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The Stability, Peace & Counterinsurgency SMARTbook

Nontraditional Approaches in a Dynamic Security Environment

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Preface

Nontraditional Approaches in a Dynamic Security Environment

In the complex, **dynamic strategic environment** of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security persist across the spectrum of conflict. The drivers of conflict emerge as numerous symptoms of crises worldwide. Achieving victory will assume new dimensions as we strengthen our ability to generate “**soft**” **power** to address root causes of conflict among the disenfranchised populations.

At the heart of this effort is a comprehensive approach to **stability operations** that integrates the tools of statecraft with our military forces, international partners, humanitarian organizations, and the private sector. Stability operations leverage the coercive and constructive capabilities of the military force to establish a safe and secure environment; facilitate reconciliation among local or regional adversaries; establish political, legal, social, and economic institutions; and facilitate the transition of responsibility to a legitimate civil authority.

Peace Operations are crisis response and limited contingency operations conducted by a combination of military forces and nonmilitary organizations to contain conflict, redress the peace, and shape the environment to support reconciliation and rebuilding and to facilitate the transition to legitimate governance.

A **counterinsurgency campaign** is a mix of offensive, defensive, and stability operations conducted along multiple lines of operations. It requires military forces to employ a mix of familiar combat tasks and skills more often associated with nonmilitary agencies and to be nation builders as well as warriors.

Civil-military operations are a primary military instrument to synchronize military and nonmilitary instruments of national power, particularly in support of stability, counterinsurgency and other operations dealing with asymmetric and irregular threats.

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Joint Publications (JPs)

JP 1	May 2007	Doctrine for the Armed Forces of the United States
JP 3-0 (Chg 1)	Feb 2008	Joint Operations
JP 3-07.1	Apr 2004	Joint Tactics, Techniques, and Procedures for Foreign Internal Defense (FID)
JP 3-07.3	Oct 2007	Peace Operations
JP 3-08	Mar 2006	Interagency, IGO and NGO Coordination (I & II)
JP 3-16	Mar 2007	Multinational Operations
JP 3-24	Oct 2009	Counterinsurgency Operations
JP 3-26	Nov 2009	Counterterrorism
JP 3-29	Mar 2009	Foreign Humanitarian Assistance
JP 3-53	Sept 2003	Joint Doctrine for Psychological Operations
JP 3-57	Jul 2008	Civil-Military Operations
JP 3-68	Jan 2007	Noncombatant Evacuation Operations
JP 5-0	Dec 2006	Joint Operation Planning

Army/Marine/Air Force Publications & Field Manuals (FMs)

FM 3-0	Feb 2008	Operations
FM 3-07	Sept 2008	Stability Operations
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DODD 5105.65	Sept 2003	Defense Security Cooperation Agency (DSCA) (incorporating Change 1)



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I. Stability Operations - The Strategic Context

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept '08), chap. 1.

I. The Strategic Approach

In the complex, dynamic strategic environment of the 21st century, significant challenges to sustainable peace and security persist across the spectrum of conflict. In this world of sovereign states, unequal in development and resources, tension and conflict are ubiquitous. In this era of persistent conflict, rapidly evolving terrorist structures, transnational crime, and ethnic violence continue to complicate international relations. These conditions create belts of state fragility and instability that present a grave threat to national security.



Sources of instability that push parties toward open conflict, known as drivers of conflict, include religious fanaticism, global competition for resources, climate change, residual territorial claims, ideology, ethnic tension, elitism, greed, and the desire for power. The drivers of conflict emerge as numerous symptoms of crises worldwide. (A driver with Security Company, Combat Logistics Battalion 6, 1st Marine Logistics Group, posts security outside his vehicle during a maintenance halt outside of Rawah. USMC photo by Cpl. GP Ingersoll.)

Any integrated approach to stability operations requires a framework that applies across the spectrum of conflict, from stable peace to general war:

- To support a partner nation during peacetime military engagement
- After a natural or man-made disaster as part of a humanitarian-based limited intervention
- During peace operations to enforce international peace agreements
- To support a legitimate host-nation government during irregular warfare
- During major combat operations to establish conditions that facilitate post-conflict activities
- In a post-conflict environment following general cessation of organized hostilities

National Strategy

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept. '08), pp. 1-10 to 1-13.

