger concept. Commanders extend the depth of operations through joint integration.

When determining an operation's depth, commanders consider their own capabilities as well as joint capabilities and limitations. They use these capabilities to ensure actions executed at an operational depth receive robust and uninterrupted support. Commanders sequence and synchronize operations in time and space to achieve simultaneous effects throughout an operational area. Army leaders seek to use Army capabilities to complement those of their unified action partners; they depend on those partners to provide capabilities that supplement or are not organic to Army forces. Effective integration requires creating shared understanding and purpose through collaboration with unified action partners.

## C. Lethality

Effective decisive action relies on lethality. The capacity for physical destruction is a foundation of all other military capabilities, the most basic building block for military operations. Army leaders organize, equip, train, and employ their formations for unmatched lethality under a wide range of conditions. Lethality is a persistent requirement for Army organizations, even in conditions where only the implicit threat of violence suffices to accomplish the mission through non-lethal engagements and activities.

An inherent, complementary relationship exists between using lethal force and applying military capabilities for non-lethal purposes. Though each situation requires a different mix of violence and constraint, lethal and non-lethal actions used together complement each other and create dilemmas for opponents. Lethal actions are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive tasks. However, non-lethal actions are also important contributors to combined arms operations, regardless of which element of decisive action dominates. Finding ways to accomplish the mission with an appropriate mix of lethal and non-lethal actions remains an important consideration for every commander.

## D. Adaptability

Adaptability reflects a quality that Army leaders and forces exhibit through critical thinking, their comfort with ambiguity and uncertainty, their willingness to accept prudent risk, and their ability to rapidly adjust while continuously assessing the situation. They accept that no prefabricated solutions to problems exist. Army leaders adapt their thinking, their formations, and their employment techniques to the specific situations they face.

Effective units adapt. Adaptability is essential to seizing, retaining, and exploiting the initiative based on relevant understanding of the specific situation. For example, leaders demonstrate adaptability while adjusting the balance of lethal and non-lethal actions necessary to achieve a position of relative advantage and set conditions for conflict resolution within their areas of operations. Transitions between operations, whether anticipated or unanticipated, also demonstrate adaptability as leaders cope with changes in an operational environment. These leaders enable adaptive forces through flexible, collaborative planning and decentralized execution. Adaptability results in teams that anticipate transitions, accept risks to create opportunities, and influence all partners.

## E. Depth

Depth is the extension of operations in time, space, or purpose, including deep-close-security operations, to achieve definitive results. Army leaders strike enemy forces throughout their depth, preventing the effective employment of reserves, command and control nodes, logistics, and other capabilities not in direct contact with friendly forces. Operations in depth can disrupt the enemy's decision cycle. These operations contribute to protecting the force by destroying enemy capabilities before the enemy can use them. Commanders balance their forces' tempo and momentum to produce simultaneous results throughout their operational areas. To achieve simultaneity, commanders establish a higher tempo to target enemy capabilities located at the limit of a force's operational reach.

Executing operations in depth is equally important when performing stability tasks. Commanders act to keep threats from operating outside the reach of friendly forces. Unified land operations achieves the best results when the enemy must cope with U.S. actions throughout the enemy's entire physical, temporal, and organizational depth. Army forces use combined arms, advanced information systems, and joint capabilities to increase the depth of friendly operations.

## F. Synchronization

Synchronization is the arrangement of military actions in time, space, and purpose to produce maximum relative combat power at a decisive place and time (JP 2-0). It is the ability to execute multiple related and mutually supporting tasks in different locations at the same time, producing greater effects than executing each in isolation. For example, synchronization of information collection, obstacles, direct fires, and indirect fires results in the destruction of an enemy formation. When conducting offensive tasks, synchronizing forces along multiple lines of operations temporarily disrupts the enemy organization and allows for exploitation.




# III. Combat Power (and Warfighting Functions)

Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), chap. 3.

## I. The Elements of Combat Power

Combined arms maneuver and wide area security, executed through simultaneous offensive, defensive, stability, or defense support of civil authorities tasks, require continuously generating and applying combat power, often for extended periods. Combat power is the total means of destructive, constructive, and information capabilities that a military unit or formation can apply at a given time. Army forces generate combat power by converting potential into effective action. To execute combined arms operations, commanders conceptualize capabilities in terms of combat power. Combat power has eight elements: leadership, information, mission command, movement and maneuver, fires, sustainment, protection, and intelligence. The Army collectively describes the last six elements as the warfighting functions. Commanders apply combat power through the warfighting functions using leadership and information.



Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, fig. 3-1, p. 3-1.

Generating and maintaining combat power throughout an operation is essential to success. Factors contributing to generating combat power include employing reserves, rotating committed forces, and focusing joint support. Commanders balance the ability to mass lethal and non-lethal effects with the need to deploy and sustain the units that produce those effects. They balance the ability of accomplishing the mission with the ability to project and sustain the force.



Refer to *The Leader's SMARTbook* for complete discussion of the basis of leadership; the Army leader; leading, developing, achieving; counseling, coaching, mentoring; training for full spectrum operations and METL development; training plans, meetings and schedules; training execution and training exercises; training assessments and AARs!

Commanders apply leadership through mission command. Leadership is the multiplying and unifying element of combat power. The Army defines leadership as the process of influencing people by providing purpose, direction, and motivation, while operating to accomplish the mission and improve the organization. An Army leader, by virtue of assumed role or assigned responsibility, inspires and influences people to accomplish organizational goals.

Information enables commanders at all levels to make informed decisions on how best to apply combat power. Ultimately, this creates opportunities to achieve definitive results. Knowledge management enables commanders to make informed, timely decisions despite the uncertainty of operations. Information management helps commanders make and disseminate effective decisions faster than the enemy can. Every operation requires complementary tasks of inform and influence activities that affect the commander's intent and concept of operations. Every operation also requires cyber electromagnetic activities. These activities ensure information availability, protection, and delivery as well as a means to deny, degrade, or disrupt the enemy's use of its command and control systems and other cyber capabilities. Commanders use information and a mission command system to understand, visualize, describe, and direct operations.

## II. The Six Warfighting Functions

Commanders use the warfighting functions to help them exercise command and to help them and their staffs exercise control. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions and training objectives. All warfighting functions possess scalable capabilities to mass lethal and nonlethal effects. The Army's warfighting functions link directly to the joint functions.

**The Six Warfighting Functions**

- 1** **Mission Command**
- 2** **Movement and Maneuver**
- 3** **Intelligence**
- 4** **Fires**
- 5** **Sustainment**
- 6** **Protection**

Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations*, pp. 3-2 to 3-6.

See facing page (p. 1-41) for a listing and discussion of each of the six warfighting functions. Each of the six warfighting function has a corresponding chapter within *The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook*.

# Mission Command Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 6-0, Mission Command (May '12) and ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (May '12), pp. 3-2 to 3-3. See also p. 1-41.*

The mission command warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that develop and integrate those activities enabling a commander to balance the art of command and the science of control in order to integrate the other warfighting functions. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate numerous processes and activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command.

Mission command encourages the greatest possible freedom of action from subordinates. While the commander remains the central figure in mission command, it enables subordinates to develop the situation. Through disciplined initiative in dynamic conditions within the commander's intent, subordinates adapt and act decisively. Mission command creates a shared understanding of an operational environment and the commander's intent to establish the appropriate degree of control. Collaborative engagement among commanders, staffs, and unified action partners helps clarify the meaning of events or situations embedded in their unique and continually evolving operational environment. They share information, knowledge, perceptions, and concepts regardless of physical location. The art of command is the creative and skillful exercise of authority through decision making and leadership. As commanders exercise the art of command, they perform the following tasks:

- Drive the operations process through their activities of understanding, visualizing, describing, directing, leading, and assessing operations
- Develop teams, both within their own organizations and with joint, interagency, and multinational partners
- Inform and influence audiences, inside and outside their organizations

The commander leads the staff's tasks under the science of control. The science of control consists of systems and procedures to improve the commander's understanding and to support accomplishing missions. The four primary staff tasks are:

- Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess
- Conduct knowledge management and information management
- Conduct inform and influence activities
- Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities

In addition to mission command warfighting function tasks, five additional tasks reside within the mission command warfighting function. These tasks are:

- Conduct military deception
- Conduct civil affairs operations
- Install, operate, and maintain the network
- Conduct airspace control
- Conduct information protection

# I. The Exercise of Mission Command

Ref: ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command* (May '12), pp. 1-2 to 1-5.

To function effectively and have the greatest chance for mission accomplishment, commanders, supported by their staffs, exercise mission command throughout the conduct of operations. In this discussion, the “exercise of mission command” refers to an overarching idea that unifies the mission command philosophy of command and the mission command war fighting function. The exercise of mission command encompasses how Army commanders and staffs apply the foundational mission command philosophy together with the mission command war fighting function, guided by the principles of mission command.

An effective approach to mission command must be comprehensive, without being rigid. Military operations are affected by human interactions and as a whole defy orderly, efficient, and precise control. People are the basis of all military organizations. Commanders understand that some decisions must be made quickly and are better made at the point of action. Mission command concentrates on the objectives of an operation, not how to achieve it. Commanders provide subordinates with their intent, the purpose of the operation, the key tasks, the desired end state, and resources. Subordinates then exercise disciplined initiative to respond to unanticipated problems. Mission command is based on mutual trust and shared understanding and purpose. It demands every Soldier be prepared to assume responsibility, maintain unity of effort, take prudent action, and act resourcefully within the commander’s intent.

## Mission Command as a Philosophy

As the Army’s philosophy of command, mission command emphasizes that command is essentially a human endeavor. Successful commanders understand that their leadership directs the development of teams and helps to establish mutual trust and shared understanding throughout the force. Commanders provide a clear intent to their forces that guides subordinates’ actions while promoting freedom of action and initiative. Subordinates, by understanding the commander’s intent and the overall common objective, are then able to adapt to rapidly changing situations and exploit fleeting opportunities. They are given the latitude to accomplish assigned tasks in a manner that best fits the situation. Subordinates understand that they have an obligation to act and synchronize their actions with the rest of the force. Likewise, commanders influence the situation and provide direction and guidance while synchronizing their own operations. They encourage subordinates to take action, and they accept prudent risks to create opportunity and to seize the initiative. Commanders at all levels need education, rigorous training, and experience to apply these principles effectively. Mission command operates more on self-discipline than imposed discipline.


## Mission Command as a Warfighting Function

Mission command—as a warfighting function—assists commanders in balancing the art of command with the science of control, while emphasizing the human aspects of mission command. A warfighting function is a group of tasks and systems (people, organizations, information, and processes) united by a common purpose that commanders use to accomplish missions (ADRP 3-0). The mission command war fighting function consists of the mission command war fighting function tasks and the mission command system.

## Mission Command System

Commanders need support to exercise mission command effectively. At every echelon of command, each commander establishes a mission command system—the arrangement of personnel, networks, information systems, processes and procedures, and facilities and equipment that enable commanders to conduct operations (ADP 6-0). Commanders organize the five components of their mission command system to support decision making and facilitate communication. The most important of these components is personnel.

# The Exercise of Mission Command



Ref: ADRP 6-0, Mission Command, fig. 1-1, p. 1-3.

## B. Staff Tasks

Ref: ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command* (May '12), pp. 3-5 to 3-7.

The staff supports the commander and subordinate commanders in understanding situations, decision making, and implementing decisions throughout the conduct of operations. The staff does this through the four staff tasks:

- Conduct the operations process: plan, prepare, execute, and assess
- Conduct knowledge management and information management
- Conduct inform and influence activities
- Conduct cyber electromagnetic activities

### 1. Conduct the Operations Process: Plan, Prepare, Execute, and Assess

The operations process consists of the major activities of mission command conducted during operations: planning, preparing, executing and assessing operations. Commanders drive the operations process, while remaining focused on the major aspects of operations. Staffs conduct the operations process; they assist commanders in the details of planning, preparing, executing, and assessing.

Upon receipt of a mission, planning starts a cycle of the operations process that results in a plan or operation order to guide the force during execution. After the completion of the initial order, however, the commander and staff revise the plan based on changing circumstances. While units and Soldiers always prepare for potential operations, preparing for a specific operation begins during planning and continues through execution. Execution puts plans into action. During execution, staffs focus on concerted action to seize and retain operational initiative, build and maintain momentum, and exploit success. As the unit executes the current operation, the commander and staff are planning future operations based on assessments of progress. Assessment is continuous and affects the other three activities. Subordinate units of the same command may be conducting different operations process activities.

The continuous nature of the operations process allows commanders and staffs to make adjustments enabling agile and adaptive forces. Commanders, assisted by their staffs, integrate activities within the headquarters and across the force as they exercise mission command. Throughout the operations process, they develop an understanding and appreciation of their operational environment. They formulate a plan and provide purpose, direction, and guidance to the entire force. Commanders then adjust operations as changes to the operational environment occur. It is this cycle that enables commanders and forces to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative to gain a position of relative advantage over the enemy. (See ADRP 5-0 for a detailed explanation of the operations process.)

### 2. Conduct Knowledge Management and Information Management

Knowledge management is the process of enabling knowledge flow to enhance shared understanding, learning, and decision making. Knowledge management facilitates the transfer of knowledge between staffs, commanders, and forces. Knowledge management aligns people, processes, and tools within an organization to distribute knowledge and promote understanding. Commanders apply judgment to the information and knowledge provided to understand their operational environment and discern operational advantages. (See Army doctrine on knowledge management for more information.)

Commanders are constantly seeking to understand their operational environment in order to facilitate decision making. The staff uses information management to assist the commander in building and maintaining understanding. Information management is the science of using procedures and information systems to collect, process, store, display,



disseminate, and protect data, information, and knowledge products. The staff studies the operational environment, identifies information gaps, and helps the commander develop and answer information requirements. Collected data are then organized and processed into information for development into and use as knowledge. Information becomes knowledge, and that knowledge also becomes a source of information. As this happens, new knowledge is created, shared, and acted upon. During the course of operations, knowledge constantly flows between individuals and organizations. Staffs help manage this constant cycle of exchange. (See Army doctrine on information management for more information.)

Staffs use information and knowledge management to provide commanders the information they need to create and maintain their understanding and make effective decisions. Information is disseminated, stored, and retrieved according to established information management practices. Information management practices allow all involved to build on each other's knowledge to further develop a shared understanding across the force. Knowledge management practices enable the transfer of knowledge between individuals and organizations. Knowledge transfer occurs both formally—through established processes and procedures—and informally—through collaboration and dialogue. Participants exchange perspectives along with information. They question each other's assumptions and exchange ideas. In this way, they create and maintain shared understanding and develop new approaches. Teams benefit, and forces enhance integration and synchronization.

### 3. Conduct Inform and Influence Activities

Throughout the operations process, staffs assist commanders in developing themes and messages to inform domestic audiences and influence foreign friendly, neutral, adversary, and enemy populations. They coordinate the activities and operations of information-related capabilities to integrate and synchronize all actions and messages into a cohesive effort. Staffs assist the commander in employing those capabilities to inform and influence foreign target audiences to shape the operational environment, exploit success, and protect friendly vulnerabilities. (See Army doctrine on inform and influence activities for more information.)

All assets and capabilities at a commander's disposal have the capacity to inform and influence to varying degrees. Some examples of resources commanders may use include combat camera, counter intelligence, maneuver and fires, and network operations. The primary information-related capabilities of inform and influence activities are:

- Public affairs
- Military information support operations
- Soldier and leader engagement

### 4. Conduct Cyber Electromagnetic Activities

Cyber electromagnetic activities are activities leveraged to seize, retain, and exploit an advantage over adversaries and enemies in both cyberspace and the electromagnetic spectrum, while simultaneously denying and degrading adversary and enemy use of the same and protecting the mission command system (ADRP 3-0).

To succeed in unified land operations, cyber electromagnetic activities must be integrated and synchronized across all command echelons and war fighting functions. Commanders, supported by their staff, integrate cyberspace operations, electromagnetic spectrum operations and electronic warfare. The electronic warfare working group or similar staff organization coordinates cyber electromagnetic activities. These activities may employ the same technologies, capabilities, and enablers to accomplish assigned tasks. Cyber electromagnetic activities also enable inform and influence activities, signals intelligence, and network operations. (See Army doctrine on cyber electromagnetic activities for more information.)



Chap 2

# II. Command and Support Relationships

Ref: FM 6-0 (C1), *Commander and Staff Organization and Operations* (May '15), app. B.

Command and support relationships provide the basis for unity of command and unity of effort in operations. Command relationships affect Army force generation, force tailoring, and task organization. Commanders use Army support relationships when task-organizing Army forces. All command and support relationships fall within the framework of joint doctrine. *Note: JP 1 discusses joint command relationships and authorities.*

## I. Chain of Command

The President and Secretary of Defense exercise authority and control of the armed forces through two distinct branches of the chain of command as described in JP-1. One branch runs from the President, through the Secretary of Defense, to the combatant commanders for missions and forces assigned to combatant commands. The other branch runs from the President through the Secretary of Defense to the secretaries of the military departments. This branch is used for purposes other than operational direction of forces assigned to the combatant commands. Each military department operates under the authority, direction, and control of the secretary of that military department. These secretaries exercise authority through their respective Service chiefs over Service forces not assigned to combatant commanders. The Service chiefs, except as otherwise prescribed by law, perform their duties under the authority, direction, and control of the secretaries to whom they are directly responsible.

The typical operational chain of command extends from the combatant commander to a joint task force commander, then to a functional component commander or a Service component commander. Joint task forces and functional component commands, such as a land component, comprise forces that are normally subordinate to a Service component command but have been placed under the operational control (OPCON) of the joint task force, and subsequently to a functional component commander. Conversely, the combatant commander may designate one of the Service component commanders as the joint task force commander or as a functional component commander. In some cases, the combatant commander may not establish a joint task force, retaining operational control over subordinate functional commands and Service components directly.

### Army Service Component Command (ASCC)

Under joint doctrine, each joint force includes a Service component command that provides administrative and logistic support to Service forces under OPCON of that joint force. However, Army doctrine distinguishes between the Army component of a combatant command and Army components of subordinate joint forces. Under Army doctrine, Army Service component command (ASCC) refers to the Army component assigned to a combatant command. There is only one ASCC within a combatant command's area of responsibility.

### ARFOR

The Army components of all other joint forces are called ARFORs. An ARFOR is the Army Service component headquarters for a joint task force or a joint and multinational force. It consists of the senior Army headquarters and its commander (when not designated as the joint force commander) and all Army forces that the combatant commander subordinates to the joint task force or places under the control of a

multinational force commander. The ARFOR becomes the conduit for most Service-related issues and administrative support. The Army Service component command may function as an ARFOR headquarters when the combatant commander does not exercise command and control through subordinate joint force commanders.

The Secretary of the Army directs the flow of administrative control (ADCON). Administrative control for Army units within a combatant command normally extends from the Secretary of the Army through the ASCC, through an ARFOR, and then to Army units assigned or attached to an Army headquarters within that joint command. However, administrative control is not tied to the operational chain of command. The Secretary of the Army may redirect some or all Service responsibilities outside the normal ASCC channels. In similar fashion, the ASCC may distribute some administrative responsibilities outside the ARFOR. Their primary considerations are the effectiveness of Army forces and the care of Soldiers.

## A. Combatant Commands

The Unified Command Plan establishes combatant commanders' missions and geographic responsibilities. Combatant commanders directly link operational military forces to the Secretary of Defense and the President. The Secretary of Defense deploys troops and exercises military power through the combatant commands.

*See the Joint Forces & Operational Warfighting SMARTbook for additional information on combatant commands, joint task forces and operational warfighting doctrine.*

## B. Joint Task Forces and Service Components

Joint task forces are the organizations most often used by a combatant commander for contingencies. Combatant commanders establish joint task forces and designate the joint force commanders for these commands. Those commanders exercise OPCON of all U.S. forces through functional component commands, Service components, subordinate joint task forces, or a combination of these. The senior Army officer assigned to a joint task force, other than the joint force commander and members of the joint task force staff, becomes the ARFOR commander. The ARFOR commander answers to the Secretary of the Army through the Army Service component command for most ADCON responsibilities.

Depending on the joint task force organization, the ARFOR commander may exercise OPCON of some or all Army forces assigned to the task force. For example, an Army corps headquarters may become a joint force land component within a large joint task force. The corps commander exercises OPCON of Army divisions and tactical control (TACON) of Marine Corps forces within the land component. As the senior Army headquarters, the corps becomes the ARFOR for not only the Army divisions but also all other Army units within the joint task force, including those not under OPCON of the corps. Unless modified by the Secretary of the Army or the ASCC, Service responsibilities continue through the ARFOR to the respective Army commanders. The corps has OPCON of the Army divisions and TACON of the Marine division. The corps does not have OPCON over the other Army units but does, as the ARFOR, exercise ADCON over them. The corps also assists the ASCC in controlling Army support to other Services and to any multinational forces as directed.

When an Army headquarters becomes the joint force land component as part of a joint task force, Army units subordinated to it are normally under OPCON. Marine Corps forces made available to a joint force land component command built around an Army headquarters are normally under TACON. The land component commander makes recommendations to the joint force commander on properly using attached, OPCON, or TACON assets; planning and coordinating land operations; and accomplishing such operational missions as assigned.

## III. Joint Command & Support Relationships

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States* (Mar '13), chap. V.

### Levels of Authority

The specific command relationship (COCOM, OPCON, TACON, and support) will define the authority a commander has over assigned or attached forces. An overview of command relationships is shown in Figure V-1, below.

### Command Relationships Synopsis

#### Combatant Command (Command Authority)

(Unique to Combatant Commander)

- Planning, programming, budgeting, and execution process input
- Assignment of subordinate commanders
- Relationships with Department of Defense agencies
- Directive authority for logistics

#### Operational control when delegated

- Authoritative direction for all military operations and joint training
- Organize and employ commands and forces
- Assign command functions to subordinates
- Establish plans and requirements for intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance activities
- Suspend subordinate commanders from duty

#### Tactical control when delegated

Local direction and control of movements or maneuvers to accomplish mission

#### Support relationship when assigned

Aid, assist, protect, or sustain another organization

Ref: JP 1, *Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States*, fig. V-1, p. V-2

### Command Relationships Overview

- Forces, not command relationships, are transferred between commands. When forces are transferred, the command relationship the gaining commander will exercise (and the losing commander will relinquish) over those forces must be specified.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be permanent (or for an unknown but long period of time) the forces should be reassigned. Combatant commanders will exercise combatant command (command authority) and subordinate joint force commanders (JFCs), will exercise operational control (OPCON) over reassigned forces.
- When transfer of forces to a joint force will be temporary, the forces will be attached to the gaining command and JFCs, normally through the Service component commander, will exercise OPCON over the attached forces.
- Establishing authorities for subordinate unified commands and joint task forces direct the assignment or attachment of their forces to those subordinate commands as appropriate.

# Movement & Maneuver Warfighting Function

Ref: ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), p. 3-3. See also p. 1-41.

The movement and maneuver warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that move and employ forces to achieve a position of relative advantage over the enemy and other threats. Direct fire and close combat are inherent in maneuver. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes tasks associated with force projection related to gaining a position of advantage over the enemy. Movement is necessary to disperse and displace the force as a whole or in part when maneuvering. Maneuver is the employment of forces in the operational area. It works through movement and with fires to achieve a position of advantage relative to the enemy to accomplish the mission. Commanders use maneuver for massing the effects of combat power to achieve surprise, shock, and momentum. Effective maneuver requires close coordination with fires. Both tactical and operational maneuver require sustainment support. The movement and maneuver warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Deploy
- Move
- Maneuver
- Employ direct fires
- Occupy an area
- Conduct mobility and countermobility operations
- Conduct reconnaissance and surveillance
- Employ battlefield obscuration

The movement and maneuver warfighting function does not include administrative movements of personnel and materiel. These movements fall under the sustainment warfighting function.

*Editor's note: For the purposes of The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook, an overview of the following topics are represented as they relate to the movement and maneuver warfighting function:*

- I. Offense and Defense, pp. 2-2 to 2-3.*
- II. Stability Operations, pp. 2-4 to 2-5.*
- III. Defense Support of Civil Authorities, pp. 2-6 to 2-7.*
- IV. Special Operations, pp. 2-7 to 2-8.*
- V. Deployment Operations, p. 2-10.*

# I. Offense and Defense (Decisive Operations)

Ref: ADP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12).

Tactics is the employment and ordered arrangement of forces in relation to each other (CJCSM 5120.01). Through tactics, commanders use combat power to accomplish missions. The tactical-level commander employs combat power in the conduct of engagements and battles. This section addresses the tactical level of war, the art and science of tactics, and hasty versus deliberate operations.

## The Tactical Level of War

ADP 3-90 is the primary manual for offensive and defensive tasks at the tactical level. It does not provide doctrine for stability or defense support of civil authorities tasks. It is authoritative and provides guidance in the form of combat tested concepts and ideas for the employment of available means to win in combat. These tactics are not prescriptive in nature, and they require judgment in application.

The tactical level of war is the level of war at which battles and engagements are planned and executed to achieve military objectives assigned to tactical units or task forces (JP 3-0). Activities at this level focus on the ordered arrangement and maneuver of combat elements in relation to each other and to the enemy to achieve combat objectives. It is important to understand tactics within the context of the levels of war. The strategic and operational levels provide the context for tactical operations. Without this context, tactical operations are just a series of disconnected and unfocused actions. Strategic and operational success is a measure of how one or more battles link to winning a major operation or campaign. In turn, tactical success is a measure of how one or more engagements link to winning a battle.

See also pp. 3-17 to 3-22.

## The Offense

The offense is the decisive form of war. While strategic, operational, or tactical considerations may require defending for a period of time, defeat of the enemy eventually requires shifting to the offense. Army forces strike the enemy using offensive action in times, places, or manners for which the enemy is not prepared to seize, retain, and exploit the operational initiative. Operational initiative is setting or dictating the terms of action throughout an operation (ADRP 3-0).

The main purpose of the offense is to defeat, destroy, or neutralize the enemy force. Additionally, commanders conduct offensive tasks to secure decisive terrain, to deprive the enemy of resources, to gain information, to deceive and divert the enemy, to hold the enemy in position, to disrupt his attack, and to set the conditions for future successful operations.

## The Defense

While the offense is the most decisive type of combat operation, the defense is the stronger type. Army forces conduct defensive tasks as part of major operations and joint campaigns, while simultaneously conducting offensive and stability tasks as part of decisive action outside the United States.

Commanders choose to defend to create conditions for a counteroffensive that allows Army forces to regain the initiative. Other reasons for conducting a defense include to retain decisive terrain or deny a vital area to the enemy, to attrit or fix the enemy as a prelude to the offense, in response to surprise action by the enemy, or to increase the enemy's vulnerability by forcing the enemy to concentrate forces.

## Tactical Enabling Tasks

Commanders direct tactical enabling tasks to support the conduct of decisive action. Tactical enabling tasks are usually shaping or sustaining. They may be decisive in the conduct of stability tasks. Tactical enabling tasks discussed in ADRP 3-90 include reconnaissance, security, troop movement, relief in place, passage of lines, encirclement operations, and urban operations. Stability ultimately aims to create a condition so the local populace regards the situation as legitimate, acceptable, and predictable.

# I. Tactical Echelons

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12), pp. 2-13 to 2-17.

The Army echelons its broad array of capabilities to perform diverse functions. These functions vary with the type of unit and, particularly at operational echelons, with the organization of the theater, the nature of the conflict, and the number of friendly forces committed to the effort.

## Tactical Echelons



**Fire Team**



**Crew**



**Squad**



**Section**



**Platoon**



**Companies, Batteries, Troops and Detachments**



**Battalions and Squadrons**



**Brigades, Regiments, and Groups**



**Division**

At each echelon, the commander task organizes available capabilities to accomplish the mission. The commander's purpose in task organization is to maximize subordinate commanders' abilities to generate a combined arms effect consistent with the concept of operations. Commanders and staffs work to ensure the distribution of capabilities to the appropriate components of the force to weight the decisive operation. The relationships between units within and supporting an echelon are described in terms of command and support relationships.

See pp. 2-27 to 2-34 for discussion of command and support relationships.