National strategy is based on a distinctly American policy of internationalism that reflects the interests and values of the country. It clearly aims to make the world a safer, better place, where a community of nations lives in relative peace. To that end, the National Security Strategy and subordinate supporting strategies focus on a path to progress that promotes political and economic freedom, peaceful relations with other nations, and universal respect for human dignity.

The body of security strategy that shapes the conduct of stability operations includes the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy, and The National Military Strategy of the United States of America (known as the National Military Strategy). Related strategies include the National Strategy for Combating Terrorism, the National Strategy for Homeland Security, and the National Strategy to Combat Weapons of Mass Destruction. Together with national policy, strategy provides the broad direction necessary to conduct operations to support national interests.

1. National Security Strategy

Fragile states tend to attract destabilizing forces, manifesting the potentially dangerous effects of rapid globalization. This poses a national security challenge unforeseen even a decade ago yet central to today's strategic environment. While the phenomenon of fragile states is not new, the need to provide a stabilizing influence is more critical than ever. This challenge is at the core of the current National Security Strategy. Essentially, national strategy aims to:

- Promote freedom, justice, and human dignity while working to end tyranny, to promote effective democracies, and to extend prosperity through free trade and wise development policies
- Confront challenges of the strategic environment by leading a growing community of nations to defeat the threats of pandemic disease, the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction, terrorism, international crime, human trafficking, and natural disasters

The National Security Strategy outlines the President's vision for providing enduring security for the American people in a volatile, uncertain, and complex strategic environment. It sets a course for statecraft, providing the broad national strategy for applying the instruments of national power to further U.S. interests globally. At the heart of this strategy is the nation's approach to stability operations: to help create a world of legitimate, well-governed states that can meet the needs of their citizens and conduct themselves responsibly in the international system.

The National Security Strategy addresses stability operations within the broad engagement strategy for regional conflict. These regional conflicts significantly threaten national security; they rarely remain isolated and often devolve into humanitarian tragedy or anarchy. External actors exploit them to further their own ends, as Al Qaeda continues to do in Afghanistan and Pakistan. Even when a particular conflict does not directly affect national security, the long-term interests of the Nation often are affected. For this reason, the national strategy identifies three levels of engagement for addressing regional conflict:

- Conflict prevention and resolution
- Conflict intervention
- Post-conflict reconstruction and stabilization

The most effective long-term measure for conflict prevention and resolution is the promotion of democracy and economic development. Effective democracies generally

resolve disputes through peaceful means, either bilaterally or through other regional states or international institutions. Stability tasks executed as part of a theater security cooperation plan under the operational theme of peacetime military engagement generally fall in this category.

Conflicts that threaten the Nation's security, interests, or values may require direct intervention to restore peace and stability. Stability tasks executed at the higher end of the spectrum of conflict, typically under the operational themes of major combat operations or irregular warfare, fall into this category.

Reconstruction is the process of rebuilding degraded, damaged, or destroyed political, socioeconomic, and physical infrastructure of a country or territory to create the foundation for long-term development. Stabilization is the process by which underlying tensions that might lead to resurgence in violence and a breakdown in law and order are managed and reduced, while efforts are made to support preconditions for successful long-term development.

2. National Defense Strategy

Reinforcing the direction of the National Security Strategy, the National Defense Strategy emphasizes the threat to national security posed by the inability of fragile states to police themselves or to work in cooperation with neighbor states to ensure long-term security. These states often undermine regional stability, threatening broader national interests. The National Defense Strategy recognizes the need for building partner capacity in these states. Built on the understanding that the national security of the United States closely ties to security within the broader international system, the National Defense Strategy focuses on the use of programs to build partnerships that strengthen the host nation's ability to confront security challenges. Security cooperation, the principal vehicle for building security capacity, supports these states by:

- Encouraging partner nations to assume lead roles in areas that represent the common interests of the United States and the host nation
- Encouraging partner nations to increase their capability and willingness to participate in a coalition with U.S. forces
- Facilitating cooperation with partner militaries and ministries of defense
- Spurring the military transformation of allied partner nations by developing multinational command and control, training and education, concept development and experimentation, and security assessment framework