## A. Fire Team

A fire team is a small military unit. A fire team generally consists of four or fewer soldiers and is usually grouped by two or three teams into a squad or section. The concept of the fire team is based on the need for tactical flexibility. A fire team is capable of autonomous operations as part of its next larger unit, such as a squad or section. It is usually led by a sergeant.

## B. Crew

A crew consists of all personnel operating a particular system. This system might be a weapons system, such as a tank or machinegun. The system might also be a vehicle, such as a helicopter, or a sensor system, such as a target acquisition radar. The rank of the senior crew member can vary widely from a junior noncommissioned officer to a commissioned or warrant officer based on the system.

## C. Squad

A squad is a small military unit typically containing two or more fire teams. It typically contains a dozen Soldiers or less. In some cases the crew of a system may also be designated as a squad. Squads are usually led by a staff sergeant.

## D. Section

A section is an Army unit smaller than a platoon and larger than a squad. A section may consist of the crews of two or more Army systems, such as a tank section, or several fire teams.

## E. Platoon

A platoon is a subdivision of a company or troop consisting of two or more squads or sections. A platoon is normally led by a lieutenant. Platoons tend to contain roughly 30 Soldiers, but in some cases they contain significantly more or less than that number.

## F. Companies, Batteries, Troops, and Detachments

A company is a unit consisting of two or more platoons, usually of the same type, with a headquarters and a limited capacity for self-support. A troop is a company-size unit in a reconnaissance organization. A battery is a company-size unit in a fires or air defense artillery battalion. A company normally consists of more than 75 soldiers. Some aviation and armor companies are exceptions to this rule. Companies and air defense and artillery batteries are the basic elements of battalions. Companies, batteries, and troops may also be assigned as separate units of brigades and larger organizations. Some companies, such as special forces companies, have subordinate detachments, instead of platoons, which are organized and trained to operate independently for extended periods. A detachment is a tactical element organized on either a temporary or permanent basis for special duties.

Company-size combat units can fight in mass or by subordinate platoons. Reconnaissance troops frequently operate with their platoons in separate areas. In combined arms battalions, companies fight either as integral units or as task-organized teams reinforced with close-combat platoons of the same or different types. A company team is a combined arms organization formed by attaching one or more nonorganic armor, mechanized infantry, Stryker, or infantry platoons to an armor, mechanized infantry, Stryker, or infantry company, either in exchange for, or in addition to, its organic platoons. These company teams can include other supporting squads or platoons, such as engineers. Company teams are task-organized for specific missions. Such teams can match capabilities to missions with greater precision than units using only organic platoons. However, the attachment of different units at the company level demands thorough training to achieve the maximum complementary effects. Whenever possible, platoons and detachments should train together before they are committed.

### 3-12 (Movement & Maneuver) I. Tactical Echelons



# III. Mobility and Countermobility

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12), pp. 3-10 to 3-14 and FM 3-34, *Engineer Operations* (Aug '11).

## I. Mobility

Mobility is a quality or capability of military forces which permits them to move from place to place while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission (JP 3-17). Mobility operations are those combined arms activities that mitigate the effects of natural and man-made obstacles to enable freedom of movement and maneuver (ATTP 3-90.4).

### Mobility Operations Primary Tasks

- Breaching Operations
- Clearing Operations (Areas and Routes)
- Gap-Crossing Operations
- Combat Roads and Trails
- Forward Airfields and Landing Zones
- Traffic Operations

### Offensive Considerations

Mobility is necessary for successful offensive actions. Its major focus is to enable friendly forces to move and maneuver freely on the battlefield. The commander seeks the capability to move, exploit, and pursue the enemy across a wide front. When attacking, the commander concentrates the effects of combat power at selected locations. This may require the unit to improve or construct combat trails through areas where routes do not exist. The surprise achieved by attacking through an area believed to be impassable may justify the effort expended in constructing these trails. The force bypasses existing obstacles and minefields identified before starting the offensive operation instead of breaching them whenever possible. Units mark bypassed minefields whenever the mission variables of METT-TC allow.

Maintaining the momentum of the offense requires the attacking force to quickly pass through obstacles as it encounters them. There is a deliberate effort to capture bridges, beach and port exits, and other enemy reserved obstacles intact. The preferred method of fighting through a defended obstacle is employing a hasty (in-stride) breach, because it avoids the loss of time and momentum associated with conducting a deliberate breach.

Rivers and other gaps remain major obstacles despite advances in high-mobility weapon systems and extensive aviation support. Wet gap crossings are among the most critical, complex, and vulnerable combined arms operations. A crossing is conducted as a hasty crossing and as a continuation of the attack whenever possible because the time needed to prepare for a gap crossing allows the enemy more time to strengthen the defense. The size of the gap, as well as the enemy and friendly situations, will dictate the specific tactics, techniques, and procedures used in conducting the crossing. Functional engineer brigades contain the majority of tactical bridging assets. Military police and CBRN assets may also be required.

# Assured Mobility

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12), pp. 3-12 to 3-13.

Assured mobility is a framework of processes, actions, and capabilities that assure the ability of a force to deploy, move, and maneuver where and when desired, without interruption or delay, to achieve the mission. The assured mobility fundamentals predict, detect, prevent, avoid, neutralize, and protect support the assured mobility framework. This framework is one means of enabling a force to achieve the commander's intent. Assured mobility emphasizes the conduct of proactive mobility, countermobility, and protection tasks in an integrated manner so as to increase the probability of mission accomplishment. While focused primarily on movement and maneuver, the assured mobility concept links to each warfighting function and both enables and is enabled by those functions.

Refer to ATTP 3-90.4, *Combined Arms Mobility Operations* for further discussion.

## Assured Mobility



### A. Predict

Commanders and staffs must accurately predict potential obstacles to force mobility by analyzing the enemy's capabilities and tactics, techniques, and procedures. This involves understanding how the enemy will evolve in reaction to friendly force countermeasures. It also involves understanding how the effects of terrain and the effects of the population, such as vehicular traffic and dislocated civilians, will impact force mobility. This helps build the mobility portion of the common operational picture and facilitates decisionmaking.

### B. Detect

Commanders and staffs use intelligence products and information collection assets to identify the location of natural and manmade obstacles and potential means the enemy can use to create obstacles. Commanders employ available information collection assets to detect enemy obstacle preparations and also identify areas where there are no or only limited obstacles to ground movement and maneuver. This knowledge can be obtained through sustained surveillance of an area. Commanders identify both actual and potential obstacles and propose solutions and alternate COAs to minimize or eliminate their potential impact.

### C. Prevent

Commanders and staffs apply this fundamental by preventing civilian interference with operations and denying the enemy's ability to influence friendly mobility. This is accomplished by forces acting proactively to elicit local populace support, or at least non-interference, and to eliminate enemy countermobility capabilities before those capabilities can emplace or activate obstacles, and by mitigating the factors that result in natural

# Intelligence Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 2-0, *Intelligence* (Aug '12), ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence* (Aug '12), chap. 2 and ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), p. 3-4.

The intelligence warfighting function is larger than military intelligence. The intelligence warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that facilitate understanding the enemy, terrain, and civil considerations (ADRP 3-0). For purposes of the definition, the term enemy includes the entire range of threats and the term terrain includes weather.

The commander and staff leverage the intelligence enterprise, coach and train the intelligence core competencies, implement the operations and intelligence processes, and direct the intelligence effort through the intelligence capabilities.

The intelligence warfighting function tasks facilitate the commander's visualization and understanding of the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment. These tasks are interactive and often occur simultaneously. The intelligence warfighting function tasks within the Army Universal Task List are—

- **Intelligence support to force generation** — the task of generating intelligence knowledge concerning an operational environment, facilitating future intelligence operations, and tailoring the force.
- **Intelligence support to situational understanding** — the task of providing information and intelligence to commanders to assist them in achieving a clear understanding of the force's current state with relation to the threat and other relevant aspects of the operational environment.
- **Conduct information collection** — the task that synchronizes and integrates the planning and employment of sensors and assets as well as the processing, exploitation, and dissemination of systems in direct support of current and future operations.
- **Intelligence support to targeting and information capabilities** — the task of providing the commander information and intelligence support for targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects.

Refer to FM 2-0 and FM 7-15 for more information on these tasks.

The commander drives intelligence, intelligence facilitates operations, and operations are supportive of intelligence; this relationship is continuous. Commanders' considerations for the intelligence warfighting function include—

- **Reducing operational uncertainty.** Intelligence does not eliminate uncertainty entirely. Commanders determine prudent risks inherent in any operation.
- **Determining the appropriate balance between the time allotted for collection and operational necessity.** It takes time to collect information and then develop that information into detailed and precise intelligence products.
- **Prioritizing finite resources and capabilities.**
- **Resourcing and prioritizing the intelligence warfighting function** appropriately to have enough network capability and access to meet the commander's needs.
- **Employing organic and supporting collection assets** as well as planning, coordinating, and articulating requirements to leverage the entire intelligence enterprise.

## V. Reconnaissance & Surveillance

Ref: ADRP 3-90, *Offense and Defense* (Aug '12), pp. 5-1 to 5-3.

Reconnaissance operations are those operations undertaken to obtain, by visual observation or other detection methods, information about the activities and resources of an enemy or potential enemy, or to secure data concerning the meteorological, hydrographical or geographical characteristics and the indigenous population of a particular area. Reconnaissance primarily relies on the human dynamic rather than technical means. Reconnaissance is performed before, during, and after other operations to provide information used in the intelligence preparation of the battlefield (IPB) process, as well as by the commander in order to formulate, confirm, or modify his course of action (COA).

### Forms of Reconnaissance

The four forms of reconnaissance are route, zone, area, and reconnaissance in force.

#### Forms of Reconnaissance



**Route Reconnaissance**



**Zone Reconnaissance**



**Area Reconnaissance**



**Reconnaissance in Force**

Ref: FM 3-90, *Tactics*, chap. 13.

Surveillance and reconnaissance missions are a principal means of information collection. A key difference between surveillance missions and reconnaissance is that surveillance is systematic, usually passive in collection of information, and may be continuous; while reconnaissance may be limited in duration of the assigned mission, is active in collection of information, and usually includes human participation. Reconnaissance employs many tactics, techniques, and procedures (TTP) throughout the course of the mission, one of which may include an extended period of surveillance.

#### A. Route Reconnaissance

Route reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses along a specific line of communication, such as a road, railway, or cross-country mobility corridor. It provides new or updated information on route conditions, such as obstacles and bridge classifications, and enemy and civilian activity along the route. A route reconnaissance includes not only the route itself, but also all terrain along the route from which the enemy could influence the friendly force's movement.

## B. Zone Reconnaissance

Zone reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that involves a directed effort to obtain detailed information on all routes, obstacles, terrain, and enemy forces within a zone defined by boundaries. It is appropriate when the enemy situation is vague, existing knowledge of the terrain is limited, or combat operations have altered the terrain. A zone reconnaissance may include several route or area reconnaissance missions assigned to subordinate units.

## C. Area Reconnaissance

Area reconnaissance is a form of reconnaissance that focuses on obtaining detailed information about the terrain or enemy activity within a prescribed area. This area may include a town, a ridgeline, woods, an airhead, or any other feature critical to operations. The area may consist of a single point, such as a bridge or an installation. Areas are normally smaller than zones and are not usually contiguous to other friendly areas targeted for reconnaissance.

## D. Reconnaissance in Force

A reconnaissance in force is a deliberate combat operation designed to discover or test the enemy's strength, dispositions, and reactions or to obtain other information. Battalion-size task forces or larger organizations usually conduct a reconnaissance in force (RIF) mission. A commander assigns a RIF mission when the enemy is known to be operating within an area and the commander cannot obtain adequate intelligence by any other means. A unit may also conduct a RIF in restrictive-type terrain where the enemy is likely to ambush smaller reconnaissance forces. A RIF is an aggressive reconnaissance, conducted as an offensive operation with clearly stated reconnaissance objectives. The overall goal of a RIF is to determine enemy weaknesses that can be exploited.


## Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) Program

The Army established the every Soldier is a sensor (ES2) program, which is accomplished through Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance. The Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance AUTL task is designed to help units more effectively collect useful information in their AO. This task is critical because units often operate in an AO characterized by violence, uncertainty, and complex threats.

*Refer to FM 2-91.6 for a detailed discussion about Soldier surveillance and reconnaissance.*

## Reconnaissance Objective

The commander orients his reconnaissance assets by identifying a reconnaissance objective within the area of operation (AO). The reconnaissance objective is a terrain feature, geographic area, or an enemy force about which the commander wants to obtain additional information. The reconnaissance objective clarifies the intent of the reconnaissance effort by specifying the most important result to obtain from the reconnaissance effort. The commander assigns a reconnaissance objective based on his priority information requirements (PIR) resulting from the IPB process and the reconnaissance asset's capabilities and limitations. The reconnaissance objective can be information about a specific geographical location, such as the cross-country trafficability, a specific enemy activity to be confirmed or denied, or a specific enemy unit to be located and tracked.



*Refer to The Small Unit Tactics SMARTbook (Leading, Planning & Conducting Tactical Operations) for discussion of reconnaissance and security operations. Related topics include tactical mission fundamentals, offensive and defensive operations, stability & counterinsurgency operations, tactical enabling operations, special purpose attacks, tactical environments, and patrols & patrolling.*

# Requirements Management


Ref: ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence* (Aug '12), p. 3-5.

For requirements management, there are three types of requirements resulting from planning requirements and assessing collection. The following three types of validated information requirements are prioritized for purposes of assigning information collection tasks: priority intelligence requirements (PIRs), intelligence requirements, and information requirements.

Refer to FM 3-55 and ATTP 2-01 for more details on requirements and indicators.

The following shows the process of developing requirements and integrating them into the information collection process.

## Requirements Development



Ref: ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence*, fig. 3-2, p. 3-5.

## Priority Intelligence Requirement (PIR)

An intelligence requirement, stated as a priority for intelligence support, that the commander and staff need to understand the adversary or the operational environment. Also called PIR. See FM 2-01.3.

## Intelligence Requirements

A type of information requirement developed by subordinate commanders and the staff (including subordinate staffs) that requires dedicated information collection for the elements of threat, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. (ADRP 2-0)

## Information Requirements

In intelligence usage, those items of information regarding the adversary and other relevant aspects of the operational environment that need to be collected and processed in order to meet the intelligence requirements of a commander. See ADRP 2-0. (Army) Any information elements the commander and staff require to successfully conduct operations. (ADRP 6-0)

## B. Collect

Collection is synchronized to provide critical information at key times throughout the phases of an operation and during the transition from one operation to another operation. A successful information collection effort results in the timely collection and reporting of relevant and accurate information, which supports the production of intelligence. Collection consists of collecting, processing, and reporting information in response to information collection tasks. Different units and systems collect information and data about threats, terrain and weather, and civil considerations. Collected information is used in intelligence databases, intelligence production, and the G-2's/S-2's awareness—and ultimately supports the commander's situational understanding. Information collection activities transition as requirements change, the unit mission changes, the unit proceeds through the phases of an operation, and the unit prepares for future operations.

It is critical for the staff to plan for and use well-developed procedures and flexible planning to track emerging targets, adapt to changing operational requirements, and meet the requirement for combat assessment. Once the information is collected, it is processed into a form that enables analysts to extract essential information and produce intelligence and targeting products. Processing involves converting, evaluating, analyzing, interpreting, and synthesizing raw collected data and information. Processing examples include—

- Preparing imagery for exploitation
- Translating a document from a foreign language
- Converting electronic data into a standardized reporting format (including database formats) that can be analyzed by a system operator
- Correlating information that groups data into a form all analysts can use

Collected and processed information must then be reported to the appropriate units, organizations, or agencies for analysis or action. The G-2/S-2 coordinates with the unit staff, subordinate and lateral commands, and higher echelon units to ensure specific reporting assets, personnel, equipment (especially communications), and procedures are in place. The G-2/S-2 staff evaluates the reported information for its responsiveness to information collection tasks.

The timely and accurate reporting of combat information and intelligence is critical to successful operations. The most critical information collected may be of little value if not reported in a timely manner. Unit SOPs must clearly state the transmission means of different types of reports (for example, sent by satellite communications, tactical radios, or by automated means). Generally, the transmission of reports for threat contact and actions, CCIRs, combat information, and CBRN is by voice, followed up with automated reports.

Intelligence and time-sensitive combat information that affect the current operation are disseminated immediately upon recognition. Combat information is unevaluated data, gathered by or provided directly to the tactical commander which, due to its highly perishable nature or the criticality of the situation, cannot be processed into tactical intelligence in time to satisfy the user's tactical intelligence requirements (JP 2-01). The routing of combat information proceeds immediately in two directions—directly to the commander and through routine reporting channels for use by intelligence analysis and production elements.

## C. Produce

Production is the development of intelligence through the analysis of collected information and existing intelligence. Analysts create intelligence products, conclusions, or projections regarding threats and relevant aspects of the operational environment to answer known or anticipated requirements in an effective format. The G-2/S-2 staff processes and analyzes information from single or multiple sources, disciplines,



# Fires Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP/ADRP 3-09, Fires (Aug '12), chap. 1 and ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (May '12), p. 3-4.*

The fires warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that provide collective and coordinated use of Army indirect fires, air and missile defense (AMD), and joint fires through the targeting process (ADRP 3-0). Army fires systems deliver fires in support of offensive and defensive tasks to create specific lethal and nonlethal effects on a target. The fires warfighting function includes the following tasks:

- Deliver fires
- Integrate all forms of Army, joint and multinational fires
- Conduct targeting

The fires warfighting function includes tasks associated with, integrating, and synchronizing the effects of Army indirect fires, AMD, and joint fires with the effects of other warfighting functions. It includes planning for targeting; providing fire support; countering air, ballistic missile, cruise missile, rocket, artillery, mortars, and unmanned aircraft systems threats; and integrating joint and multinational fires. This represents the tasks the fires function must accomplish to complement and reinforce the other warfighting functions.

Fires organizations require deliberate and dynamic targeting to achieve lethal and nonlethal effects against ground and aerial targets. For ground threats, fires leaders use the Army's targeting methodology to plan, prepare, execute, and assess effects on the ground. For aerial threats, fires leaders use air defense planning to determine air defense priorities and the tailoring of air defense artillery capabilities to defeat aerial threats.

As a warfighting function, fires address requirements associated with offensive and defensive tasks supporting the concept of operations and integrated into the scheme of maneuver. A wide range of precision to conventional scalable capabilities provides the means for the employment of fires in unified land operations.

## A. Deliver Fires

Today's operational environments require the integration of Army indirect fires in support of offensive, defensive, and stability tasks. Fires combine the use of air and ground artillery with the capabilities of other Army warfighting functions, special operations forces (SOF), joint forces, and unified action partners to enable the supported commander to seize the initiative. Army forces plan for, integrate, coordinate and synchronize the fires capabilities (sensors and weapon systems) of unified action partners into the concept of operations to achieve synergy, develop a common operational picture (COP), and enable joint interdependencies from the tactical to strategic levels. Additionally, complementary and reinforcing joint and multinational capabilities provide redundancy to mitigate environmental and operational restrictions, resource shortfalls, as well as gaps in coverage from a particular asset.

## B. Integrate All Forms of Army, Joint and Multinational Fires

Fires must be integrated with the capabilities of other Army warfighting functions, special operation forces, joint forces and multinational forces. Integration of fires creates an optimal environment that mitigates risks, resource shortfalls and covers gaps within the areas of operations (AO). Ground and air fires must be integrated with decisive action and unified land operations. Fires in unified land operations from air-to-surface, surface-to-air and surface-to-surface assets must be coordinated and

# I. Fires in Support of Unified Land Operations

Ref: ADRP 3-09, *Fires* (Aug '12), chap. 1.

## I. Roles

The role of fires is to enable Army forces to seize and retain the initiative, prevent and deter conflict, defeat adaptive threats and succeed in a wide range of contingencies. Fires in decisive action create effects and set conditions to enable commanders to prevail in unified land operations. Fires are surface-to-surface, surface-to-air, and joint fires including electronic attack.

## II. Core Competencies

### A. Air Defense Artillery

Army ADA forces, fight interdependently with other elements of unified action partners at strategic, operational, and tactical levels. Army ADA provides AMD and contributes to the situational understanding, airspace management, early warning, and operational force protection. Army ADA forces deter or defeat enemy aerial threats, protect the force and high value assets. This mission is normally executed within a joint theater and requires integration and close coordination between Army ADA forces and other counterair forces. The mission of Air Defense Artillery is to provide fires to protect the force and selected geopolitical assets from aerial attack, missile attack, and surveillance.

ADA forces accomplish their mission by developing procedures and deploying air and missile defense systems to protect forward deployed elements of the U.S. armed forces, and multinational partners. This mission employs multi-tier (lower-tier and upper-tier), that are interoperable, and provide a layered and defense in-depth capability against air breathing threats, ballistic and cruise missiles, and unmanned aircraft systems. The distinction between the upper- and lower-tier systems and capabilities depend on the ranges and altitude of the threat.

Lower-tier systems defeat air breathing threats, short range ballistic missiles, cruise missiles, unmanned aircraft systems, and enemy indirect fire. For example, the lower-tier systems provide air defense of ground combat forces and high value assets against high performance air-breathing threats fixed-wing, rotary-wing and unmanned aircraft, cruise missiles, and ballistic missile threats.

Upper-tier systems defend larger areas and defeat medium and intermediate range ballistic missiles, and increase the theater commanders' effectiveness against weapons of mass destruction.

### B. Field Artillery

FA operations are actually two distinct functions; FA, and fire support. The FA provides the nucleus for effective fires coordination through staff personnel, fires agencies, and attack resources. The integration of fires is a critical factor in the success of operations. The commander is responsible for the integration of fires within their operational area. The chief of fires (COF), the fire support coordinator (FSCOORD), and brigade fire support officer (FSO) advise the commander on the allocation and use of available fires resources. The mission of the Field Artillery is to destroy, defeat, or disrupt the enemy with integrated fires to enable maneuver commanders to dominate in unified land operations.

FA cannon, rocket, missile, and sensor systems provide continuously available fires under all weather conditions and in all types of terrain. FA can shift and mass fires rapidly without having to displace. Should a maneuver or other supported force displace, FA units should be as mobile as the units they support. FA forces man the fires cells, act as forward observers, and are employed as fire support teams (FIST) and combat observation and lasing teams (COLT) to integrate all means of fire support for the commander and synchronize fire support with the concept of operations. FA destroys, disrupts, denies, degrades, neutralizes, interdicts, or suppresses enemy forces, and protects and enables friendly forces in support of the maneuver commander requirements and objectives. A variety of FA munitions provide the commander with tremendous flexibility when attacking targets with fires.

FA forces synchronize and integrate Army, joint and multinational fires assets for use at the designated place and time. Fires are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive operations. Accomplishing the mission by achieving an appropriate mix of lethal and nonlethal effects remains an important consideration for every commander.

### III. Fires and Joint Principles

The nine principles of joint operations that provide guidelines for combining the elements of combat power and for employing fires are listed below.

#### Objective

The purpose of specifying the objective is to direct every military operation toward a clearly defined, decisive, and achievable goal (JP 3-0). Objective means ensuring all fires actions contribute to the supported commander's mission. The fire support plan and AADP must have clearly defined objectives that support the commander's intent. Objectives allow commanders to focus combat power on the most important tasks and to protect critical assets in their area of operations.

#### Offensive

The purpose of an offensive action is to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative (JP 3-0). Fires must always be conducted in the spirit of the offense. Effective fires must maintain responsiveness and fire superiority to allow the supported force to seize and retain the initiative.

Regardless of whether the force is engaged in the offense or is in a defensive posture, fires are used offensively to strike HPT and in offensive counterair operations. Optimally, fires are preemptive, with the ability for rapid reaction to unforeseen requirements. The aggressive application of fires can keep an enemy off balance and in a reactive state. Disrupting his operations throughout the AO with synchronized fires can prevent the enemy from establishing his desired tempo of operations and concentration of forces. Additionally AMD fires allow a commander to maintain momentum and operational tempo of the offense. The use of clearly stated essential tasks for fires, concise fire support plans, area air defense plans (AADP) and decentralized control of fires assets are ways to facilitate increased initiative.


#### Mass

The purpose of mass is to concentrate the effects of combat power at the most advantageous place and time to produce decisive results (JP 3-0). Fires weapons and units are normally not physically massed, but they must be able to provide maximum massed fires when and where they are required. The actual methods of achieving massed fires vary with each attack resource. Commanders select the method that best fits the circumstances. Army forces can mass fires quickly and across large distances. Commanders can use fires to achieve mass by—


- Allocating fires assets to add weight to the main effort
- Assigning priorities of fires and quickfire channels
- Focusing target acquisition, sensors, and information collection assets
- Concentrating fires assets on one aspect of fires such as fires in support of close combat

#### 5-6 (Fires) I. Support of Unified Land Operations


## Weighted Coverage    Early Engagement    Defense in Depth



Combining and concentrating weapons coverage toward the most likely enemy air avenues of approach or direction of attack achieve **weighted coverage**.



**Early engagement** is achieved by positioning sensors and weapons so they can engage the enemy before aircraft ordnance release or friendly target acquisition by the enemy.



**Defense in depth** is achieved by positioning weapons and sensors so the enemy is exposed to a continuously increasing volume of fire as it approaches the friendly protected asset or force.

## B. Field Artillery Employment

When planning for the integration, synchronization and coordination of FA employment, commanders and staffs should consider the steps listed below:

### Adequate Fire Support for the Committed Units

Organic fire units are most responsive to maneuver elements. The minimum adequate support for committed units is considered to be one organic FA battalion for each committed brigade. In no instance can there be more than one fires unit in direct support of a maneuver unit.

### Weight the Main Effort

Support relationships of reinforcing or general support reinforcing (GSR) can be assigned to provide additional responsive fires to an organic FA battalion or a FA battalion with a direct support relationship.

### Immediate Responsive Fires

The force commander should place some artillery on call with which they can immediately influence unified land operations.

### Facilitate Future Operations

This fundamental is essential to ensure success in the face of unforeseen events and to ensure smooth transition from one phase of an operation to another. The fundamental can be implemented through the assignment of a support relationship, positioning of fires elements, and allocation of ammunition. The assignment of an on-order mission facilitates a future mission. Another way to facilitate future operations is to modify the current command or support relationship in accordance with anticipated requirements.

### Maximize Feasible Centralized Control

Fires are most effective when control is centralized at the highest level consistent with the fire support capabilities and requirements of the overall mission. Centralized control of fires permits flexibility in their employment and facilitates effective support to each subordinate element of the command and to the force as a whole. Command and support relationships represent varying degrees of centralized control and responsiveness to committed units. The optimum degree of centralized control varies with each tactical situation. Decisive action will require more careful planning because of the limited resources available to attack targets and the need for carefully coordinated employment of acquisition, attack, and assessment means. A high degree of centralized control is desired in a defensive situation. Since the enemy has the initiative, it is difficult to accurately predict where and when he will strike. A lesser degree of centralized control is required in an offensive situation, because the supported force has the initiative.

# II. Fires Organizations and Key Personnel

Ref: ADRP 3-09, Fires (Aug '12), chap. 2.