The National Defense Strategy also recognizes the need to foster interagency coordination and integration in these efforts. Such efforts draw a vital link between the Department of Defense and Department of State in the conduct of stability operations. The National Defense Strategy emphasizes the need to establish conditions of enduring security to support stability operations, necessary to the success of the other instruments of national power. Unless the security environment supports using civilian agencies and organizations, military forces must be prepared to perform those nonmilitary tasks normally the responsibility of others. Thus, the National Defense Strategy clearly establishes the intent of the Secretary of Defense to focus efforts on tasks directly associated with establishing favorable long-term security conditions.

3. National Military Strategy

Prepared by the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Military Strategy is consistent with the National Security Strategy and National Defense Strategy. It specifies the ends, ways, and means necessary to ensure national security and interests, and to pursue national interests at home and abroad. It also describes and analyzes the strategic environment as it affects military operations, as well as the most significant threats in that environment.

II. Lethal and Non-Lethal Actions

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept. '08), pp. 2-3 to 2-4. See also p. 2-31.

In the conduct of full spectrum operations, an inherent, complementary relationship exists between lethal and nonlethal actions; every situation requires a different combination of violence and restraint. Lethal actions are critical to accomplishing offensive and defensive missions. They leverage swift, decisive force to impose friendly will on enemy forces. Nonlethal actions are vital contributors to all operations but are typically decisive only in the execution of stability tasks.

Generally, stability operations require a greater emphasis on nonlethal actions.

Nonlethal actions expand the options available to commanders to achieve their objectives. Conditions may limit the conduct of lethal actions, and forces must be organized appropriately to reflect this change in emphasis. Nonlethal actions range from constructive activities focused on building institutional capacity and social well-being to coercive activities intended to compel certain behaviors. They may include a wide range of intelligence-gathering, disruptive, and other activities. They may also include aspects of command and control warfare, nonlethal fires, or other technological means that aim to alter the behavior of an adversary or impair, disrupt, or delay hostile forces, functions, and facilities.

Sometimes, just the threat of violent action is enough to compel the enemy to yield to friendly will and force a settlement. In stability operations, military forces combine various lethal and nonlethal actions to accomplish the mission; within the security sector, for example, lethal action is often critical to overcoming violent opposition, yet enduring success is generally achieved through nonlethal activities. Stability operations emphasize nonlethal, constructive actions by military forces operating among the local populace; however, the more coercive aspects of nonlethal actions may prove equally critical to success.



Well-trained, equipped, and led forces represent a potent combination of lethal and nonlethal capabilities. Often, the presence of military forces alone influences human behavior; demonstrating the potential for lethal action helps to maintain order. Maintaining order is vital to establishing a safe, secure environment. Even though stability operations emphasize nonlethal actions, the ability to engage potential enemies with decisive lethal force remains a sound deterrent and is often a key to success. (Dept. of Army photo)

III. Essential Stability Tasks

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept '08), chap. 3.

I. Primary Stability Tasks

Stability operations aim to stabilize the environment enough so the host nation can begin to resolve the root causes of conflict and state failure. These operations establish a safe, secure environment that facilitates reconciliation among local or regional adversaries. Stability operations aim to establish conditions that support the transition to legitimate host-nation governance, a functioning civil society, and a viable market economy.

Essential Stability Tasks



Establish Civil Security



Establish Civil Control



Restore Essential Services



Support to Governance



Support to Economic & Infrastructure Development

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, fig 2-2, p. 2-5.

The size of the force and combination of tasks necessary to stabilize conditions depend on the situation in the operational area. When a functional, effective host-nation government exists, military forces work through and with local civil authorities. Together they restore stability and order and may be required to reform the security institutions that foster long-term development. In this situation, the size of the force and the scope of the mission are more limited. However, in a worst-case engagement scenario, the security environment is in chaos, and the state is in crisis or has failed altogether. In this situation, international law requires the military force to focus on essential tasks that establish a safe, secure environment and address the immediate humanitarian needs of the local populace. This requires a force capable of securing borders, protecting the population, holding individuals accountable for criminal activities, regulating the behavior of individuals or groups that pose a security risk, reestablishing essential civil services, and setting conditions in the operational area that enable the success of other actors.