The fires warfighting function uses a diverse group of systems, personnel, and materiel—most of which operate in various ways to provide different capabilities. This chapter discusses the organizations and key personnel of the fires warfighting function from the strategic level to the tactical level. The following table provides an overview of all fires organizations and key personnel down to the battalion and battery level. This chapter will only cover organizations and key personnel down to brigade.

| Fires Organization and Key Personnel   |  |
|--|--|
| Strategic Level Fires Organizations  |  |
| Air Defense  | Field Artillery  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Joint Functional Component Command-Integrated Missile Defense (JFCC-IMD)</li><li>• Army Space and Missile Defense Command (SMDC)/Army Strategic Command (ARSTRAT)</li></ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Joint Land Component/Joint Task Force Fires Cell</li><li>• Battlefield Coordination Detachment</li></ul>   |
| Operational Level Fires Organizations  |  |
| Air Defense  | Field Artillery  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Army Air and Missile Defense Command (AAMDC)<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Theater Air and Missile Defense Coordinator (TAMCOORD)</li><li>- Deputy Area Air Defense Coordinator (DAADC—when designated)</li></ul></li><li>• Corps Air Defense/Airspace Management Cell</li></ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Corps and Theater Fires Cell</li><li>• Expeditionary Air Support Operations Group</li><li>• Ground Liaison Detachment</li></ul>  |
| Tactical Level Fires Organizations   |  |
| Air Defense  | Field Artillery  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Air Defense Artillery Brigade<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Air Defense Fire Control Officer (ADAFCO)</li><li>- Air Defense Artillery Battalion</li><li>- Patriot Battalion</li><li>- Air and Missile Defense Battalion</li><li>- Indirect Fires Protection Capability (IFPC) Battalion</li><li>- Terminal High-Altitude Area Defense (THAAD) Battery</li></ul></li></ul> | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Division Fires Cell<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Division Chief of Fires</li></ul></li><li>• Air Liaison Officer</li><li>• Fires Brigade<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>- Fire Support Officer</li><li>- Field Artillery Battalions<ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>o Multiple Launch Rocket System (MLRS)</li><li>o High-Mobility Artillery Rocket System (HIMARS)</li><li>o M109-series Paladin</li><li>o M777-series</li><li>o M119-series</li></ul></li></ul></li></ul> |
| Fires Cell (Division/Brigade Combat Team)  |  |
| <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Air Defense Element</li><li>• Air Defense Airspace Management/Brigade Aviation Element (ADAM/BAE)</li></ul>  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"><li>• Fires Element</li><li>• Air Support Operations Center/Air Liaison Officer (ASOC/ALO)</li></ul>   |
| Legend : D3A – decide, detect, deliver, and assess   |  |

Ref: ADRP 3-09, Fires, table 2-1, p. 2-2.

For further breakdown of organizations and key personnel refer to FM 3-09 and FM 3-01.

# The Sustainment Warfighting Function

Ref: ADP 4-0, *Sustainment* (Jul '12) and ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12), p. 3-4.

The sustainment warfighting function is related tasks and systems that provide support and services to ensure freedom of action, extend operational reach, and prolong endurance (ADP 3-0). The endurance of Army forces is primarily a function of their sustainment. Sustainment determines the depth and duration of Army operations. Successful sustainment enables freedom of action by increasing the number and quality of options available to the commander. It is essential to retaining and exploiting the initiative. The sustainment warfighting function consists of three major elements: logistics, personnel services, and health service support.

## A. Logistics

Logistics is planning and executing of the movement and support of forces. It includes those aspects of military operations that deal with: design and development; acquisition, storage, movement, distribution, maintenance, and disposition of materiel; acquisition or construction, maintenance, operation, and disposition of facilities; and acquisition or furnishing of services. Explosive ordnance disposal is a function of logistics. However, EOD tasks are discussed under the protection warfighting function (Refer to FM 3-37 and ATTP 4-32). Logistics consists of the following:

- Maintenance (ATTP 4-33)
- Transportation (FM 55-1)
- Supply (FM 10-1)
- Field services (FM 10-1)
- Distribution (ATTP 4-0.1)
- Operational contract support (ATTP 4-10)
- General engineering support (FM 3-34)

See pp. 6-37 to 6-44 for further discussion.

## B. Personnel Services

Personnel services are sustainment functions that man and fund the force, maintain Soldier and Family readiness, promote the moral and ethical values of the nation, and enable the fighting qualities of the Army. Personnel services provide economic power at the operational and tactical levels. Personnel services complement logistics by planning for and coordinating efforts that provide and sustain personnel. Personnel services consist of the following:

- Human resources support (FM 1-0)
- Financial management operations (FM 1-06)
- Legal support (FM 1-04)
- Religious support (FM 1-05)
- Band support (ATTP 1-19)

See pp. 6-45 to 6-50 for further discussion.



Refer to *The Sustainment & Multifunctional Logistician's SMARTbook (Warfighter's Guide to Logistics, Personnel Services, & Health Services Support)* for complete discussion of the sustainment warfighting function.

## C. Health Service Support

Health service support encompasses all support and services performed, provided, and arranged by the Army Medical Department to promote, improve, conserve, or restore the mental and physical well being of personnel in the Army and, as directed, in other Services, agencies, and organizations (ATTP 4-02). Army Health System support includes both health service support and force health protection. The health service support mission is a part of the sustainment warfighting function. The force health protection mission falls under the protection warfighting function and will not be covered in this publication. Health service support consists of the following medical functions:

- Casualty care, which encompasses a number of Army Medical Department functions, to include —
  - Organic and area medical support
  - Hospitalization
  - Dental care (treatment aspects)
  - Behavioral health/neuropsychiatric treatment
  - Clinical laboratory services
  - Treatment of chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear patients
- Medical evacuation
- Medical logistics

*See pp. 6-51 to 6-54 for further discussion.*

Sample



# I. Sustainment of Unified Land Operations

*Ref: ADRP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '12). chap. 2.*

Unified action is the synchronization, coordination, and/or integration of the activities of governmental and nongovernmental entities with military operations to achieve a unity of effort (JP 1). Unified land operations acknowledges that strategic success requires fully integrating U.S. military operations with the efforts of interagency and multinational partners. The sustainment of unified land operations requires a continuous link between the strategic, operational, and tactical levels. It also requires close coordination and collaboration with other Services, allies, host nation, and other governmental organizations. This chapter demonstrates the important roles that the U.S. military and intergovernmental partners play during the sustainment of Army forces. It also builds the doctrinal bridge between our strategic and inter-organizational partners and sustainment of Army forces conducting operations.

## I. Strategic Context

In the U.S., sustainment originates at the strategic base. The strategic base consists of the Department of Defense and industrial base. The DOD acquisition(s) sustainment resources and capabilities and then provide(s) them for use in support of national strategic objectives. The industrial bases, privately and government-owned capabilities, manufactures, maintains, modifies, and repairs resources required by U.S. forces. The strategic base generates Army capabilities which are employed across the strategic environment. Army forces through joint interdependence rely upon joint capabilities, air and maritime, to deliver sustainment to a theater of operations. Through coordination and collaboration between strategic and operational partners, a continuous and accountable flow of sustainment is provided to achieve national military objectives. Also through coordination, collaboration, and agreements with host nation, allies and intergovernmental organizations certain sustainment efficiencies are achieved to facilitate a unity of effort.

## II. Joint Interdependence

Joint interdependence is the purposeful reliance by one Service's forces on another Service's capabilities to maximize the complementary and reinforcing effects of both. Army forces operate as part of an interdependent joint force.

There are many services that joint forces provide each other. The U.S. Air Force (USAF) provides lift capabilities to quickly move Army forces across strategic lines of communication to theater operations. In emergency situations, the USAF may aerial deliver sustainment to forward areas or areas where terrain may be too restrictive for ground operations. The USAF through the Air Mobility Command (AMC) provides worldwide cargo and passenger airlift, air refueling, and aeromedical evacuation. AMC also provides Contingency Response Elements that provide enroute ground support for airlift operations.

The Naval Forces provide critical sustainment support to Army operations. Naval forces provide essential joint logistics over the shore (JLOTS) support ensuring sustainment is provided to land forces when ports may be austere, damaged, or non-existent. Naval forces may be responsible for removing sustainment from vessels and delivering them to port operations for release to Army forces. The Naval Construction Force provides port construction such as warehouses, storage facilities. The Navy also provides explosive ordnance disposal support to locate and dispose of mines along ports and channels.

# Operating Forces (Continued)

Ref: ADRP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '12), pp. 2-8 to 2-12.

## 9. Financial Management Center (FMC)

The Financial Management Center (FMC) is a modular and tailorable operational financial management unit whose mission is inextricably linked to the TA G-8. In order to provide adequate theater and national-provider responsiveness and support, the FMC maintains visibility of all financial management operations and placement of all operational and tactical financial management units in theater. The primary mission of the FMC is to provide technical coordination of all theater finance operations and serve as the principal advisor to the TA G-8 and the TSC commander on all aspects of theater finance operations. Technical coordination of theater financial management units (financial management companies and their subordinate detachments) encompasses the provision of recommendations and advice to theater commanders and staff regarding the employment, integration, direction, and control of their financial management forces for the accomplishment of assigned missions. Other missions include but are not limited to: negotiations with host nation banking facilities, advising unit commanders on the use of local currency, and coordination with national providers (e.g., Department of the Treasury, DFAS, Assistant Secretary of the Army Financial Management & Comptroller, USAFMCOM) and the ECC to establish financial management support requirements (FM 1-06).

## 10. Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB)

The Army Field Support Brigade (AFSB) is assigned to the ASC and when deployed, is placed OPCON to the supported theater Army. This OPCON relationship is normally delegated to the supporting TSC or ESC as appropriate. An AFSB provides materiel readiness focused support to include coordination of acquisition logistics and technology actions, less theater support contracting and medical, to Army operational forces. AFSBs serve as ASC's link between the generating force and the operational force. AFSBs are also responsible to integrate LOGCAP support into contract support integration plans, in coordination with the theater Army G-4 and the supporting CSB (ATP 4-91).

## 11. Sustainment Brigade

When deployed, the sustainment brigade is a subordinate command of the TSC, or by extension the ESC. The sustainment brigade is a flexible, multifunctional sustainment organization, tailored and task organized according to mission, enemy, terrain and weather, troops and support available, time available, and civil considerations (METT-TC). It plans, prepares, executes, and assesses sustainment operations within an area of operations. It provides mission command of sustainment operations and distribution management.

## 12. Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB)

The Combat Sustainment Support Battalion (CSSB) is a flexible and responsive unit that executes logistics throughout the depth of an area of operations including transportation, maintenance, ammunition, supply, MA, airdrop, field services, water, and petroleum. The CSSB is attached to a sustainment brigade and is the building block upon which the sustainment brigade capabilities are developed. The CSSB is tailored to meet specific mission requirements. Employed on an area basis, the CSSB plans, prepares, executes, and assesses logistics operations within an area of operations. The CSSB also supports units in or passing through its designated area.

## 13. Medical Command (Deployment Support)

The Medical Command (Deployment Support) (MEDCOM [DS]) serves as the senior medical command within the theater in support of the CCDR. The MEDCOM (DS) pro-

vides the mission command for medical units delivering health care in support of deployed forces. The MEDCOM (DS) is a regionally focused command and provides subordinate medical organizations to operate under the medical brigade (MEDBDE) and/or multifunctional medical battalion (MMB). The Medical Command (Deployment Support) is a versatile, modular mission command structure composed of a main command post (MCP) and an operational command post (OCP). Refer to FM 4-02.12 for more information.

#### **14. Medical Brigade (MEDBDE)**

The Medical Brigade (MEDBDE) provides a scalable expeditionary mission command capability for assigned and attached medical functional organizations task-organized for support of the BCTs and supported units at echelons above brigade (EAB). The MEDBDE provides all of the mission command and planning capabilities necessary to deliver responsive and effective AHS support. The MEDBDE ensures the right mixture of medical professional (operational, technical, and clinical) expertise to synchronize the complex system of medical functions.

The Medical Brigade has the capability to provide an early entry module, an expansion module, and the campaign module, thus enabling its capability to be tailored to METT-TC factors of a specific operation. As the supported forces grow in size and complexity, the MEDBDE can deploy additional modules that build upon one another to support unified land operations.

#### **15. Multifunctional Medical Battalion (MMB)**

The Multifunctional Medical Battalion (MMB) is designed as a multifunctional HQ. It can also be deployed to provide mission command to expeditionary forces in early entry operations and facilitate the RSOI of theater medical forces. All EAB medical companies, detachments, and teams in theater may be assigned, attached, or placed under the OPCON of an MMB. The MMB is under the mission command of the MEDBDE/MEDCOM (DS).

#### **16. Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne)**

The Sustainment Brigade (Special Operations) (Airborne) is a subordinate command of the U.S. Army Special Operations Command. Its mission is to provide limited sustainment, medical, and signal support to Army Special Operations Forces (ARSOF). ARSOF are not logistically self-sufficient. ARSOF units rely upon the GCC theater infrastructure for virtually all of their support above their organic capabilities. The planning and execution of logistics support to ARSOF must be nested within the GCC's concepts of operation and support, as well as tailored to interface with the theater logistics structures. For further information on ARSOF logistics capabilities refer to FM 3-05.140.

#### **17. Brigade Support Battalion (BSB)**

The Brigade Support Battalion (BSB) is an organic component of BCT, fires, and maneuver enhancement brigades. The BSB is tailored to support the particular brigade to which it is organic. For example, the BSB of an armor brigade combat team (HBCT) has more fuel distribution capabilities and maintenance than does a fires brigade BSB. The BSB provides supply, maintenance, motor transport, and medical support to the supported brigade. The BSB plans, prepares, and executes, logistics operations in support of brigade operations (refer to FM 4-90).

#### **18. Aviation Support Battalion (ASB)**

The Aviation Support Battalion is the primary aviation logistics organization organic to Combat Aviation Brigade and the Theater Aviation Brigade. The Aviation Support Battalion performs the BSB mission. It provides aviation and ground field maintenance, brigade-wide satellite signal support, replenishment of all supplies, and medical support to the aviation brigade. The Aviation Support Battalion has been optimized to support the Combat Aviation Brigade's forward support companies, aviation maintenance companies, and the brigade HQ and HQ company (FM 3-04.111).

## VIII. Joint Logistics

Ref: JP 4-0, Joint Logistics (Oct '13), chap. I.

Sustainment is one of the six joint functions (command and control [C2], intelligence, fires, movement and maneuver, protection, and sustainment) described in Joint Publication (JP) 3-0, Joint Operations. Sustainment provides the joint force commanders (JFCs) freedom of action, endurance, and the ability to extend operational reach. Effective sustainment determines the depth to which the joint force can conduct decisive operations, allowing the JFC to seize, retain, and exploit the initiative. Sustainment is primarily the responsibility of the supported combatant commander (CCDR) and subordinate Service component commanders in close cooperation with the Services, combat support agencies (CSAs), and supporting commands. Sustainment is the provision of logistics and personnel services necessary to maintain and prolong operations until mission accomplishment and redeployment of the force. Joint logistics supports sustained readiness for joint forces.