Establishing Transitional Military Authority

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept. '08), pp. 5-2 to 5-3.

A transitional military authority is a temporary military government exercising the functions of civil administration in the absence of a legitimate civil authority. It restores and maintains public order, ensures the safety and security of the local populace, and provides essential civil services. Transitional military authority is not limited to the occupation of enemy territory. During operations outside the United States and its territories, necessity may also require establishing transitional military authority in various situations, including:

- An allied or neutral territory liberated from enemy forces
- A technically neutral or allied territory proven to be hostile
- Ungoverned areas

The time during which a transitional military authority exercises authority varies based on the requirements of both the military operation and international law. To establish transitional military authority, commanders may require from the host-nation population a level of obedience commensurate with military necessity. Such obedience provides security of military forces, maintenance of law and order, and proper administration of the operational area. Commanders can reward civil obedience by reducing infringement on the individual liberties of the local populace.

The degree of control exercised by a transitional military authority varies greatly due to several factors, including:

- The legal authorities of the military commander under international law.
- The relationship that previously existed between the USG and the host-nation government
- Existing attitudes and the level of cooperation of the host nation's national, regional, and local leaders, and the local populace
- Ongoing and projected military operations
- The presence of hostile or enemy forces
- The level of civil obedience

As conditions in the territory subject to transitional military authority stabilize, the degree of control exercised by a military authority can decrease. Authority and control can transfer either to the legitimate sovereign or to another civil authority.

Command Responsibility for Transitional Military Authority

The exercise of transitional military authority is a command responsibility, exercised in accordance with international law. To ensure that understanding and cultural awareness inform planning and the conduct of transitional military authority, commanders at all levels maintain open, continuous dialog. They also collaborate among the echelons of command and various agencies, organizations, and institutions that share in efforts to restore legitimate governance to the host nation.

The authority to implement transitional military authority resides with the President and is exercised through the Secretary of Defense and the joint force commander. Broad policy formulation and initial planning for transitional military authority is conducted under the direction of the Joint Chiefs of Staff. However, the joint force commander, key staff, and subordinate Service component and allied commanders also participate to a lesser degree.

VI. (PRT) Provincial Reconstruction Teams

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept '08), app. F.

A provincial reconstruction team (PRT) is an interim civil-military organization designed to operate in an area with unstable or limited security. The PRT leverages all the instruments of national power—diplomatic, informational, military, and economic—to improve stability. However, the efforts of the PRT alone will not stabilize an area; the combined military and civil efforts are required to reduce conflict while developing the local institutions to take the lead in national governance, the provision of basic services, fostering economic development, and enforcement of rule of law.



A PRT is an essential part of a long-term strategy to transition the functions of security, governance, and economics to provincial governments. It is a potential combat multiplier for maneuver commanders performing governance and economics functions and providing expertise to programs designed to strengthen infrastructure and the institutions of local governments. The PRT leverages the principles of reconstruction and development to build host-nation capacity while speeding the transition of security, justice, and economic development to the control of the host nation. (USMC photo by Lance Cpl. James Purschwitz)

The development community uses specific principles for reconstruction and development. These enduring principles represent years of practical application and understanding of the cultural and socioeconomic elements of developing nations. Understanding these principles enables development officials to incorporate techniques and procedures effectively to improve economic and social conditions for the local populace. By applying the principles of reconstruction and development, the development community significantly improves the probability of success. Timely emphasis on the principles increases the opportunity for success and provides the flexibility to adapt to the changing conditions. This community assumes risk in projects and programs by failing to adhere to the principles.

I. Principles of PRT

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Sept '08), pp. 4-1 to 4-4.

A PRT does not conduct military operations or directly assist host-nation military forces. The PRT helps the central ministries distribute funds to respective provincial representatives for implementing projects. This assistance encompasses more than a distribution of funds; it includes mentoring, management, and accountability.

PRT Principles



Governance



Security



Reconstruction

Ref: FM 3-07, *Stability Operations*, pp. 4-1 to 4-5.

A. Governance

Within an operational area, a PRT focuses on improving the provincial government's ability to provide effective governance and essential services. Strengthening the provincial government is important given the decentralization of authority common to a post-conflict environment. For example, under Saddam Hussein's regime in Iraq, provincial officials received detailed directions from Baghdad. Under the current structure, provincial officials take initiatives without direct guidance from Baghdad.

The United States Agency for International Development (USAID) contracts a three-person team of civilian specialists to provide training and technical assistance programs. These programs aim to improve the efficiency of provincial governments. They do this by providing policy analysis, training, and technical assistance to national ministries, their provincial representatives, provincial governors, and provincial councils. The team of civilian specialists works directly with provincial officials to increase competence and efficiency. For example, they help provincial council members conduct meetings, develop budgets, and oversee provincial government activities. The team also encourages transparency and popular participation by working with citizens and community organizations, hosting conferences, and promoting public forums.

The USAID team contains members with expertise in local government, financial management, and municipal planning. Up to 70 percent of the contracted staff members come from regional countries and include local professionals. Additional contracted experts are on call from regional offices. The USAID requires contract advisors that speak the host-nation language and possess extensive professional experience. USAID-trained instructors present training programs based on professionally developed modules in the host-nation language. The training and technical assistance programs emphasize practical application with focus areas in computers, planning, public administration, and provision of public services.

B. Security

The absence of security impacts the effectiveness of PRT operations and efforts to develop effective local governments. Provincial governors and other senior officials may be intimidated, threatened, and assassinated in limited or unsecured areas. Provincial councils may potentially reduce or eliminate regular meetings if security deteriorates. Additionally, provincial-level ministry representatives could become reluctant to attend work because of security concerns. PRT personnel and local officials may lose the ability to meet openly or visit provincial government centers and military installations in limited security environments. During security alerts, PRT civilian personnel may be restricted to base, preventing interaction with host-nation counterparts. Unstable security situations limit PRT personnel from promoting economic development by counseling local officials, encouraging local leaders and business owners, and motivating outside investors.

Moving PRT personnel with military escorts contributes to the overall security presence. However, the PRT does not conduct military operations nor does it assist host-nation military forces. The only security role assigned to a PRT is protection; military forces provide vehicles and an advisor to escort PRT personnel to meetings with local officials. Military personnel assigned to escort civilian PRT members receive training in protecting civilian PRT personnel under an agreement with the Department of State. The training is designed to reinforce understanding of escort responsibilities and to avoid endangering PRT civilian personnel. Military forces escorting PRT personnel should not combine this responsibility with other missions. The problem of providing PRT civilian personnel with security is compounded by competing protection priorities. Such priorities often prevent dedicated security teams in most situations limiting security teams to available personnel.

C. Reconstruction

The USAID representative of the PRT is responsible for developing the PRT economic development work plan including its assistance projects. The PRT emphasizes the construction of infrastructure, including schools, clinics, community centers, and government buildings. The PRT also focuses on developing human capacity through training and advisory programs.

Funds and financing for microcredit projects from the Commanders' Emergency Response Program are necessary to build host-nation capacity and strengthen the legitimacy of the governance. U.S. funds and other sources of outside funding are vital; however, host-nation governments should budget for the long-term financing of most projects. The PRT exists to encourage central ministries in distributing funds to provincial representatives. These funds are for project implementation, including accountability and management of funds.

Provincial reconstruction development committees (PRDCs) prioritize provincial development projects and ensure the necessary funding for economic progress. The PRDC was developed before the creation of the current PRT structure. The PRDC contains a USAID representative, a civil affairs advisor, one or more PRT members, and host-nation officials. A PRDC develops a list of potential projects after consulting with the national ministries, provincial authorities, and local citizens. It aims to coordinate projects with both national and provincial development plans. The PRDC examines possible funding sources to determine how project funding will be provided.