### Core Logistic Capabilities

| Core Capabilities            | Functional Capabilities  |
|------------------------------|--|
| Supply                       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Manage Supplies and Equipment</li> <li>Inventory Management</li> <li>Manage Supplier Networks</li> </ul>  |
| Maintenance Operations       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Depot Maintenance Operations</li> <li>Field Maintenance Operations</li> <li>Manage Life Cycle Systems Readiness</li> </ul>  |
| Deployment and Distribution  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Move the Force</li> <li>Sustain the Force</li> <li>Operate the Joint Deployment and Distribution Enterprise</li> </ul>  |
| Health Service Support       | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Casualty Management</li> <li>Patient Movement</li> <li>Medical Logistics</li> <li>Preventive Medicine and Health Surveillance</li> <li>Theater Medical Information</li> </ul> |
| Engineering                  | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Combat Engineering</li> <li>General Engineering</li> <li>Geospatial Engineering</li> </ul>  |
| Logistic Services            | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Food Service</li> <li>Water and Ice Service</li> <li>Base Camp Services</li> <li>Hygiene Services</li> </ul>  |
| Operational Contract Support | <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>Contract Support Integration</li> <li>Contract Management</li> </ul>  |

Logistics concerns the integration of strategic, operational, and tactical support efforts within the theater, while scheduling the mobilization and movement of forces and materiel to support the JFC's concept of operations (CONOPS). Joint logistics is the coordinated use, synchronization, and sharing of two or more Military Departments' logistics resources to support the joint force. The joint logistics enterprise (JLEnt) projects and sustains a logistically ready joint force by leveraging Department of Defense (DOD), interagency, nongovernmental agencies, multinational, and industrial resources.



Refer to *The Joint Forces Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook (Guide to Joint, Multinational & Interagency Operations)* for discussion of joint logistics to include sustainment as a joint function, core logistics capabilities, and planning/controlling/executing joint logistics (from a joint doctrine perspective).

# Sustainment of Decisive Action

Ref: ADP 4-0, *Sustainment* (Jul '12), pp. 10 to 15.

Sustainment is one of the elements of sustaining operations. Sustaining operations, typically address important sustainment and protection actions essential to the success of decisive and shaping operations. A sustaining operation is an operation at any echelon that enables the decisive operation or shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power and is inseparable from decisive and shaping operations.

Sustainment enables commanders with operational reach, freedom of action, and endurance. Operational reach is achieved by the ability to open theaters, deploy forces to support the combatant commander's mission. Mission command is the primary means by which sustainment headquarters plan, prepare, execute, and assess the sustainment of operations. An effective distribution system enables prolonged endurance by delivering sustainment in the right quantities to support decisive action.

## I. Operational Reach

Operational reach is a necessity for successful operations. Operational reach is the distance and duration across which a unit can successfully employ military capabilities (JP 3-0). The limit of a unit's operational reach is its culminating point. Operational reach is facilitated by prepositioning stocks; capability to project Army forces and sustainment to an operational environment; to open theater ports; establish forward bases; and to close a theater upon conclusion of an operation.

See p. 6-26 for further discussion.

## II. Freedom of Action

Freedom of action enables commanders with the will to act, to achieve operational initiative and control and maintain operational tempo. Enabling freedom of action requires that sustainment commanders synchronize the sustainment plan with the operations plan to ensure supported commanders can operate freely and unencumbered by limited resources. Sustainment commanders can enable freedom of action through preparing and putting in place sustainment capabilities.

**Negotiating and agreements.** Negotiating and establishing agreements with host nation resources is important for establishing freedom of action. Through negotiation and agreements, Army forces can reduce the military sustainment footprint and resources to focus on higher priority operations requiring greater military sustainment involvement. Host nation support agreements may include pre-positioning of supplies and equipment, OCONUS training programs, and humanitarian and civil assistance programs. These agreements are designed to enhance the development and cooperative solidarity of the host nation and provide infrastructure compensation should deployment of forces to the target country be required.

See p. 6-34 for further discussion.

## III. Endurance

Endurance refers to the ability to employ combat power anywhere for protracted periods (ADRP 3-0). Endurance stems from the ability to maintain, protect, and sustain forces, regardless of how far away they are deployed, how austere the environment, or how long land power is required.

**Distribution.** Distribution is key for endurance. Endurance is enabled by an Army distribution system (referred to as theater distribution) that provides forces with a continuous flow of sustainment. The distribution system is a complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, and control the flow of military resources between point of receipt into the military system and point of issue to using activities and units (refer to ATTP 4-0.1). An important aspect of distribution is intransit visibility.

See p. 6-34 for further discussion.

# Distribution

Ref: ADRP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '12), pp. 3-16 to 3-18.

Distribution is the primary means to prolong endurance. Distribution is the operational process of synchronizing all elements of the logistic system to deliver the “right things” to the “right place” at the “right time” to support the geographic combatant commander. Additionally, it is also the process of assigning military personnel to activities, units, or billets (JP 4-0).

The distribution system consists of a complex of facilities, installations, methods, and procedures designed to receive, store, maintain, distribute, manage, and control the flow of military materiel between point of receipt into the military system and point of issue to using activities and units.

The Joint segment of the distribution system is referred to as global distribution. It is defined as the process that synchronizes and integrates the fulfillment of joint requirements with the employment of joint forces (JP 4-09). It provides national resources (personnel and materiel) to support the execution of joint operations.

The Army segment of the distribution system is referred to as theater distribution. Theater distribution is the flow of equipment, personnel, and materiel within theater to meet the CDR's mission. The theater segment extends from the ports of debarkation or source of supply (in theater) to the points of need (Soldier). It is enabled by a distribution management system synchronizes and coordinates a complex of networks (physical, communications, information, and resources) and the sustainment war fighting function to achieve responsive support to operational requirements. Distribution management includes the management of transportation and movement control, warehousing, inventory control, order administration, site and location analysis, packaging, data processing, accountability for equipment (materiel management), people, and communications. See ATP 4-0.1, Army Theater Distribution for details.

The distribution management of medical materiel is accomplished by a support team from the Medical Logistics Management Center (MLMC). The MLMC support team collocates with the DMC of the TSC/ESC to provide the MEDCOM (DS) with visibility and control of all Class VIII.

## In-Transit Visibility

In-transit visibility is the ability to track the identity, status, and location of DOD units, and non-unit cargo (excluding bulk petroleum, oils, and lubricants) and passengers; patients and personal property from origin to consignee, or destination across the range of military operations (JP 3-35). This includes force tracking and visibility of convoys, containers/pallets, transportation assets, other cargo, and distribution resources within the activities of a distribution node.

## Retrograde of Materiel

Another aspect of distribution is retrograde of materiel. Retrograde of materiel is the return of materiel from the owning/using unit back through the distribution system to the source of supply, directed ship-to location, and/or point of disposal (ATP 4-0.1). Retrograde includes turn-in/classification, preparation, packing, transporting, and shipping. To ensure these functions are properly executed, commanders must enforce supply accountability and discipline and utilize the proper packing materials. Retrograde of materiel can take place as part of theater distribution operations and as part of redeployment operations. Retrograde of materiel must be continuous and not be allowed to build up at supply points/nodes.

Early retrograde planning is essential and necessary to preclude the loss of materiel assets, minimize environmental impact, and maximize use of transportation capabilities. Planners must consider environmental issues when retrograding hazardous materiel.



## (III. Elements of Sustainment)

# A. Logistics

Ref: ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment* (Jul '12). pp. 4-1 to 4-6.

Logistics involves both military art and science. Knowing when and how to accept risk, prioritizing a myriad of requirements, and balancing limited resources all require military art while understanding equipment capabilities incorporates military science. Logistics integrates strategic, operational, and tactical support of deployed forces while scheduling the mobilization and deployment of additional forces and materiel. Logistics include; maintenance, transportation, supply, field services, distribution, operational contract support, and general engineering support. Distribution was previously discussed elsewhere.

### A. Maintenance

Maintenance is all actions taken to retain materiel in a serviceable condition or to restore it to serviceability. The Army's two levels of maintenance are field maintenance and sustainment maintenance (see ATTP 4-33). Maintenance is necessary for endurance and performed at the tactical through strategic levels of war.

#### 1. Field Maintenance

Field maintenance is repair and return to user and is generally characterized by on-(or near) system maintenance, often utilizing line replaceable unit, component replacement, battle damage assessment, repair, and recovery (see ATTP 4-33). It is focused on returning a system to an operational status. Field level maintenance is not limited to remove and replace, but also provides adjustment, alignment, and fault/failure diagnoses. Field maintenance also includes battlefield damage and repair tasks performed by either the crew or support personnel to maintain system in an operational state.

#### 2. Sustainment Maintenance

Sustainment maintenance is generally characterized as "off system" and "repair rear" (see ATTP 4-33). The intent is to perform commodity-oriented repairs on all supported items to one standard that provides a consistent and measurable level of reliability. Off-system maintenance consists of overhaul and remanufacturing activities designed to return components, modules, assemblies, and end items to the supply system or to units, resulting in extended or improved operational life expectancies.

### B. Transportation Operations

Army transportation units play a key role in facilitating endurance. Transportation units move sustainment from ports to points of need and retrograde materiel as required. Transportation operations encompass the wide range of capabilities needed to allow joint and Army commanders to conduct operations. Important transportation functions are movement control, intermodal operations (terminal and mode), and container management.

#### 1. Movement Control

Movement control is the dual process of committing allocated transportation assets and regulating movements according to command priorities to synchronize distribution flow over lines of communications to sustain land forces. Movement control balances requirements against capabilities and requires continuous synchronization to integrate military, host nation, and commercial movements by all modes of trans-



# Principles of the Army Health System

Ref: ADRP 4-0, Sustainment (Jul '12), pp. 1-5 to 1-6.

The principles of the Army health system (AHS) are the enduring tenets upon which the delivery of health care in a field environment is founded. The principles guide medical planners in developing operational plans which are effective, efficient, flexible, and executable. The AHS plans are designed to support the tactical commander's scheme of maneuver while still retaining a Soldier/patient focus. The AHS principles apply across all medical functions and are synchronized through medical mission command and close coordination and synchronization of all deployed medical assets through medical technical channels.

## Principles of the Army Health System

1. **Conformity**
2. **Proximity**
3. **Flexibility**
4. **Mobility**
5. **Continuity**
6. **Control**

### 1. Conformity

Conformity with the tactical plan is the most basic element for effectively providing AHS support. In order to develop a comprehensive concept of operations, the medical commander must have direct access to the tactical commander. AHS planners must be involved early in the planning process and once the plan is established it must be rehearsed with the forces it supports.

### 2. Proximity

Proximity is to provide AHS support to sick, injured, and wounded Soldiers at the right time and to keep morbidity and mortality to a minimum. AHS support assets are placed within supporting distance of the maneuver forces which they are supporting, but not close enough to impede ongoing combat operations. As the battle rhythm of the medical commander is similar to the tactical commander's, it is essential that AHS assets are positioned to rapidly locate, acquire, stabilize, and evacuate combat casualties. Peak workloads for AHS resources occur during combat operations.

### 3. Flexibility

Flexibility is being prepared and empowered to shift AHS resources to meet changing requirements. Changes in tactical plans or operations make flexibility in AHS planning and execution essential. In addition to building flexibility into operation plans to support the tactical commander's scheme of maneuver, the medical commander must also ensure that he has the flexibility to rapidly transition from one level of violence to another across the range of military operations. As the current era is one characterized by conflict, the medical commander may be supporting simultaneous actions along the continuum from stable peace through general war (JP 3-0). The medical commander exercises command authority to effectively manage scarce medical resources to benefit the greatest number of Soldiers in the area of operations.

## 4. Mobility

Mobility is to ensure that AHS assets remain in supporting distance to support maneuvering forces. The mobility, survivability (such as armor plating and other force protection measures), and sustainability of medical units organic to maneuver elements must be equal to the forces being supported. Major AHS headquarters in echelons above brigade continually assess and forecast unit movement and redeployment. AHS support must be continually responsive to shifting medical requirements in the operational environment. In noncontiguous operations, the use of ground ambulances may be limited depending on the security threat and air ambulance use may be limited by environmental conditions and enemy air defense threat. Therefore, to facilitate a continuous evacuation flow, medical evacuation must be a synchronized effort to ensure timely, responsive, and effective support is provided to the tactical commander. The only means available to increase the mobility of medical units is to evacuate all patients they are holding. Medical units anticipating an influx of patients must medically evacuate patients on hand prior to the start of the engagement.

## 5. Continuity

Continuity in care and treatment is achieved by moving the patient through progressive, phased roles of care, extending from the point of injury or wounding to the continental United States (CONUS)-support base. Each type of AHS unit contributes a measured, logical increment in care appropriate to its location and capabilities. In current operations, lower casualty rates, availability of rotary-wing air ambulances, and other situational variables often times enables a patient to be evacuated from the point of injury directly to the supporting combat support hospital. In more traditional combat operations, higher casualty rates, extended distances, and patient condition may necessitate that a patient receive care at each role of care to maintain physiologic status and enhance chances of survival. The medical commander's depth of medical knowledge, ability to anticipate follow-on medical treatment requirements, and assessment of the availability of specialized medical resources can adjust the patient flow to ensure each Soldier receives the care required to optimize patient outcome. The medical commander can recommend changes in the theater evacuation policy to adjust patient flow within the deployed setting.

## 6. Control

Control is required to ensure that scarce AHS resources are efficiently employed and support the tactical through strategic plans. It also ensures that the scope and quality of medical treatment meet professional standards, policies, and U.S. and international law. As the Army Medical Department (AMEDD) is comprised of 10 medical functions which are interdependent and interrelated. Control of AHS support operations requires synchronization to ensure the complex interrelationships and interoperability of all medical assets remain in balance to optimize the effective functioning of the entire system.

# Protection Warfighting Function

*Ref: ADP 3-37, Protection (Aug '12) and ADRP 3-0, Unified Land Operations (May '12), pp. 3-5 to 3-6. See also p. 1-41.*

Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power and the freedom of action and to mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners. Survivability refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence. For the military, survivability is about much more than mere survival—it is also about remaining effective. Military forces are composed of personnel and physical assets, each having their own inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that permit them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. These inherent qualities or capabilities are affected by various factors (dispersion, redundancy, morale, leadership, discipline, mobility, situational understanding, terrain and weather conditions) and can be enhanced by tasks within the protection warfighting function.