The PRT provincial program manager (a Department of State employee) works with the PRDC to review projects and determine compliance with project funding guidelines. The PRT engineer reviews construction projects to determine their technical feasibility. The list of projects is presented in a public forum to the provincial council for approval following PRDC deliberations. The list is presented to the host-nation coordination team. This team circulates the project list for final review and funding priority. A PRT has limited involvement in project implementation following project selection.

VII. Foreign Humanitarian Assistance (FHA)

Ref: JP 3-9, *Foreign Humanitarian Assistance* (Mar '09) and FM 3-07, *Stability Operations* (Oct '08), app. E.

Foreign humanitarian assistance (FHA) consists of Department of Defense (DOD) activities, normally in support of the United States Agency for International Development (USAID) or Department of State (DOS), conducted outside the United States, its territories, and possessions to relieve or reduce human suffering, disease, hunger, or privation.

DOD has unique assets for effective response and can play a key role in foreign humanitarian crises. For example, the US military possesses exceptional operational reach that can be employed to enhance an initial response. Additionally, the US military augments private sector capability and thus limits threats to regional stability. Furthermore, the US military's unmatched capabilities in logistics, command and control (C2), communications, and mobility are able to provide rapid and robust response to dynamic and evolving situations among vastly different military, civilian, and government entities.

Statutory authority for USG agencies to provide FHA is contained in the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, in Title 22, US Code. This legislation provides a blueprint for USG engagement with friendly nations. DOD Directive 5100.46, Foreign Disaster Relief, establishes policy and provides for component participation in foreign disaster relief operations only after a determination is made by DOS that foreign disaster relief shall be provided.

Typical FHA Missions and Operations

- **Relief missions** include prompt aid that can be used to alleviate the suffering of disaster victims. Potential relief roles for US forces include immediate response to prevent loss of life and destruction of property, construction of basic sanitation facilities and shelters, and provision of food and medical care.
- **Dislocated civilian support missions** are specifically designed to support the assistance and protection for dislocated civilians. Support missions may include camp organization (basic construction and administration); provision of care (food, supplies, medical attention, and protection); and placement (movement or relocation to other countries, camps, and locations).
- **Security missions** may include establishing and maintaining conditions for the provision of FHA by organizations of the world relief community. In some cases, the affected country will not be able to meet the required conditions and may request assistance from US military forces to secure areas for storage of relief material until it can be distributed to the affected population. Other tasks may involve providing protection and armed escorts for convoys and personnel delivering emergency aid, protection of shelters for dislocated civilians, and security for multinational forces, nongovernmental organizations (NGOs), and intergovernmental organizations (IGOs).
- **Technical assistance and support functions** may take the form of advice and selected training, assessments, manpower, and equipment.
- **Foreign consequence management (FCM)** is DOD assistance provided by the USG to a HN to mitigate the effects of a deliberate or inadvertent chemical, biological, radiological, nuclear, and high-yield explosives attack or event and to restore essential government services.

I. The Red Cross Code of Conduct

Ref: FM 3-07, Stability Operations (Sept '08), pp. E-5 to E-7.

In the summer of 1994, the code of conduct for the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement and nongovernmental organizations in disaster relief was developed. Eight of the world's largest disaster response agencies agreed on this code. It represents the body of international standards for disaster response. Before then, no accepted body of professional standards existed to guide their work. Today, the international community uses it to monitor its own standards of relief delivery and to encourage other agencies to set similar standards. Like most professional codes, the code of conduct is voluntary. It applies to any nongovernmental organization, national or international, regardless of size.

1. The Humanitarian Imperative Comes First

The right to receive humanitarian assistance, and to offer it, is a fundamental humanitarian principle that all citizens of all countries should have. As part of the international community, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement recognizes its obligation to provide humanitarian assistance wherever needed. Hence, to provide humanitarian assistance, organizations need unimpeded access to affected populations. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement's motivation to respond to disaster is to alleviate human suffering. It strives to help those least able to withstand the stress caused by disaster. Giving humanitarian aid is not a partisan or political act and should not be viewed as such.

2. Aid Is Given Regardless of Race, Creed, or Nationality

Aid priorities are calculated on need alone. Wherever possible, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement provides relief aid after thoroughly assessing the situation. It assesses the needs of the disaster victims and the local capacities already in place to meet those needs. In all of its programs, the Movement provides aid in proportion to the need. Human suffering must be alleviated whenever it is found; life is as precious in one area as another. The Movement recognizes the crucial role women play in disaster-prone communities. It tries to support, not diminish, their role with its aid programs. Implementing such a universal, impartial, and independent policy is effective only when relief organizations have access to resources and all disaster victims.

3. Aid Will Not Be Used to Further Certain Standpoints

Humanitarian aid will be given according to the need of individuals, families, and communities. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement affirms that assistance does not depend on the recipients to adhere to political or religious opinions. The Movement does not tie the promise, delivery, or distribution of assistance to the embracing or acceptance of a particular political or religious creed.

4. Agents of Aid Shall Not Act as Instruments of Government Foreign Policy

NGHAs act independently from governments. They form their own policies and implementation strategies. They do not seek to implement the policy of any government unless it coincides with their own independent policy. They never knowingly or through negligence allow themselves to be used to gather information. Information could be politically, military, or economically sensitive to governments or other bodies that may serve purposes other than those that are strictly humanitarian. NGHAs do not act as instruments of foreign policy of donor organizations. They use the assistance received to respond to needs. This assistance is not driven by the need to use surpluses or by the donor's political interest. Agents of aid value and promote the voluntary giving of labor and finances by individuals to support their work. To protect independence, agents of aid avoid depending on a single funding source.

5. Agents of Aid Shall Respect Culture and Custom

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement tries to respect the culture, structures, and customs of the communities and countries in which the members work.

6. Agents of Aid Shall Attempt to Build Disaster Response on Local Capacities

All people and communities—even in disaster—possess capacities as well as vulnerabilities. Where possible, the International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement strengthens these capacities by employing local staff, purchasing local materials, and trading with local companies. Where possible, these agents of aid work through local nongovernmental organizations providing humanitarian assistance as partners in planning and implementation; they cooperate with local governments where appropriate.

7. Involve Program Beneficiaries in Managing Relief Aid

Disaster response assistance should never be forced on those needing assistance. Effective relief and lasting rehabilitation can best be achieved when the intended beneficiaries help to design, manage, and implement the assistance program. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement strives to achieve full community participation in relief and rehabilitation programs.

8. Aid Must Strive to Reduce Future Vulnerabilities and Meet Basic Needs

All relief actions affect the prospects for long-term development, either positively or negatively. Recognizing this, the agents of aid strive to implement relief programs that actively reduce the beneficiaries' vulnerability to future disasters and help create sustainable lifestyles. These agents pay particular attention to environmental concerns when designing and managing relief programs. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement tries to minimize the negative impact of humanitarian assistance. The Movement tries to prevent the beneficiary from depending upon external aid for a long time.

9. Agents of Aid Hold Themselves Accountable

The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement often acts as an institutional link between those who wish to assist and those who need assistance during disasters. The Movement therefore holds itself accountable to both constituencies. All dealings with donors and beneficiaries are open and transparent. The agents of aid report on activities, both from a financial perspective and the perspective of effectiveness. They recognize they must appropriately monitor aid distributions and regularly assess the impact of disaster assistance. The International Red Cross and Red Crescent Movement openly reports on the impact of its work and the factors limiting or enhancing that impact. Relief programs are based on high standards of professionalism and expertise to minimize the wasting of valuable resources.

10. Agents of Aid Recognize Disaster Victims as Dignified Humans

Respect for the disaster victim as an equal partner in action should never be lost. In public information, the Movement portrays an objective image of the disaster situation. This image highlights the capacities and aspirations of disaster victims, not just their vulnerabilities and fears. While working with the media to enhance public response, the Movement prohibits external or internal demands for publicity to take precedence over the principle of maximizing overall relief assistance. These agents of aid avoid competing with other disaster response agencies for media coverage. In some situations, coverage may hinder the service provided to the beneficiaries or the security. Humanitarian response applies to men and women—both genders are to be helped equally. Bringing a gender perspective illuminates how gender inequalities, roles, responsibilities, and identities shape and influence vulnerabilities and capacities in a crisis.



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