## I. The Protection Warfighting Function

The protection warfighting function is the related tasks and systems that preserve the force so that commanders can apply maximum combat power to accomplish the mission (ADRP 3-0). Preserving the force includes protecting personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners. The protection warfighting function enables commanders to preserve force integrity and combat power by integrating protection capabilities to safeguard bases/base camps, secure routes, and protect forces. Commanders incorporate protection when they understand and visualize capabilities available for protection. Some of these actions or effects may be achieved through the combined integration of the eight elements of combat power, resulting in an increasingly effective and efficient scheme of protection.

The supporting tasks of the protection warfighting function are—

- Conduct operational area security
- Employ safety techniques (including fratricide avoidance)
- Implement operations security
- Provide intelligence support to protection
- Implement physical security procedures
- Apply antiterrorism measures
- Conduct law and order
- Conduct survivability operations
- Provide force health protection
- Conduct chemical, biological, radiological, and nuclear operations
- Provide explosive ordnance disposal and protection support
- Coordinate air and missile defense
- Conduct personnel recovery operations
- Conduct internment and resettlement


*Refer to JP 3-0 for more information on joint protection tasks.*

## IV. Protection Integration in the Operations Process

Ref: ADP 3-37, *Protection* (Aug '12), pp. 3 to 7.

Protection is integrated throughout the operations process to provide a synchronization of efforts and an integration of capabilities. The protection warfighting function tasks are incorporated into the process in a layered and redundant approach to complement and reinforce actions to achieve force protection.

### Protection within the Operations Process



Ref: ADRP 3-37, *Protection*, introductory fig. 1, p. vi.

### A. Plan (pp. 7-25 to 7-38)

Planning is the first step toward effective protection. Commanders consider the most likely threats and hazards and decide which personnel, physical assets, and information to protect. They set protection priorities for each phase or critical event of an operation. The military decisionmaking process and troop leading procedures provide a deliberate process to develop and examine information for use in the various continuing activities and integrating processes that comprise the operations process. Effective protection schemes and risk decisions are developed based on information that flows from mission analysis, allowing a thorough understanding of the environment (operational and mission variables). The integrating processes provide a context to identify and analyze threats and hazards, to develop a situational understanding of the operational environment, and to develop a scheme of protection. Staffs assess threats, hazards, criticality, vulnerability, and capability to help commanders determine protection priorities, task organizations, and protection task integration.

Commanders and staffs apply protection considerations in relation to the mission and the operational environment throughout the operations process. They discern hazards that are preventable and divide threats into those that may be deterred and those that may require the application of security or defensive measures to achieve protection. Commanders provide risk guidance, critical information requirements, essential elements of friendly

information, and asset or capability criticality to help focus staffs and subordinate leaders. Commanders direct staffs to conduct the necessary tasks to protect the force, secure the area, and mitigate the effects of current and potential threats and hazards.

The keys to protection planning are identifying the threats and hazards, assessing the threats and hazards to determine the risks, developing preventive measures, and integrating protection tasks into a comprehensive scheme of protection that includes mitigating measures. The warfighting functions are synchronized throughout the operations process to assist in the development of an enduring scheme of protection. The critical asset list and the defended asset are developed and revised during this process.

During planning, the protection cell/working group—

- Establishes a protection working group
- Conducts initial assessments
- Develops a critical asset list and a defended asset list
- Integrates and layers protection tasks
- Develops a scheme of protection.
- Recommends protection priorities
- Refines the running estimate
- Synchronizes protection within the elements of combat power
- Identifies communication channels among key personnel within protection and leadership
- Develops and publishes personnel recovery guidance
- Establishes personnel recovery that is related to the commander's critical information requirements

## **B. Prepare** (pp. 7-39 to 7-42)

During the preparation phase, protection focuses on deterring and preventing the enemy or adversary from actions that would affect combat power and the freedom of action. The implementation of protection tasks with ongoing preparation activities assists in the prevention of negative effects. Commanders ensure the integration of protection warfighting function tasks and systems to safeguard bases/base camps, secure routes, and protect the force while it prepares for operations. Active defense measures assist in denying the initiative to the enemy or adversary, while the execution of passive defense measures prepares the force against the threat and hazard effects and speeds the mitigation of those effects.

Assessment occurs during preparation and includes activities required to maintain situational understanding; monitor and evaluate running estimates and tasks, methods of evaluation, and measures of performance; and identify variances for decision support. These assessments generally provide commanders with a composite estimate of preoperational force readiness or status in time to make adjustments.

Preparation includes increased application and emphasis on protection measures. During preparation, the protection cell/working group—

- Revises and refines the plan
- Determines protection indicators and warnings for information collection
- Emplaces systems to detect threats to the critical assets
- Directs operations security measures
- Prepares and improves survivability positions
- Conducts liaison and coordinates with adjacent and protected units
- Rehearses
- Trains with defended assets
- Reviews the personnel recovery readiness of subordinate units
- Establishes personnel recovery architecture
- Implements vulnerability reduction measures

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Protection

# I. Protection Supporting Tasks

Ref: ADRP 3-37 (FM 3-37), Protection (Aug '12), chap. 1.

Commanders and staffs synchronize, integrate, and organize capabilities and resources throughout the operations process to preserve combat power and the freedom of action and to mitigate the effects of threats and hazards. Protection safeguards the force, personnel (combatants and noncombatants), systems, and physical assets of the United States and unified action partners. Survivability refers to the capacity, fitness, or tendency to remain alive or in existence. For the military, survivability is about much more than mere survival—it is also about remaining effective. Military forces are composed of personnel and physical assets, each having their own inherent survivability qualities or capabilities that permit them to avoid or withstand hostile actions or environmental conditions while retaining the ability to fulfill their primary mission. These inherent qualities or capabilities are affected by various factors (dispersion, redundancy, morale, leadership, discipline, mobility, situational understanding, terrain and weather conditions) and can be enhanced by tasks within the protection warfighting function.

## I. Supporting Tasks

Supporting task of the protection warfighting function include:

| Protection Supporting Tasks  |  |
|--|--|
| <b>A</b> Conduct Operational Area Security                         | <b>H</b> Conduct Survivability Operations  |
| <b>B</b> Employ Safety Techniques (including Fratricide Avoidance) | <b>I</b> Provide Force Health Protection   |
| <b>C</b> Implement OPSEC   | <b>J</b> Provide Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Protection Support          |
| <b>D</b> Provide Intelligence Support to Protection                | <b>K</b> Conduct Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Operations |
| <b>E</b> Apply Antiterrorism Measures                              | <b>L</b> Coordinate Air and Missile Defense  |
| <b>F</b> Implement Physical Security Procedures                    | <b>M</b> Conduct Personnel Recovery  |
| <b>G</b> Conduct Law and Order                                     | <b>N</b> Conduct Internment and Resettlement                                       |

Ref: ADRP 3-37 (FM 3-37), Protection (Aug '12), p. 1-3.

## A. Conduct Operational Area Security

The task of conducting operational area security is a form of security operations conducted to protect friendly forces, installations, routes, and actions within an area of operations. Forces engaged in operational area security protect the force, installation, route, area, or asset. Although vital to the success of military operations, operational area security is normally an economy-of-force mission, often designed to ensure the continued conduct of sustainment operations and to support decisive and shaping operations by generating and maintaining combat power.

Operational area security may be the predominant method of protecting support areas that are necessary to facilitate the positioning, employment, and protection of resources required to sustain, enable, and control forces. Operational area security is often an effective method of providing civil security and control during some stability operations. Forces engaged in operational area security can saturate an area or position on key terrain to provide protection through early warning, reconnaissance, or surveillance and to guard against unexpected enemy or adversary attack with an active response. This early warning, reconnaissance or surveillance may come from ground- and space-based sensors. Operational area security often focuses on named areas of interest in an effort to answer commander's critical information requirements, aiding in tactical decisionmaking and confirming or denying threat intentions. Forces engaged in operational area security are typically organized in a manner that emphasizes their mobility, lethality, and communications capabilities. The maneuver enhancement brigade and some military police units are specifically equipped and trained to conduct operational area security and may constitute the only available force during some phases of an operation. However, operational area security takes advantage of the local security measures performed by all units, regardless of their location in the area of operations.

All commanders apportion combat power and dedicate assets to protection tasks and systems based on an analysis of the operational environment, the likelihood of threat action, and the relative value of friendly resources and populations. Based on their assessments, joint force commanders may designate the Army to provide a joint security coordinator to be responsible for designated joint security areas. Although all resources have value, the mission variables of METT-TC make some resources, assets, or locations more significant to successful mission accomplishment from enemy or adversary and friendly perspectives. Commanders rely on the risk management process and other specific assessment methods to facilitate decisionmaking, issue guidance, and allocate resources. Criticality, vulnerability, and recoverability are some of the most significant considerations in determining protection priorities that become the subject of commander guidance and the focus of operational area security.

*See facing page for further discussion.*

## B. Employ Safety Techniques (Including Fratricide Avoidance)

Safety techniques are used to identify and assess hazards to the force and make recommendations on ways to prevent or mitigate the effects of those hazards. Commanders have the inherent responsibility to analyze the risks and implement control measures to mitigate them. All staffs understand and factor into their analysis how their execution recommendations could adversely affect Soldiers. Incorporating protection within the risk management integrating process is key. It ensures a thorough analysis of risks and implements controls to mitigate their effects. All commands develop and implement a command safety program that includes fratricide avoidance, occupational health, risk management, fire prevention and suppression, and accident prevention programs focused on minimizing safety risks.



## Initial Assessments (Protection)



**Threat and Hazard Assessment** (p. 7-28)



**Vulnerability Assessment** (p. 7-30)



**Criticality Assessment** (p. 7-30)



**Capability Assessment** (p. 7-31)

*Ref: ADRP 3-37, Protection, chap. 2.*

## II. Integrating Processes

The integrating processes of intelligence preparation of the battlefield, targeting, and risk management are essential in providing assessments or key information to assessments. They are a vital part of integrating protection within the other warfighting functions and throughout the operations process.

### **Intelligence Preparation of the Battlefield (IPB)**

The intelligence preparation of the battlefield is a systematic process of analyzing and visualizing the mission variables of threat, terrain, weather, and civil considerations in a specific area of interest and for a specific mission. By applying the intelligence preparation of the battlefield, commanders gain the information necessary to selectively apply and maximize operation effectiveness at critical points in time and space.

### **Targeting**

The targeting process integrates commander guidance and priorities to determine which targets to engage and how, when, and where to engage them in order to assign friendly capabilities to achieve the desired effect. The staff then assigns friendly capabilities that are best suited to produce the desired effect on each target. An important part of targeting is identifying possibilities for fratricide and collateral damage. Commanders establish control measures, including the consideration for restraint, that are necessary to minimize the chance of these events. The protection priorities must be integrated within the targeting process to achieve the desired effects while ensuring the preservation of combat power.

### **Risk Management**

Risk management is the process of identifying, assessing, and controlling risks that arise from operational factors and making decisions that balance risk cost with mission benefits. Threat, hazard, capability, vulnerability, and criticality assessments are utilized to evaluate the risk to the force, determine the critical assets, ascertain available resources, and apply security or defensive measures to achieve protection. Risk management helps commanders preserve lives and resources, avoid or mitigate unnecessary risk, identify and implement feasible and effective control measures where specific standards do not exist, and develop valid courses of action (COAs). Risk management integration during operations process activities is the primary responsibility of the unit protection officer or operations officer.

*See fig. 2-1 on previous page for an overview of the risk management process.*

## V. Scheme of Protection Development

Ref: ADRP 3-37 (FM 3-37), Protection (Aug '12), pp. 2-7 to 2-8.

The scheme of protection describes how protection tasks support the commander's intent and concept of operations, and it uses the commander's guidance to establish the priorities of support to units for each phase of the operation. A commander's initial protection guidance may include protection priorities, civil considerations, protection task considerations, potential protection decisive points, high-risk considerations, and prudent risk.

Planners receive guidance as commanders describe their visualization of the operational concept and intent. This guidance generally focuses on the COA development by identifying decisive and supporting efforts, massing effects, and stating priorities. Effective planning guidance provides a broad perspective of the commander's visualization, with the latitude to explore additional options.

The scheme of protection is developed after receiving guidance and considering the principles of protection in relation to the mission variables, the incorporation of efforts, and the tasks that comprise the protection warfighting function. The scheme of protection is based on the mission variables, thus includes protection priorities by area, unit, activity, or resource. It addresses how protection is applied and derived during the conduct of operations. For example, the security for routes, bases/base camps, and critical infrastructure is accomplished by applying protection assets in dedicated, fixed, or local security roles; or it may be derived from economy-of-force protection measures such as area security techniques. It also identifies areas and conditions where forces may become fixed or static and unable to derive protection from their ability to maneuver and press the offensive. These conditions, areas, or situations are anticipated; and the associated risks are mitigated by describing and planning for the use of response forces. The staff considers the following items, at a minimum:

- Protection priorities
- Work priorities for survivability assets
- Air and missile defense positioning guidance
- Specific terrain and weather factors
- Intelligence focus and limitations for security efforts
- Areas or events where risk is acceptable
- Protected targets and areas
- Civilians and noncombatants in the area of operations
- Vehicle and equipment safety or security constraints
- Personnel recovery actions and control measures
- Force protection condition status
- Force health protection measures
- Mission-oriented protective posture guidance
- Environmental guidance
- Information operations condition
- Explosive ordnance and hazard guidance
- Ordnance order of battle
- OPSEC risk tolerance
- Fratricide avoidance measures
- Rules of engagement, standing rules for the use of force, and rules of interaction
- Escalation of force and nonlethal weapons guidance
- Operational scheme of maneuver
- Military deception
- Obscuration

# Doctrine 2015 (Army (Operations) Glossary

This combined glossary lists new and modified terms with Army or joint definitions from the following Doctrine 2015 publications used as references in The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook:

- ADRP 3-0, *Unified Land Operations* (May '12)
- ADRP 6-0, *Mission Command* (May '12)
- ADRP 2-0, *Intelligence* (Aug '12)
- ADRP 3-09, *Fires* (Aug '12)
- ADRP 4-0, *Sustainment* (Jul '12)
- ADRP 3-37, *Protection* (Aug '12)

Where Army and joint definitions differ, (Army) precedes the definition. The proponent manual for other terms is listed in parentheses after the definition.

**active air defense** - The direct defensive action taken to destroy, nullify, or reduce the effectiveness of hostile air and missile threats against friendly forces and assets. It includes the use of aircraft, air defense weapons, electronic warfare, and other available weapons. (JP 3-01)

**adversary** - A party acknowledged as potentially hostile to a friendly party and against which the use of force may be envisaged. (JP 3-0)

**air and missile defense** - The direct defensive actions taken to protect friendly forces by destroying or reducing the effectiveness of hostile air and ballistic missile threats against friendly forces and assets in support of joint force commander's objectives.

**air defense artillery** - The defensive measures designed to destroy attacking enemy aircraft or missiles in the atmosphere, or to nullify or reduce the effectiveness of such attack either through surveillance actions or active engagements of aerial threat. (ADRP 3-09)

**alliance** - The relationship that results from a formal agreement between two or more nations for broad, long-term objectives that further the common interests of the members. (JP 3-0)

**all-source intelligence** - (Army) The integration of intelligence and information from all relevant sources in order to analyze situations or conditions that impact operations. (ADRP 2-0)

**anticipation** - The ability to foresee events and requirements and initiate necessary actions that most appropriately satisfy a response without waiting for operations orders or fragmentary orders. (ADRP 4-0)

**area of influence** - A geographical area wherein a commander is directly capable of influencing operations by maneuver or fire support systems normally under the commander's command or control. (JP 3-0)

**area of interest** - That area of concern to the commander, including the area of influence, areas adjacent thereto, and extending into enemy territory. This area also includes areas occupied by enemy forces who could jeopardize the accomplishment of the mission. (JP 3-0)



# The Army Operations & Doctrine SMARTbook

# Index

## A

Acceptable Risk, 2-24  
Actions by Friendly Forces, 3-21  
ADA Brigade, 5-24  
Adaptability, 1-37  
Additional Tasks, 2-12  
Adversary, 1-9  
Air and Missile Defense, 7-22  
    *Employment*, 5-12  
Air Defense Artillery, 5-5  
Air Defense Planning, 5-30  
Airspace Control Measures, 2-36  
Alliance, 1-11  
All-Source Intelligence, 4-23  
Analyze, 4-22  
Antiterrorism (AT) Measures, 7-16  
Area of Influence, 1-20  
Area of Interest, 1-20  
Area of Operations, 1-20  
Area Reconnaissance, 4-9  
Army Airspace Command and Control (A2C2), 2-35  
Army Command & Support Relationships, 2-32  
Army Design Methodology (ADM), 1-19  
Army Force Generation (ARFORGEN), 3-10  
Army Planning Methodologies, 1-19  
Army Prepositioned Stocks, 6-27  
Army Support, 3-6  
Army's Operational Concept, 1-25  
Art of Command, 1-38, 2-16  
Assess, 4-22  
Assess, 5-26  
Assured Mobility, 3-24  
Authority, 2-16

## B

Band Support, 6-50  
Basing, 1-51  
Basing, 6-29  
Battles, 3-17

## C

Campaigns, 1-15  
Campaign Quality, 1-13  
Capability Assessment, 7-31  
Casualty Care, 6-51  
Centers of Gravity, 1-46  
Chain of Command, 2-27  
Chemical, Biological, Radiological, and Nuclear (CBRN) Ops, 7-21  
Civil Considerations, 4-10  
Classes of Supply, 6-41  
Close Combat, 1-16  
Close Support, 2-31  
Coalition, 1-11  
Collect, 4-18  
Combat Power, 1-39  
    *Elements*, 1-39  
    *Organizing*, 1-42  
Combatant Command (COM), 2-31  
Combatant Commands, 2-28  
Combined Arms, 1-22  
Combined Arms Maneuver, 1-34  
Command and Support Relationships, 2-27  
Command Posts, 2-34  
Command Presence, 2-24  
Command Relationships, 2-30, 2-32  
Commander Tasks, 2-8  
Commander's Guidance, 4-14  
Communication, 2-22  
Complementary Capabilities, 1-24  
Complementary Intelligence Capabilities, 4-24

Core Competencies, 1-33  
Counter mobility, 3-26  
Crisis Response, 1-15  
Critical Assets Lists (CAL), 5-30, 7-32  
Criticality Assessment, 7-30  
Culmination, 1-54

## D

Decide, 5-26  
Decisionmaking, 2-17, 2-18  
Decisive Action, 1-27  
Decisive Operations, 3-1  
Decisive Points, 1-48  
Decisive-Shaping-Sustaining, 1-21, 5-14  
Deep-Close-Security, 1-21, 5-14  
Defended Asset Development (CAL and DAL), 5-30, 7-32  
Defended Assets Lists (DAL), 5-30, 7-32  
Defense Support of Civil Authorities, 1-29, 3-6  
Defense, 3-2  
Defensive Tasks, 1-28  
Degrees of Control, 2-23  
Deliver Fires, 5-1  
Deliver, 5-26  
Deployment & Redeployment, 3-10  
Depth, 1-37  
Detect, 5-26  
Deterrence, 1-15  
Direct Support, 2-31  
Directive Authority for Logistics (DAFL), 6-8  
Disseminate, 4-20  
Dissemination Methods and Techniques, 4-21  
Distribution, 6-35  
Dynamic Targeting, 5-26

---

## E

Effects on Enemy Forces, 3-20  
Elements,  
    *of Combat Power, 1-39*  
    *of Operational Art, 1-46, 1-47*  
    *of Operational Design, 1-47*  
End State and Conditions, 1-46  
Endurance, 6-34  
Enemy, 1-9  
Engagements, 3-17  
Engineer

*Across the Levels of War, 3-32*

*Disciplines, 3-32*

*Framework, 3-31*

*Support, 3-30*

Every Soldier is a Sensor (ES2) Program, 4-9

Executive Agent (EA), 6-7

Expeditionary Capability, 1-13

Explosive Ordnance Disposal (EOD) and Protection Support, 7-20

---

## F

Field Artillery, 5-5

*Employment, 5-13*

Field Services, 6-42

Financial Management, 6-46

Find, Fix, Finish, Exploit, Analyze and Disseminate (F3EAD), 5-26

Fires,

*Core Competencies, 5-5*

*Employment, 5-12*

*In Support of Unified Land Operations, 5-5, 5-9*

*In Support Decisive Operations, 5-10*

*In the Operational Framework, 5-14*

*In the Operations Process, 5-25*

*Joint Principles, 5-6*

*Organizations and Key Personnel, 5-15*

*Planning, 5-28*

*Principles and Characteristics, 5-7*

*Roles, 5-5*

*Warfighting Function, 1-41, 5-1*

Fires Brigade (FIB), 5-22

Flexibility, 1-36

Force Health Protection, 7-19

Force Projection, 3-10

Force Tailoring, 1-42

Freedom of Action, 6-34

Friendly Force, 1-6

---

## G

General Engineering Support, 6-44

General Support, 2-31

Generating Forces, 6-8

Hazards, 7-26

Health Service Support, 6-4, 6-51

*Principles, 6-52*

---

## H

Homeland Defense, 1-32

Human Resources Support, 6-45

Hybrid Threat, 1-9

---

## I

Inform and Influence Activities, 2-9, 2-11

Information, 2-21

Information Management, 2-10

Information Protection, 2-12

Initial Assessments, 7-25

Initiative, 1-25

Integrating Processes, 7-25

Integration, 1-36

Intelligence Reach, 4-19

Intelligence,

*Capabilities 4-23*

*Characteristic, 4-12*

*Continuing Activities, 4-22*

*Disciplines, 4-24*

*Planning Considerations, 4-15*

*Process, 4-13*

*Purpose, 4-6*

*Support to Commanders and Decisionmakers, 4-7*

*Warfighting Function, 1-41, 4-1*

*Warfighting Tasks, 4-11*

Intergovernmental and Interagency Coordination, 6-16

Internment and Resettlement, 7-24

---

## J

Joint Command & Support Relationships, 2-30

Joint Command for Logistics, 6-8

Joint Interdependence, 6-5

Joint Logistics, 6-20

Joint Operations, 1-12, 1-14

Joint Task Forces, 2-28

Judgment, 2-19

---

## K

Knowledge Management, 2-10

---

## L

Land Operations, 1-13

Law and Order Operations, 7-18

Law of War, 1-18

Lead Service, 6-7

Leadership, 2-17

Legal Support, 6-48

Lessons-Learned Integration, 7-45

Lethality, 1-37

Limited Contingency Operations, 1-15

Lines of Effort, 1-48

Lines of Engineer Support 3-36

Lines of Operations, 1-48

Logistics, 6-1, 6-37

*Principles, 6-38*

---

## M

Main and Supporting Efforts, 1-21

Maintenance, 6-37

Major Operations, 1-15

Medical Evacuation, 6-54  
Medical Logistics, 6-54  
Military Deception, 2-12  
Military Decisionmaking Process (MDMP), 1-19  
Military Engagement, 1-15  
Military Units and Echelons, 3-13  
Mission Command, 1-33  
    *Philosophy of Command*, 2-13  
    *Principles* 2-13  
    *System*, 2-7  
    *Warfighting Function*, 1-41, 2-1  
    *Warfighting Tasks*, 2-6  
Mission Orders, 2-15  
Mission Symbols, 3-22  
Mission Variables (METT-TC), 1-4  
Mobility and Countermobility, 3-23  
Movement & Maneuver Warfighting Function, 1-41, 3-1  
Multinational Operations, 1-11  
Mutual Support, 1-42, 2-31

## N

Neutral, 1-9  
No-Strike List, 5-29

## O

Obstacle Planning, 3-28  
Offense, 3-2  
Offensive Tasks, 1-28  
Operating Forces, 6-12  
Operational Approach, 1-44  
Operational Area Security, 7-12  
Operational Art and Planning, 1-47  
Operational Art, 1-43  
Operational Concept, 1-25  
Operational Contract Support, 6-42  
Operational Control (OPCON), 2-31  
Operational Environment, 1-1, 1-6

Operational Framework 1-18, 1-19  
Operational Reach, 1-50, 6-26  
Operational Variables (PMESII-PT), 1-4  
Operations Process, 1-16  
Operations Structure, 1-16  
OPSEC, 7-16  
Organizing Combat Power, 1-42

## P

Personnel Recovery, 7-23  
Personnel Services, 6-1, 6-45  
    *Principles*, 6-47  
Phasing, 1-53  
Physical Security Procedures, 7-17  
Plan and Direct, 4-16  
Principles of Joint Operations, 1-49  
Processing, Exploitation, and Dissemination (PED), 4-24  
Produce, 4-18  
Protection Cell and Working Group 7-34, 7-39  
Protection,  
    *In Execution*, 7-43  
    *In Preparation*, 7-39  
    *In the Operations Process*, 7-6  
    *In Support of Unified Land Operations*, 7-10, 7-43  
    *In Assessment*, 7-45  
    *Role*, 7-2  
    *Planning*, 7-25  
    *Priorities*, 7-31  
    *Supporting Tasks*, 7-11  
    *Warfighting Function*, 1-41, 7-1  
Prudent Risk, 2-15

## R

Range of Military Operations (ROMO), 1-12, 1-14  
Reconnaissance, 4-8  
Reconnaissance in Force, 4-9

Reconnaissance Objective, 4-9  
Reinforcing Capabilities, 1-24  
Religious Support, 6-48  
Requirements Management, 4-17  
Restricted Target List, 5-29  
Risk Management Process, 7-25  
Risk, 1-54, 2-19  
Route Reconnaissance, 4-8  
Rules of Engagement, 1-18, 1-22

## S

Safety Techniques (Including Fratricide Avoidance), 7-12  
Scheme of Protection, 7-33  
*Science and Art of Tactics*, 3-18  
*Science of Control*, 1-38, 2-20  
Security Cooperation, 1-15  
Service Components 2-28  
Single-Source Intelligence, 4-24  
Social Understanding, 4-10  
Special Operations, 3-8  
Special Warfare, 3-8  
Stability Operations, 3-4  
Stability Tasks, 1-29  
Staff Tasks, 2-10  
Strategic Context, 1-6  
Structure, 2-23  
Supply, 6-40  
Support Relationships, 2-31, 2-33  
Supporting Distance, 1-42  
Supporting Efforts, 1-21  
Supporting Range, 1-42  
Surgical Strike, 3-8  
Surveillance, 4-8  
Survivability Operations, 7-19  
Sustainment,  
    *Army Responsibilities*, 6-7  
    *Execution*, 6-34  
    *In Multinational Operations* 6-17  
    *Mission Command of*, 6-25

*Of Unified Land Operations*, 6-5  
*Of Decisive Action*, 6-21  
*Planning*, 6-24  
*Preparation*, 6-34  
*Warfighting Function*, 1-41, 6-1

Synchronization, 1-37

---

## T

Tactical Control (TACON), 2-31  
Tactical Doctrinal Taxonomy, 3-19  
Tactical Echelons, 3-11  
Tactical Enabling Tasks, 3-2  
Tactical Level of War, 3-2, 3-17  
Tactical Mission Tasks, 3-17, 3-18  
Targeting (D3A), 5-4, 5-25  
Task Organization, 2-29  
Task-Organizing, 1-42  
Tasks and Systems Integration, 7-24  
Tempo, 1-52  
Tenets of Unified Land Operations, 1-36  
Terrain and Weather, 4-6  
Theater Closing, 6-28  
Theater Opening, 6-28  
Threats, 1-7, 1-9  
Threats and Hazards, 4-6, 7-26  
Threat and Hazard Assessment, 7-28  
Title 10 Sustainment Requirements, 6-7  
Transitioning in Decisive Action, 1-30  
Transitions, 1-53  
Transportation Operations, 6-37  
Troop Leading Procedures (TLP), 1-10

---

## U

Understanding, 2-18  
Unified Action, 1-8, 1-14

Unified Land Operations, 1-1  
*Goal*, 1-25  
*Foundations*, 1-25  
*Tenets*, 1-36  
*Underlying Logic*, 1-5

---

## V

Vulnerability Assessment, 7-30

---

## S


Warfighting Functions, 1-18, 1-23, 1-40  
Wide Area Security, 1-35

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## Z

Zone Reconnaissance, 4-9





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


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
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
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